mox/webmail/webmail.go
Mechiel Lukkien 42793834f8
add Content-Disposition and Filename to the payload of incoming webhooks
for each message part. The ContentDisposition value is the base value without
header key/value parameters. the Filename field is the likely filename of the
part. the different email clients encode filenames differently. there is a
standard mime mechanism from rfc 2231. and there is the q/b-word-encoding from
rfc 2047. instead of letting users of the webhook api deal with those
differences, we provide just the parsed filename.

for issue #258 by morki, thanks for reporting!
2024-12-06 14:19:39 +01:00

977 lines
31 KiB
Go

// Package webmail implements a webmail client, serving html/js and providing an API for message actions and SSE endpoint for receiving real-time updates.
package webmail
// todo: should we be serving the messages/parts on a separate (sub)domain for user-content? to limit damage if the csp rules aren't enough.
import (
"archive/zip"
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"io/fs"
"log/slog"
"mime"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"runtime/debug"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
_ "embed"
"golang.org/x/net/html"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promauto"
"github.com/mjl-/bstore"
"github.com/mjl-/sherpa"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/message"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/metrics"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/mlog"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/mox-"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/moxio"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/store"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/webauth"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/webops"
)
var pkglog = mlog.New("webmail", nil)
type ctxKey string
// We pass the request to the sherpa handler so the TLS info can be used for
// the Received header in submitted messages. Most API calls need just the
// account name.
var requestInfoCtxKey ctxKey = "requestInfo"
type requestInfo struct {
Log mlog.Log
LoginAddress string
Account *store.Account // Nil only for methods Login and LoginPrep.
SessionToken store.SessionToken
Response http.ResponseWriter
Request *http.Request // For Proto and TLS connection state during message submit.
}
//go:embed webmail.html
var webmailHTML []byte
//go:embed webmail.js
var webmailJS []byte
//go:embed msg.html
var webmailmsgHTML []byte
//go:embed msg.js
var webmailmsgJS []byte
//go:embed text.html
var webmailtextHTML []byte
//go:embed text.js
var webmailtextJS []byte
var (
// Similar between ../webmail/webmail.go:/metricSubmission and ../smtpserver/server.go:/metricSubmission and ../webapisrv/server.go:/metricSubmission
metricSubmission = promauto.NewCounterVec(
prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "mox_webmail_submission_total",
Help: "Webmail message submission results, known values (those ending with error are server errors): ok, badfrom, messagelimiterror, recipientlimiterror, queueerror, storesenterror.",
},
[]string{
"result",
},
)
metricServerErrors = promauto.NewCounterVec(
prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "mox_webmail_errors_total",
Help: "Webmail server errors, known values: dkimsign, submit.",
},
[]string{
"error",
},
)
metricSSEConnections = promauto.NewGauge(
prometheus.GaugeOpts{
Name: "mox_webmail_sse_connections",
Help: "Number of active webmail SSE connections.",
},
)
)
func xcheckf(ctx context.Context, err error, format string, args ...any) {
if err == nil {
return
}
msg := fmt.Sprintf(format, args...)
errmsg := fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", msg, err)
pkglog.WithContext(ctx).Errorx(msg, err)
code := "server:error"
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
code = "user:error"
}
panic(&sherpa.Error{Code: code, Message: errmsg})
}
func xcheckuserf(ctx context.Context, err error, format string, args ...any) {
if err == nil {
return
}
msg := fmt.Sprintf(format, args...)
errmsg := fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", msg, err)
pkglog.WithContext(ctx).Errorx(msg, err)
panic(&sherpa.Error{Code: "user:error", Message: errmsg})
}
func xdbwrite(ctx context.Context, acc *store.Account, fn func(tx *bstore.Tx)) {
err := acc.DB.Write(ctx, func(tx *bstore.Tx) error {
fn(tx)
return nil
})
xcheckf(ctx, err, "transaction")
}
func xdbread(ctx context.Context, acc *store.Account, fn func(tx *bstore.Tx)) {
err := acc.DB.Read(ctx, func(tx *bstore.Tx) error {
fn(tx)
return nil
})
xcheckf(ctx, err, "transaction")
}
var webmailFile = &mox.WebappFile{
HTML: webmailHTML,
JS: webmailJS,
HTMLPath: filepath.FromSlash("webmail/webmail.html"),
JSPath: filepath.FromSlash("webmail/webmail.js"),
CustomStem: "webmail",
}
func customization() (css, js []byte, err error) {
if css, err = os.ReadFile(mox.ConfigDirPath("webmail.css")); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
return nil, nil, err
}
if js, err = os.ReadFile(mox.ConfigDirPath("webmail.js")); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
return nil, nil, err
}
css = append([]byte("/* Custom CSS by admin from $configdir/webmail.css: */\n"), css...)
js = append([]byte("// Custom JS by admin from $configdir/webmail.js:\n"), js...)
js = append(js, '\n')
return css, js, nil
}
// Serve HTML content, either from a file, or return the fallback data. If
// customize is set, css/js is inserted if configured. Caller should already have
// set the content-type. We use this to return a file from the local file system
