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// Copyright 2015 Matthew Holt and The Caddy Authors
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
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package caddytls
import (
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"context"
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"crypto/tls"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"runtime/debug"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/caddyserver/certmagic"
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"go.uber.org/zap"
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"go.uber.org/zap/zapcore"
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"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2"
"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyevents"
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)
func init ( ) {
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caddy . RegisterModule ( TLS { } )
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caddy . RegisterModule ( AutomateLoader { } )
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}
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var (
certCache * certmagic . Cache
certCacheMu sync . RWMutex
)
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// TLS provides TLS facilities including certificate
// loading and management, client auth, and more.
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type TLS struct {
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// Certificates to load into memory for quick recall during
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// TLS handshakes. Each key is the name of a certificate
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// loader module.
//
// The "automate" certificate loader module can be used to
// specify a list of subjects that need certificates to be
// managed automatically. The first matching automation
// policy will be applied to manage the certificate(s).
//
// All loaded certificates get pooled
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// into the same cache and may be used to complete TLS
// handshakes for the relevant server names (SNI).
// Certificates loaded manually (anything other than
// "automate") are not automatically managed and will
// have to be refreshed manually before they expire.
CertificatesRaw caddy . ModuleMap ` json:"certificates,omitempty" caddy:"namespace=tls.certificates" `
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// Configures certificate automation.
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Automation * AutomationConfig ` json:"automation,omitempty" `
// Configures session ticket ephemeral keys (STEKs).
SessionTickets * SessionTicketService ` json:"session_tickets,omitempty" `
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// Configures the in-memory certificate cache.
Cache * CertCacheOptions ` json:"cache,omitempty" `
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// Disables OCSP stapling for manually-managed certificates only.
// To configure OCSP stapling for automated certificates, use an
// automation policy instead.
//
// Disabling OCSP stapling puts clients at greater risk, reduces their
// privacy, and usually lowers client performance. It is NOT recommended
// to disable this unless you are able to justify the costs.
// EXPERIMENTAL. Subject to change.
DisableOCSPStapling bool ` json:"disable_ocsp_stapling,omitempty" `
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// Disables checks in certmagic that the configured storage is ready
// and able to handle writing new content to it. These checks are
// intended to prevent information loss (newly issued certificates), but
// can be expensive on the storage.
//
// Disabling these checks should only be done when the storage
// can be trusted to have enough capacity and no other problems.
// EXPERIMENTAL. Subject to change.
DisableStorageCheck bool ` json:"disable_storage_check,omitempty" `
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// Disables the automatic cleanup of the storage backend.
// This is useful when TLS is not being used to store certificates
// and the user wants run their server in a read-only mode.
//
// Storage cleaning creates two files: instance.uuid and last_clean.json.
// The instance.uuid file is used to identify the instance of Caddy
// in a cluster. The last_clean.json file is used to store the last
// time the storage was cleaned.
// EXPERIMENTAL. Subject to change.
DisableStorageClean bool ` json:"disable_storage_clean,omitempty" `
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certificateLoaders [ ] CertificateLoader
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automateNames [ ] string
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ctx caddy . Context
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storageCleanTicker * time . Ticker
storageCleanStop chan struct { }
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logger * zap . Logger
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events * caddyevents . App
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// set of subjects with managed certificates,
// and hashes of manually-loaded certificates
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// (managing's value is an optional issuer key, for distinction)
managing , loaded map [ string ] string
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}
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// CaddyModule returns the Caddy module information.
func ( TLS ) CaddyModule ( ) caddy . ModuleInfo {
return caddy . ModuleInfo {
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ID : "tls" ,
New : func ( ) caddy . Module { return new ( TLS ) } ,
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}
}
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// Provision sets up the configuration for the TLS app.
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func ( t * TLS ) Provision ( ctx caddy . Context ) error {
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eventsAppIface , err := ctx . App ( "events" )
if err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "getting events app: %v" , err )
}
t . events = eventsAppIface . ( * caddyevents . App )
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t . ctx = ctx
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t . logger = ctx . Logger ( )
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repl := caddy . NewReplacer ( )
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t . managing , t . loaded = make ( map [ string ] string ) , make ( map [ string ] string )
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// set up a new certificate cache; this (re)loads all certificates
cacheOpts := certmagic . CacheOptions {
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GetConfigForCert : func ( cert certmagic . Certificate ) ( * certmagic . Config , error ) {
return t . getConfigForName ( cert . Names [ 0 ] ) , nil
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} ,
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Logger : t . logger . Named ( "cache" ) ,
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}
if t . Automation != nil {
cacheOpts . OCSPCheckInterval = time . Duration ( t . Automation . OCSPCheckInterval )
cacheOpts . RenewCheckInterval = time . Duration ( t . Automation . RenewCheckInterval )
}
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if t . Cache != nil {
cacheOpts . Capacity = t . Cache . Capacity
}
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if cacheOpts . Capacity <= 0 {
cacheOpts . Capacity = 10000
}
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certCacheMu . Lock ( )
if certCache == nil {
certCache = certmagic . NewCache ( cacheOpts )
} else {
certCache . SetOptions ( cacheOpts )
}
certCacheMu . Unlock ( )
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// certificate loaders
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val , err := ctx . LoadModule ( t , "CertificatesRaw" )
if err != nil {
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return fmt . Errorf ( "loading certificate loader modules: %s" , err )
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}
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for modName , modIface := range val . ( map [ string ] any ) {
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if modName == "automate" {
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// special case; these will be loaded in later using our automation facilities,
// which we want to avoid doing during provisioning
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if automateNames , ok := modIface . ( * AutomateLoader ) ; ok && automateNames != nil {
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repl := caddy . NewReplacer ( )
subjects := make ( [ ] string , len ( * automateNames ) )
