Fix#32427
(cherry picked from commit 35bcd667b23de29a7b0d0bf1090fb10961d3aca3)
Conflicts:
- tests/integration/repo_tag_test.go
Resolved by manually copying the added test, and also manually
adjusting the imported Go modules.
It's unnecessary to query the team table if the repository is not under
organization when getting assignees.
(cherry picked from commit 1887c75c35c1d16372b1dbe2b792e374b558ce1f)
Add the default value of the purpose field to both the table and the
migration. The table in v9 and v7 backport already have the default
value.
ALTER TABLE `forgejo_auth_token` ADD `purpose` TEXT NOT NULL [] - Cannot add a NOT NULL column with default value NULL
- Ensure that the specified push mirror ID belongs to the requested
repository, otherwise it is possible to modify the intervals of the push
mirrors that do not belong to the requested repository.
- Integration test added.
- If a repository is forked to a private or limited user/organization,
the fork should not be visible in the list of forks depending on the
doer requesting the list of forks.
- Added integration testing for web and API route.
- The RSS and atom feed for branches exposes details about the code, it
therefore should be guarded by the requirement that the doer has access
to the code of that repository.
- Added integration testing.
- _Simply_ add `^$` to regexp that didn't had it yet, this avoids any
content being allowed that simply had the allowed content as a
substring.
- Fix file-preview regex to have `$` instead of `*`.
- This unifies the security behavior of enrolling security keys with
enrolling TOTP as a 2FA method. When TOTP is enrolled, you cannot use
basic authorization (user:password) to make API request on behalf of the
user, this is now also the case when you enroll security keys.
- The usage of access tokens are the only method to make API requests on
behalf of the user when a 2FA method is enrolled for the user.
- Integration test added.
- Consider private/limited users in the `AccessibleRepositoryCondition`
query, previously this only considered private/limited organization.
This limits the ability for anomynous users to do code search on
private/limited user's repository
- Unit test added.
- If the incoming mail feature is enabled, tokens are being sent with
outgoing mails. These tokens contains information about what type of
action is allow with such token (such as replying to a certain issue
ID), to verify these tokens the code uses the HMAC-SHA256 construction.
- The output of the HMAC is truncated to 80 bits, because this is
recommended by RFC2104, but RFC2104 actually doesn't recommend this. It
recommends, if truncation should need to take place, it should use
max(80, hash_len/2) of the leftmost bits. For HMAC-SHA256 this works out
to 128 bits instead of the currently used 80 bits.
- Update to token version 2 and disallow any usage of token version 1,
token version 2 are generated with 128 bits of HMAC output.
- Add test to verify the deprecation of token version 1 and a general
MAC check test.
- Add a `purpose` column, this allows the `forgejo_auth_token` table to
be used by other parts of Forgejo, while still enjoying the
no-compromise architecture.
- Remove the 'roll your own crypto' time limited code functions and
migrate them to the `forgejo_auth_token` table. This migration ensures
generated codes can only be used for their purpose and ensure they are
invalidated after their usage by deleting it from the database, this
also should help making auditing of the security code easier, as we're
no longer trying to stuff a lot of data into a HMAC construction.
-Helper functions are rewritten to ensure a safe-by-design approach to
these tokens.
- Add the `forgejo_auth_token` to dbconsistency doctor and add it to the
`deleteUser` function.
- TODO: Add cron job to delete expired authorization tokens.
- Unit and integration tests added.