for i , sub := range * automateNames {
subjects [ i ] = repl . ReplaceAll ( sub , "" )
}
t . automateNames = subjects
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} else {
return fmt . Errorf ( "loading certificates with 'automate' requires array of strings, got: %T" , modIface )
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}
continue
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}
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t . certificateLoaders = append ( t . certificateLoaders , modIface . ( CertificateLoader ) )
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}
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// on-demand permission module
if t . Automation != nil && t . Automation . OnDemand != nil && t . Automation . OnDemand . PermissionRaw != nil {
if t . Automation . OnDemand . Ask != "" {
return fmt . Errorf ( "on-demand TLS config conflict: both 'ask' endpoint and a 'permission' module are specified; 'ask' is deprecated, so use only the permission module" )
}
val , err := ctx . LoadModule ( t . Automation . OnDemand , "PermissionRaw" )
if err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "loading on-demand TLS permission module: %v" , err )
}
t . Automation . OnDemand . permission = val . ( OnDemandPermission )
}
// run replacer on ask URL (for environment variables) -- return errors to prevent surprises (#5036)
if t . Automation != nil && t . Automation . OnDemand != nil && t . Automation . OnDemand . Ask != "" {
t . Automation . OnDemand . Ask , err = repl . ReplaceOrErr ( t . Automation . OnDemand . Ask , true , true )
if err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "preparing 'ask' endpoint: %v" , err )
}
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perm := PermissionByHTTP {
Endpoint : t . Automation . OnDemand . Ask ,
}
if err := perm . Provision ( ctx ) ; err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "provisioning 'ask' module: %v" , err )
}
t . Automation . OnDemand . permission = perm
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}
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// automation/management policies
if t . Automation == nil {
t . Automation = new ( AutomationConfig )
}
t . Automation . defaultPublicAutomationPolicy = new ( AutomationPolicy )
err = t . Automation . defaultPublicAutomationPolicy . Provision ( t )
if err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "provisioning default public automation policy: %v" , err )
}
for _ , n := range t . automateNames {
// if any names specified by the "automate" loader do not qualify for a public
// certificate, we should initialize a default internal automation policy
// (but we don't want to do this unnecessarily, since it may prompt for password!)
if certmagic . SubjectQualifiesForPublicCert ( n ) {
continue
}
t . Automation . defaultInternalAutomationPolicy = & AutomationPolicy {
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IssuersRaw : [ ] json . RawMessage { json . RawMessage ( ` { "module":"internal"} ` ) } ,
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}
err = t . Automation . defaultInternalAutomationPolicy . Provision ( t )
if err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "provisioning default internal automation policy: %v" , err )
}
break
}
for i , ap := range t . Automation . Policies {
err := ap . Provision ( t )
if err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "provisioning automation policy %d: %v" , i , err )
}
}
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// session ticket ephemeral keys (STEK) service and provider
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if t . SessionTickets != nil {
err := t . SessionTickets . provision ( ctx )
if err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "provisioning session tickets configuration: %v" , err )
}
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}
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// load manual/static (unmanaged) certificates - we do this in
// provision so that other apps (such as http) can know which
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// certificates have been manually loaded, and also so that
// commands like validate can be a better test
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certCacheMu . RLock ( )
magic := certmagic . New ( certCache , certmagic . Config {
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Storage : ctx . Storage ( ) ,
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Logger : t . logger ,
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OnEvent : t . onEvent ,
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OCSP : certmagic . OCSPConfig {
DisableStapling : t . DisableOCSPStapling ,
} ,
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DisableStorageCheck : t . DisableStorageCheck ,
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} )
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certCacheMu . RUnlock ( )
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for _ , loader := range t . certificateLoaders {
certs , err := loader . LoadCertificates ( )
if err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "loading certificates: %v" , err )
}
for _ , cert := range certs {
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hash , err := magic . CacheUnmanagedTLSCertificate ( ctx , cert . Certificate , cert . Tags )
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if err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "caching unmanaged certificate: %v" , err )
}
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t . loaded [ hash ] = ""
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}
}
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return nil
}
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// Validate validates t's configuration.
func ( t * TLS ) Validate ( ) error {
if t . Automation != nil {
// ensure that host aren't repeated; since only the first
// automation policy is used, repeating a host in the lists
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// isn't useful and is probably a mistake; same for two
// catch-all/default policies
var hasDefault bool
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hostSet := make ( map [ string ] int )
for i , ap := range t . Automation . Policies {
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if len ( ap . subjects ) == 0 {
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if hasDefault {
return fmt . Errorf ( "automation policy %d is the second policy that acts as default/catch-all, but will never be used" , i )
}
hasDefault = true
}
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for _ , h := range ap . subjects {
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if first , ok := hostSet [ h ] ; ok {
return fmt . Errorf ( "automation policy %d: cannot apply more than one automation policy to host: %s (first match in policy %d)" , i , h , first )
}
hostSet [ h ] = i
}
}
}
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if t . Cache != nil {
if t . Cache . Capacity < 0 {
return fmt . Errorf ( "cache capacity must be >= 0" )
}
}
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return nil
}
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// Start activates the TLS module.
func ( t * TLS ) Start ( ) error {
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// warn if on-demand TLS is enabled but no restrictions are in place
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if t . Automation . OnDemand == nil || ( t . Automation . OnDemand . Ask == "" && t . Automation . OnDemand . permission == nil ) {
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for _ , ap := range t . Automation . Policies {
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if ap . OnDemand && ap . isWildcardOrDefault ( ) {
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if c := t . logger . Check ( zapcore . WarnLevel , "YOUR SERVER MAY BE VULNERABLE TO ABUSE: on-demand TLS is enabled, but no protections are in place" ) ; c != nil {
c . Write ( zap . String ( "docs" , "https://caddyserver.com/docs/automatic-https#on-demand-tls" ) )
}
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break
}
}
}
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// now that we are running, and all manual certificates have
// been loaded, time to load the automated/managed certificates
err := t . Manage ( t . automateNames )
if err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "automate: managing %v: %v" , t . automateNames , err )
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}
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if ! t . DisableStorageClean {
// start the storage cleaner goroutine and ticker,
// which cleans out expired certificates and more
t . keepStorageClean ( )
}
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return nil
}
// Stop stops the TLS module and cleans up any allocations.
func ( t * TLS ) Stop ( ) error {
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// stop the storage cleaner goroutine and ticker
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if t . storageCleanStop != nil {
close ( t . storageCleanStop )
}
if t . storageCleanTicker != nil {
t . storageCleanTicker . Stop ( )
}
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return nil
}
// Cleanup frees up resources allocated during Provision.
func ( t * TLS ) Cleanup ( ) error {
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// stop the session ticket rotation goroutine
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if t . SessionTickets != nil {
t . SessionTickets . stop ( )
}
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// if a new TLS app was loaded, remove certificates from the cache that are no longer
// being managed or loaded by the new config; if there is no more TLS app running,
// then stop cert maintenance and let the cert cache be GC'ed
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if nextTLS , err := caddy . ActiveContext ( ) . AppIfConfigured ( "tls" ) ; err == nil && nextTLS != nil {
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nextTLSApp := nextTLS . ( * TLS )
// compute which certificates were managed or loaded into the cert cache by this
// app instance (which is being stopped) that are not managed or loaded by the
// new app instance (which just started), and remove them from the cache
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var noLongerManaged [ ] certmagic . SubjectIssuer
var reManage , noLongerLoaded [ ] string
for subj , currentIssuerKey := range t . managing {
// It's a bit nuanced: managed certs can sometimes be different enough that we have to
// swap them out for a different one, even if they are for the same subject/domain.
// We consider "private" certs (internal CA/locally-trusted/etc) to be significantly
// distinct from "public" certs (production CAs/globally-trusted/etc) because of the
// implications when it comes to actual deployments: switching between an internal CA
// and a production CA, for example, is quite significant. Switching from one public CA
// to another, however, is not, and for our purposes we consider those to be the same.
// Anyway, if the next TLS app does not manage a cert for this name at all, definitely
// remove it from the cache. But if it does, and it's not the same kind of issuer/CA
// as we have, also remove it, so that it can swap it out for the right one.
if nextIssuerKey , ok := nextTLSApp . managing [ subj ] ; ! ok || nextIssuerKey != currentIssuerKey {
// next app is not managing a cert for this domain at all or is using a different issuer, so remove it
noLongerManaged = append ( noLongerManaged , certmagic . SubjectIssuer { Subject : subj , IssuerKey : currentIssuerKey } )
// then, if the next app is managing a cert for this name, but with a different issuer, re-manage it
if ok && nextIssuerKey != currentIssuerKey {
reManage = append ( reManage , subj )
}
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}
}
for hash := range t . loaded {
if _ , ok := nextTLSApp . loaded [ hash ] ; ! ok {
noLongerLoaded = append ( noLongerLoaded , hash )
}
}
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// remove the certs
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certCacheMu . RLock ( )
certCache . RemoveManaged ( noLongerManaged )
certCache . Remove ( noLongerLoaded )
certCacheMu . RUnlock ( )
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// give the new TLS app a "kick" to manage certs that it is configured for
// with its own configuration instead of the one we just evicted
if err := nextTLSApp . Manage ( reManage ) ; err != nil {
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if c := t . logger . Check ( zapcore . ErrorLevel , "re-managing unloaded certificates with new config" ) ; c != nil {
c . Write (
zap . Strings ( "subjects" , reManage ) ,
zap . Error ( err ) ,
)
}
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}
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} else {
// no more TLS app running, so delete in-memory cert cache
certCache . Stop ( )
certCacheMu . Lock ( )
certCache = nil
certCacheMu . Unlock ( )
}
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return nil
}
// Manage immediately begins managing names according to the
// matching automation policy.
func ( t * TLS ) Manage ( names [ ] string ) error {
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// for a large number of names, we can be more memory-efficient
// by making only one certmagic.Config for all the names that
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// use that config, rather than calling ManageAsync once for
// every name; so first, bin names by AutomationPolicy
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policyToNames := make ( map [ * AutomationPolicy ] [ ] string )
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for _ , name := range names {
ap := t . getAutomationPolicyForName ( name )
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policyToNames [ ap ] = append ( policyToNames [ ap ] , name )
}
// now that names are grouped by policy, we can simply make one
// certmagic.Config for each (potentially large) group of names
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// and call ManageAsync just once for the whole batch
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for ap , names := range policyToNames {
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err := ap . magic . ManageAsync ( t . ctx . Context , names )
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if err != nil {
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const maxNamesToDisplay = 100
if len ( names ) > maxNamesToDisplay {
names = append ( names [ : maxNamesToDisplay ] , fmt . Sprintf ( "(%d more...)" , len ( names ) - maxNamesToDisplay ) )
}
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return fmt . Errorf ( "automate: manage %v: %v" , names , err )
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}
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for _ , name := range names {
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// certs that are issued solely by our internal issuer are a little bit of
// a special case: if you have an initial config that manages example.com
// using internal CA, then after testing it you switch to a production CA,
// you wouldn't want to keep using the same self-signed cert, obviously;
// so we differentiate these by associating the subject with its issuer key;
// we do this because CertMagic has no notion of "InternalIssuer" like we
// do, so we have to do this logic ourselves
var issuerKey string
if len ( ap . Issuers ) == 1 {
if intIss , ok := ap . Issuers [ 0 ] . ( * InternalIssuer ) ; ok && intIss != nil {
issuerKey = intIss . IssuerKey ( )
}
}
t . managing [ name ] = issuerKey
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}
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}
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return nil
}
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// HandleHTTPChallenge ensures that the ACME HTTP challenge or ZeroSSL HTTP
// validation request is handled for the certificate named by r.Host, if it
// is an HTTP challenge request. It requires that the automation policy for
// r.Host has an issuer that implements GetACMEIssuer() or is a *ZeroSSLIssuer.
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func ( t * TLS ) HandleHTTPChallenge ( w http . ResponseWriter , r * http . Request ) bool {
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acmeChallenge := certmagic . LooksLikeHTTPChallenge ( r )
zerosslValidation := certmagic . LooksLikeZeroSSLHTTPValidation ( r )
admin: Identity management, remote admin, config loaders (#3994)
This commits dds 3 separate, but very related features:
1. Automated server identity management
How do you know you're connecting to the server you think you are? How do you know the server connecting to you is the server instance you think it is? Mutually-authenticated TLS (mTLS) answers both of these questions. Using TLS to authenticate requires a public/private key pair (and the peer must trust the certificate you present to it).
Fortunately, Caddy is really good at managing certificates by now. We tap into that power to make it possible for Caddy to obtain and renew its own identity credentials, or in other words, a certificate that can be used for both server verification when clients connect to it, and client verification when it connects to other servers. Its associated private key is essentially its identity, and TLS takes care of possession proofs.
This configuration is simply a list of identifiers and an optional list of custom certificate issuers. Identifiers are things like IP addresses or DNS names that can be used to access the Caddy instance. The default issuers are ZeroSSL and Let's Encrypt, but these are public CAs, so they won't issue certs for private identifiers. Caddy will simply manage credentials for these, which other parts of Caddy can use, for example: remote administration or dynamic config loading (described below).
2. Remote administration over secure connection
This feature adds generic remote admin functionality that is safe to expose on a public interface.
- The "remote" (or "secure") endpoint is optional. It does not affect the standard/local/plaintext endpoint.
- It's the same as the [API endpoint on localhost:2019](https://caddyserver.com/docs/api), but over TLS.
- TLS cannot be disabled on this endpoint.
- TLS mutual auth is required, and cannot be disabled.
- The server's certificate _must_ be obtained and renewed via automated means, such as ACME. It cannot be manually loaded.
- The TLS server takes care of verifying the client.
- The admin handler takes care of application-layer permissions (methods and paths that each client is allowed to use).\
- Sensible defaults are still WIP.
- Config fields subject to change/renaming.
3. Dyanmic config loading at startup
Since this feature was planned in tandem with remote admin, and depends on its changes, I am combining them into one PR.
Dynamic config loading is where you tell Caddy how to load its config, and then it loads and runs that. First, it will load the config you give it (and persist that so it can be optionally resumed later). Then, it will try pulling its _actual_ config using the module you've specified (dynamically loaded configs are _not_ persisted to storage, since resuming them doesn't make sense).
This PR comes with a standard config loader module called `caddy.config_loaders.http`.
Caddyfile config for all of this can probably be added later.
COMMITS:
* admin: Secure socket for remote management
Functional, but still WIP.
Optional secure socket for the admin endpoint is designed
for remote management, i.e. to be exposed on a public
port. It enforces TLS mutual authentication which cannot
be disabled. The default port for this is :2021. The server
certificate cannot be specified manually, it MUST be
obtained from a certificate issuer (i.e. ACME).
More polish and sensible defaults are still in development.
Also cleaned up and consolidated the code related to
quitting the process.
* Happy lint
* Implement dynamic config loading; HTTP config loader module
This allows Caddy to load a dynamic config when it starts.
Dynamically-loaded configs are intentionally not persisted to storage.
Includes an implementation of the standard config loader, HTTPLoader.
Can be used to download configs over HTTP(S).
* Refactor and cleanup; prevent recursive config pulls
Identity management is now separated from remote administration.
There is no need to enable remote administration if all you want is identity
management, but you will need to configure identity management
if you want remote administration.
* Fix lint warnings
* Rename identities->identifiers for consistency
2021-01-28 02:16:04 +03:00
// no-op if it's not an ACME challenge request
2024-04-14 04:31:43 +03:00
if ! acmeChallenge && ! zerosslValidation {
2019-04-25 22:54:48 +03:00
return false
}
admin: Identity management, remote admin, config loaders (#3994)
This commits dds 3 separate, but very related features:
1. Automated server identity management
How do you know you're connecting to the server you think you are? How do you know the server connecting to you is the server instance you think it is? Mutually-authenticated TLS (mTLS) answers both of these questions. Using TLS to authenticate requires a public/private key pair (and the peer must trust the certificate you present to it).
Fortunately, Caddy is really good at managing certificates by now. We tap into that power to make it possible for Caddy to obtain and renew its own identity credentials, or in other words, a certificate that can be used for both server verification when clients connect to it, and client verification when it connects to other servers. Its associated private key is essentially its identity, and TLS takes care of possession proofs.
This configuration is simply a list of identifiers and an optional list of custom certificate issuers. Identifiers are things like IP addresses or DNS names that can be used to access the Caddy instance. The default issuers are ZeroSSL and Let's Encrypt, but these are public CAs, so they won't issue certs for private identifiers. Caddy will simply manage credentials for these, which other parts of Caddy can use, for example: remote administration or dynamic config loading (described below).
2. Remote administration over secure connection
This feature adds generic remote admin functionality that is safe to expose on a public interface.
- The "remote" (or "secure") endpoint is optional. It does not affect the standard/local/plaintext endpoint.
- It's the same as the [API endpoint on localhost:2019](https://caddyserver.com/docs/api), but over TLS.
- TLS cannot be disabled on this endpoint.
- TLS mutual auth is required, and cannot be disabled.
- The server's certificate _must_ be obtained and renewed via automated means, such as ACME. It cannot be manually loaded.
- The TLS server takes care of verifying the client.
- The admin handler takes care of application-layer permissions (methods and paths that each client is allowed to use).\
- Sensible defaults are still WIP.
- Config fields subject to change/renaming.
3. Dyanmic config loading at startup
Since this feature was planned in tandem with remote admin, and depends on its changes, I am combining them into one PR.
Dynamic config loading is where you tell Caddy how to load its config, and then it loads and runs that. First, it will load the config you give it (and persist that so it can be optionally resumed later). Then, it will try pulling its _actual_ config using the module you've specified (dynamically loaded configs are _not_ persisted to storage, since resuming them doesn't make sense).
This PR comes with a standard config loader module called `caddy.config_loaders.http`.
Caddyfile config for all of this can probably be added later.
COMMITS:
* admin: Secure socket for remote management
Functional, but still WIP.
Optional secure socket for the admin endpoint is designed
for remote management, i.e. to be exposed on a public
port. It enforces TLS mutual authentication which cannot
be disabled. The default port for this is :2021. The server
certificate cannot be specified manually, it MUST be
obtained from a certificate issuer (i.e. ACME).
More polish and sensible defaults are still in development.
Also cleaned up and consolidated the code related to
quitting the process.
* Happy lint
* Implement dynamic config loading; HTTP config loader module
This allows Caddy to load a dynamic config when it starts.
Dynamically-loaded configs are intentionally not persisted to storage.
Includes an implementation of the standard config loader, HTTPLoader.
Can be used to download configs over HTTP(S).
* Refactor and cleanup; prevent recursive config pulls
Identity management is now separated from remote administration.
There is no need to enable remote administration if all you want is identity
management, but you will need to configure identity management
if you want remote administration.
* Fix lint warnings
* Rename identities->identifiers for consistency
2021-01-28 02:16:04 +03:00
2020-11-16 21:05:55 +03:00
// try all the issuers until we find the one that initiated the challenge
2019-04-25 22:54:48 +03:00
ap := t . getAutomationPolicyForName ( r . Host )
2024-04-14 04:31:43 +03:00
if acmeChallenge {
type acmeCapable interface { GetACMEIssuer ( ) * ACMEIssuer }
for _ , iss := range ap . magic . Issuers {
if acmeIssuer , ok := iss . ( acmeCapable ) ; ok {
if acmeIssuer . GetACMEIssuer ( ) . issuer . HandleHTTPChallenge ( w , r ) {
return true
}
2020-11-16 21:05:55 +03:00
}
}
admin: Identity management, remote admin, config loaders (#3994)
This commits dds 3 separate, but very related features:
1. Automated server identity management
How do you know you're connecting to the server you think you are? How do you know the server connecting to you is the server instance you think it is? Mutually-authenticated TLS (mTLS) answers both of these questions. Using TLS to authenticate requires a public/private key pair (and the peer must trust the certificate you present to it).
Fortunately, Caddy is really good at managing certificates by now. We tap into that power to make it possible for Caddy to obtain and renew its own identity credentials, or in other words, a certificate that can be used for both server verification when clients connect to it, and client verification when it connects to other servers. Its associated private key is essentially its identity, and TLS takes care of possession proofs.
This configuration is simply a list of identifiers and an optional list of custom certificate issuers. Identifiers are things like IP addresses or DNS names that can be used to access the Caddy instance. The default issuers are ZeroSSL and Let's Encrypt, but these are public CAs, so they won't issue certs for private identifiers. Caddy will simply manage credentials for these, which other parts of Caddy can use, for example: remote administration or dynamic config loading (described below).
2. Remote administration over secure connection
This feature adds generic remote admin functionality that is safe to expose on a public interface.
- The "remote" (or "secure") endpoint is optional. It does not affect the standard/local/plaintext endpoint.
- It's the same as the [API endpoint on localhost:2019](https://caddyserver.com/docs/api), but over TLS.
- TLS cannot be disabled on this endpoint.
- TLS mutual auth is required, and cannot be disabled.
- The server's certificate _must_ be obtained and renewed via automated means, such as ACME. It cannot be manually loaded.
- The TLS server takes care of verifying the client.
- The admin handler takes care of application-layer permissions (methods and paths that each client is allowed to use).\
- Sensible defaults are still WIP.
- Config fields subject to change/renaming.
3. Dyanmic config loading at startup
Since this feature was planned in tandem with remote admin, and depends on its changes, I am combining them into one PR.
Dynamic config loading is where you tell Caddy how to load its config, and then it loads and runs that. First, it will load the config you give it (and persist that so it can be optionally resumed later). Then, it will try pulling its _actual_ config using the module you've specified (dynamically loaded configs are _not_ persisted to storage, since resuming them doesn't make sense).
This PR comes with a standard config loader module called `caddy.config_loaders.http`.
Caddyfile config for all of this can probably be added later.
COMMITS:
* admin: Secure socket for remote management
Functional, but still WIP.
Optional secure socket for the admin endpoint is designed
for remote management, i.e. to be exposed on a public
port. It enforces TLS mutual authentication which cannot
be disabled. The default port for this is :2021. The server
certificate cannot be specified manually, it MUST be
obtained from a certificate issuer (i.e. ACME).
More polish and sensible defaults are still in development.
Also cleaned up and consolidated the code related to
quitting the process.
* Happy lint
* Implement dynamic config loading; HTTP config loader module
This allows Caddy to load a dynamic config when it starts.
Dynamically-loaded configs are intentionally not persisted to storage.
Includes an implementation of the standard config loader, HTTPLoader.
Can be used to download configs over HTTP(S).
* Refactor and cleanup; prevent recursive config pulls
Identity management is now separated from remote administration.
There is no need to enable remote administration if all you want is identity
management, but you will need to configure identity management
if you want remote administration.
* Fix lint warnings
* Rename identities->identifiers for consistency
2021-01-28 02:16:04 +03:00
2024-04-14 04:31:43 +03:00
// it's possible another server in this process initiated the challenge;
// users have requested that Caddy only handle HTTP challenges it initiated,
// so that users can proxy the others through to their backends; but we
// might not have an automation policy for all identifiers that are trying
// to get certificates (e.g. the admin endpoint), so we do this manual check
if challenge , ok := certmagic . GetACMEChallenge ( r . Host ) ; ok {
return certmagic . SolveHTTPChallenge ( t . logger , w , r , challenge . Challenge )
}
} else if zerosslValidation {
for _ , iss := range ap . magic . Issuers {
if ziss , ok := iss . ( * ZeroSSLIssuer ) ; ok {
if ziss . issuer . HandleZeroSSLHTTPValidation ( w , r ) {
return true
}
}
}
admin: Identity management, remote admin, config loaders (#3994)
This commits dds 3 separate, but very related features:
1. Automated server identity management
How do you know you're connecting to the server you think you are? How do you know the server connecting to you is the server instance you think it is? Mutually-authenticated TLS (mTLS) answers both of these questions. Using TLS to authenticate requires a public/private key pair (and the peer must trust the certificate you present to it).
Fortunately, Caddy is really good at managing certificates by now. We tap into that power to make it possible for Caddy to obtain and renew its own identity credentials, or in other words, a certificate that can be used for both server verification when clients connect to it, and client verification when it connects to other servers. Its associated private key is essentially its identity, and TLS takes care of possession proofs.
This configuration is simply a list of identifiers and an optional list of custom certificate issuers. Identifiers are things like IP addresses or DNS names that can be used to access the Caddy instance. The default issuers are ZeroSSL and Let's Encrypt, but these are public CAs, so they won't issue certs for private identifiers. Caddy will simply manage credentials for these, which other parts of Caddy can use, for example: remote administration or dynamic config loading (described below).
2. Remote administration over secure connection
This feature adds generic remote admin functionality that is safe to expose on a public interface.
- The "remote" (or "secure") endpoint is optional. It does not affect the standard/local/plaintext endpoint.
- It's the same as the [API endpoint on localhost:2019](https://caddyserver.com/docs/api), but over TLS.
- TLS cannot be disabled on this endpoint.
- TLS mutual auth is required, and cannot be disabled.
- The server's certificate _must_ be obtained and renewed via automated means, such as ACME. It cannot be manually loaded.
- The TLS server takes care of verifying the client.
- The admin handler takes care of application-layer permissions (methods and paths that each client is allowed to use).\
- Sensible defaults are still WIP.
- Config fields subject to change/renaming.
3. Dyanmic config loading at startup
Since this feature was planned in tandem with remote admin, and depends on its changes, I am combining them into one PR.
Dynamic config loading is where you tell Caddy how to load its config, and then it loads and runs that. First, it will load the config you give it (and persist that so it can be optionally resumed later). Then, it will try pulling its _actual_ config using the module you've specified (dynamically loaded configs are _not_ persisted to storage, since resuming them doesn't make sense).
This PR comes with a standard config loader module called `caddy.config_loaders.http`.
Caddyfile config for all of this can probably be added later.
COMMITS:
* admin: Secure socket for remote management
Functional, but still WIP.
Optional secure socket for the admin endpoint is designed
for remote management, i.e. to be exposed on a public
port. It enforces TLS mutual authentication which cannot
be disabled. The default port for this is :2021. The server
certificate cannot be specified manually, it MUST be
obtained from a certificate issuer (i.e. ACME).
More polish and sensible defaults are still in development.
Also cleaned up and consolidated the code related to
quitting the process.
* Happy lint
* Implement dynamic config loading; HTTP config loader module
This allows Caddy to load a dynamic config when it starts.
Dynamically-loaded configs are intentionally not persisted to storage.
Includes an implementation of the standard config loader, HTTPLoader.
Can be used to download configs over HTTP(S).
* Refactor and cleanup; prevent recursive config pulls
Identity management is now separated from remote administration.
There is no need to enable remote administration if all you want is identity
management, but you will need to configure identity management
if you want remote administration.
* Fix lint warnings
* Rename identities->identifiers for consistency
2021-01-28 02:16:04 +03:00
}
2020-03-07 09:15:25 +03:00
return false
}
// AddAutomationPolicy provisions and adds ap to the list of the app's
2020-03-13 20:06:08 +03:00
// automation policies. If an existing automation policy exists that has
// fewer hosts in its list than ap does, ap will be inserted before that
// other policy (this helps ensure that ap will be prioritized/chosen
// over, say, a catch-all policy).
2020-03-07 09:15:25 +03:00
func ( t * TLS ) AddAutomationPolicy ( ap * AutomationPolicy ) error {
if t . Automation == nil {
t . Automation = new ( AutomationConfig )
}
2020-03-21 05:25:46 +03:00
err := ap . Provision ( t )
2020-03-07 09:15:25 +03:00
if err != nil {
return err
}
2020-10-22 21:40:23 +03:00
// sort new automation policies just before any other which is a superset
// of this one; if we find an existing policy that covers every subject in
// ap but less specifically (e.g. a catch-all policy, or one with wildcards
// or with fewer subjects), insert ap just before it, otherwise ap would
// never be used because the first matching policy is more general
for i , existing := range t . Automation . Policies {
// first see if existing is superset of ap for all names
var otherIsSuperset bool
outer :
2023-03-28 00:16:22 +03:00
for _ , thisSubj := range ap . subjects {
for _ , otherSubj := range existing . subjects {
2020-10-22 21:40:23 +03:00
if certmagic . MatchWildcard ( thisSubj , otherSubj ) {
otherIsSuperset = true
break outer
}
}
}
// if existing AP is a superset or if it contains fewer names (i.e. is
// more general), then new AP is more specific, so insert before it
2023-03-28 00:16:22 +03:00
if otherIsSuperset || len ( existing . SubjectsRaw ) < len ( ap . SubjectsRaw ) {
2020-03-13 20:06:08 +03:00
t . Automation . Policies = append ( t . Automation . Policies [ : i ] ,
2020-03-18 06:00:45 +03:00
append ( [ ] * AutomationPolicy { ap } , t . Automation . Policies [ i : ] ... ) ... )
2020-03-13 20:06:08 +03:00
return nil
}
}
// otherwise just append the new one
2020-03-07 09:15:25 +03:00
t . Automation . Policies = append ( t . Automation . Policies , ap )
return nil
2019-04-25 22:54:48 +03:00
}
2020-03-07 09:15:25 +03:00
func ( t * TLS ) getConfigForName ( name string ) * certmagic . Config {
2019-04-25 22:54:48 +03:00
ap := t . getAutomationPolicyForName ( name )
2020-03-07 09:15:25 +03:00
return ap . magic
2019-04-25 22:54:48 +03:00
}
httpcaddyfile, caddytls: Multiple edge case fixes; add tests
- Create two default automation policies; if the TLS app is used in
isolation with the 'automate' certificate loader, it will now use
an internal issuer for internal-only names, and an ACME issuer for
all other names by default.
- If the HTTP Caddyfile adds an 'automate' loader, it now also adds an
automation policy for any names in that loader that do not qualify
for public certificates so that they will be issued internally. (It
might be nice if this wasn't necessary, but the alternative is to
either make auto-HTTPS logic way more complex by scanning the names in
the 'automate' loader, or to have an automation policy without an
issuer switch between default issuer based on the name being issued
a certificate - I think I like the latter option better, right now we
do something kind of like that but at a level above each individual
automation policies, we do that switch only when no automation
policies match, rather than when a policy without an issuer does
match.)
- Set the default LoggerName rather than a LoggerNames with an empty
host value, which is now taken literally rather than as a catch-all.
- hostsFromKeys, the function that gets a list of hosts from server
block keys, no longer returns an empty string in its resulting slice,
ever.
2020-04-08 23:46:44 +03:00
// getAutomationPolicyForName returns the first matching automation policy
// for the given subject name. If no matching policy can be found, the
// default policy is used, depending on whether the name qualifies for a
// public certificate or not.
2020-02-14 21:14:52 +03:00
func ( t * TLS ) getAutomationPolicyForName ( name string ) * AutomationPolicy {
2020-03-07 09:15:25 +03:00
for _ , ap := range t . Automation . Policies {
2023-03-28 00:16:22 +03:00
if len ( ap . subjects ) == 0 {
2020-03-07 09:15:25 +03:00
return ap // no host filter is an automatic match
}
2023-03-28 00:16:22 +03:00
for _ , h := range ap . subjects {
2020-03-26 23:01:38 +03:00
if certmagic . MatchWildcard ( name , h ) {
2019-04-25 22:54:48 +03:00
return ap
}
}
}
2020-04-09 22:09:48 +03:00
if certmagic . SubjectQualifiesForPublicCert ( name ) || t . Automation . defaultInternalAutomationPolicy == nil {
httpcaddyfile, caddytls: Multiple edge case fixes; add tests
- Create two default automation policies; if the TLS app is used in
isolation with the 'automate' certificate loader, it will now use
an internal issuer for internal-only names, and an ACME issuer for
all other names by default.
- If the HTTP Caddyfile adds an 'automate' loader, it now also adds an
automation policy for any names in that loader that do not qualify
for public certificates so that they will be issued internally. (It
might be nice if this wasn't necessary, but the alternative is to
either make auto-HTTPS logic way more complex by scanning the names in
the 'automate' loader, or to have an automation policy without an
issuer switch between default issuer based on the name being issued
a certificate - I think I like the latter option better, right now we
do something kind of like that but at a level above each individual
automation policies, we do that switch only when no automation
policies match, rather than when a policy without an issuer does
match.)
- Set the default LoggerName rather than a LoggerNames with an empty
host value, which is now taken literally rather than as a catch-all.
- hostsFromKeys, the function that gets a list of hosts from server
block keys, no longer returns an empty string in its resulting slice,
ever.
2020-04-08 23:46:44 +03:00
return t . Automation . defaultPublicAutomationPolicy
}
return t . Automation . defaultInternalAutomationPolicy
2019-04-25 22:54:48 +03:00
}
2019-09-18 01:00:15 +03:00
// AllMatchingCertificates returns the list of all certificates in
2019-09-13 20:46:58 +03:00
// the cache which could be used to satisfy the given SAN.
2023-07-11 22:10:58 +03:00
func AllMatchingCertificates ( san string ) [ ] certmagic . Certificate {
return certCache . AllMatchingCertificates ( san )
}
func ( t * TLS ) HasCertificateForSubject ( subject string ) bool {
certCacheMu . RLock ( )
allMatchingCerts := certCache . AllMatchingCertificates ( subject )
certCacheMu . RUnlock ( )
for _ , cert := range allMatchingCerts {
// check if the cert is manually loaded by this config
if _ , ok := t . loaded [ cert . Hash ( ) ] ; ok {
return true
}
// check if the cert is automatically managed by this config
for _ , name := range cert . Names {
if _ , ok := t . managing [ name ] ; ok {
return true
}
}
}
return false
2019-08-09 21:05:47 +03:00
}
2020-07-08 19:59:49 +03:00
// keepStorageClean starts a goroutine that immediately cleans up all
// known storage units if it was not recently done, and then runs the
// operation at every tick from t.storageCleanTicker.
2019-09-18 01:00:15 +03:00
func ( t * TLS ) keepStorageClean ( ) {
2021-04-13 00:41:22 +03:00
t . storageCleanTicker = time . NewTicker ( t . storageCleanInterval ( ) )
2019-09-30 18:07:43 +03:00
t . storageCleanStop = make ( chan struct { } )
2019-09-18 01:00:15 +03:00
go func ( ) {
2020-05-12 20:36:20 +03:00
defer func ( ) {
if err := recover ( ) ; err != nil {
log . Printf ( "[PANIC] storage cleaner: %v\n%s" , err , debug . Stack ( ) )
}
} ( )
2020-07-08 19:59:49 +03:00
t . cleanStorageUnits ( )
2019-09-18 01:00:15 +03:00
for {
select {
case <- t . storageCleanStop :
return
case <- t . storageCleanTicker . C :
t . cleanStorageUnits ( )
}
}
} ( )
}
func ( t * TLS ) cleanStorageUnits ( ) {
storageCleanMu . Lock ( )
defer storageCleanMu . Unlock ( )
2023-12-07 21:00:02 +03:00
// TODO: This check might not be needed anymore now that CertMagic syncs
// and throttles storage cleaning globally across the cluster.
// The original comment below might be outdated:
//
2021-04-13 00:41:22 +03:00
// If storage was cleaned recently, don't do it again for now. Although the ticker
2021-11-02 17:27:25 +03:00
// calling this function drops missed ticks for us, config reloads discard the old
// ticker and replace it with a new one, possibly invoking a cleaning to happen again
// too soon. (We divide the interval by 2 because the actual cleaning takes non-zero
// time, and we don't want to skip cleanings if we don't have to; whereas if a cleaning
// took most of the interval, we'd probably want to skip the next one so we aren't
2021-04-13 00:41:22 +03:00
// constantly cleaning. This allows cleanings to take up to half the interval's
// duration before we decide to skip the next one.)
if ! storageClean . IsZero ( ) && time . Since ( storageClean ) < t . storageCleanInterval ( ) / 2 {
2019-09-18 01:00:15 +03:00
return
}
2023-12-07 21:00:02 +03:00
id , err := caddy . InstanceID ( )
if err != nil {
2024-09-13 20:16:37 +03:00
if c := t . logger . Check ( zapcore . WarnLevel , "unable to get instance ID; storage clean stamps will be incomplete" ) ; c != nil {
c . Write ( zap . Error ( err ) )
}
2023-12-07 21:00:02 +03:00
}
2019-09-18 01:00:15 +03:00
options := certmagic . CleanStorageOptions {
2023-12-07 21:00:02 +03:00
Logger : t . logger ,
InstanceID : id . String ( ) ,
Interval : t . storageCleanInterval ( ) ,
2019-09-18 01:00:15 +03:00
OCSPStaples : true ,
ExpiredCerts : true ,
ExpiredCertGracePeriod : 24 * time . Hour * 14 ,
}
2021-04-13 00:41:22 +03:00
// start with the default/global storage
2023-12-07 21:00:02 +03:00
err = certmagic . CleanStorage ( t . ctx , t . ctx . Storage ( ) , options )
if err != nil {
// probably don't want to return early, since we should still
// see if any other storages can get cleaned up
2024-09-13 20:16:37 +03:00
if c := t . logger . Check ( zapcore . ErrorLevel , "could not clean default/global storage" ) ; c != nil {
c . Write ( zap . Error ( err ) )
}
2023-12-07 21:00:02 +03:00
}
2019-09-18 01:00:15 +03:00
// then clean each storage defined in ACME automation policies
2019-09-30 18:07:43 +03:00
if t . Automation != nil {
for _ , ap := range t . Automation . Policies {
2021-04-13 00:41:22 +03:00
if ap . storage == nil {
continue
}
2023-12-07 21:00:02 +03:00
if err := certmagic . CleanStorage ( t . ctx , ap . storage , options ) ; err != nil {
2024-09-13 20:16:37 +03:00
if c := t . logger . Check ( zapcore . ErrorLevel , "could not clean storage configured in automation policy" ) ; c != nil {
c . Write ( zap . Error ( err ) )
}
2019-09-18 01:00:15 +03:00
}
}
}
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// remember last time storage was finished cleaning
storageClean = time . Now ( )
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t . logger . Info ( "finished cleaning storage units" )
}
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func ( t * TLS ) storageCleanInterval ( ) time . Duration {
if t . Automation != nil && t . Automation . StorageCleanInterval > 0 {
return time . Duration ( t . Automation . StorageCleanInterval )
}
return defaultStorageCleanInterval
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}
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// onEvent translates CertMagic events into Caddy events then dispatches them.
func ( t * TLS ) onEvent ( ctx context . Context , eventName string , data map [ string ] any ) error {
evt := t . events . Emit ( t . ctx , eventName , data )
return evt . Aborted
}
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// CertificateLoader is a type that can load certificates.
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// Certificates can optionally be associated with tags.
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type CertificateLoader interface {
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LoadCertificates ( ) ( [ ] Certificate , error )
}
// Certificate is a TLS certificate, optionally
// associated with arbitrary tags.
type Certificate struct {
tls . Certificate
Tags [ ] string
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}
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// AutomateLoader will automatically manage certificates for the names in the
// list, including obtaining and renewing certificates. Automated certificates
// are managed according to their matching automation policy, configured
// elsewhere in this app.
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//
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// Technically, this is a no-op certificate loader module that is treated as
// a special case: it uses this app's automation features to load certificates
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// for the list of hostnames, rather than loading certificates manually. But
// the end result is the same: certificates for these subject names will be
// loaded into the in-memory cache and may then be used.
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type AutomateLoader [ ] string
// CaddyModule returns the Caddy module information.
func ( AutomateLoader ) CaddyModule ( ) caddy . ModuleInfo {
return caddy . ModuleInfo {
ID : "tls.certificates.automate" ,
New : func ( ) caddy . Module { return new ( AutomateLoader ) } ,
}
}
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// CertCacheOptions configures the certificate cache.
type CertCacheOptions struct {
// Maximum number of certificates to allow in the
// cache. If reached, certificates will be randomly
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// evicted to make room for new ones. Default: 10,000
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Capacity int ` json:"capacity,omitempty" `
}
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// Variables related to storage cleaning.
var (
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defaultStorageCleanInterval = 24 * time . Hour
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storageClean time . Time
storageCleanMu sync . Mutex
)
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// Interface guards
var (
_ caddy . App = ( * TLS ) ( nil )
_ caddy . Provisioner = ( * TLS ) ( nil )
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_ caddy . Validator = ( * TLS ) ( nil )
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_ caddy . CleanerUpper = ( * TLS ) ( nil )
)