// (during development), or embedded in the binary (when deployed).
func serveContentFallback(log mlog.Log, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, path string, fallback []byte, customize bool) {
serve := func(mtime time.Time, rd io.ReadSeeker) {
if customize {
buf, err := io.ReadAll(rd)
if err != nil {
log.Errorx("reading content to customize", err)
http.Error(w, "500 - internal server error - reading content to customize", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
customCSS, customJS, err := customization()
if err != nil {
log.Errorx("reading customizations", err)
http.Error(w, "500 - internal server error - reading customizations", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
buf = bytes.Replace(buf, []byte("/* css placeholder */"), customCSS, 1)
buf = bytes.Replace(buf, []byte("/* js placeholder */"), customJS, 1)
rd = bytes.NewReader(buf)
}
http.ServeContent(w, r, "", mtime, rd)
}
f, err := os.Open(path)
if err == nil {
defer f.Close()
st, err := f.Stat()
if err == nil {
serve(st.ModTime(), f)
return
}
}
serve(mox.FallbackMtime(log), bytes.NewReader(fallback))
}
func init() {
mox.NewWebmailHandler = func(maxMsgSize int64, basePath string, isForwarded bool, accountPath string) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(Handler(maxMsgSize, basePath, isForwarded, accountPath))
}
}
// Handler returns a handler for the webmail endpoints, customized for the max
// message size coming from the listener and cookiePath.
func Handler(maxMessageSize int64, cookiePath string, isForwarded bool, accountPath string) func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sh, err := makeSherpaHandler(maxMessageSize, cookiePath, isForwarded)
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "500 - internal server error - cannot handle requests", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
handle(sh, isForwarded, accountPath, w, r)
}
}
func handle(apiHandler http.Handler, isForwarded bool, accountPath string, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
log := pkglog.WithContext(ctx).With(slog.String("userauth", ""))
// Server-sent event connection, for all initial data (list of mailboxes), list of
// messages, and all events afterwards. Authenticated through a single use token in
// the query string, which it got from a Token API call.
if r.URL.Path == "/events" {
serveEvents(ctx, log, accountPath, w, r)
return
}
defer func() {
x := recover()
if x == nil {
return
}
err, ok := x.(*sherpa.Error)
if !ok {
log.WithContext(ctx).Error("handle panic", slog.Any("err", x))
debug.PrintStack()
metrics.PanicInc(metrics.Webmailhandle)
panic(x)
}
if strings.HasPrefix(err.Code, "user:") {
log.Debugx("webmail user error", err)
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - "+err.Message, http.StatusBadRequest)
} else {
log.Errorx("webmail server error", err)
http.Error(w, "500 - internal server error - "+err.Message, http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
}()
switch r.URL.Path {
case "/":
switch r.Method {
case "GET", "HEAD":
h := w.Header()
h.Set("X-Frame-Options", "deny")
h.Set("Referrer-Policy", "same-origin")
webmailFile.Serve(ctx, log, w, r)
default:
http.Error(w, "405 - method not allowed - use get", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
return
case "/licenses.txt":
switch r.Method {
case "GET", "HEAD":
h := w.Header()
h.Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
mox.LicensesWrite(w)
default:
http.Error(w, "405 - method not allowed - use get", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
return
case "/msg.js", "/text.js":
switch r.Method {
default:
http.Error(w, "405 - method not allowed - use get", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
case "GET", "HEAD":
}
path := filepath.Join("webmail", r.URL.Path[1:])
var fallback = webmailmsgJS
if r.URL.Path == "/text.js" {
fallback = webmailtextJS
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8")
serveContentFallback(log, w, r, path, fallback, false)
return
}
isAPI := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/")
// Only allow POST for calls, they will not work cross-domain without CORS.
if isAPI && r.URL.Path != "/api/" && r.Method != "POST" {
http.Error(w, "405 - method not allowed - use post", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
var loginAddress, accName string
var sessionToken store.SessionToken
// All other URLs, except the login endpoint require some authentication.
if r.URL.Path != "/api/LoginPrep" && r.URL.Path != "/api/Login" {
var ok bool
isExport := r.URL.Path == "/export"
requireCSRF := isAPI || isExport
accName, sessionToken, loginAddress, ok = webauth.Check(ctx, log, webauth.Accounts, "webmail", isForwarded, w, r, isAPI, requireCSRF, isExport)
if !ok {
// Response has been written already.
return
}
}
if isAPI {
var acc *store.Account
if accName != "" {
log = log.With(slog.String("account", accName))
var err error
acc, err = store.OpenAccount(log, accName)
if err != nil {
log.Errorx("open account", err)
http.Error(w, "500 - internal server error - error opening account", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
defer func() {
err := acc.Close()
log.Check(err, "closing account")
}()
}
reqInfo := requestInfo{log, loginAddress, acc, sessionToken, w, r}
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, requestInfoCtxKey, reqInfo)
apiHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
return
}
// We are now expecting the following URLs:
// .../export
// .../msg/<msgid>/{attachments.zip,parsedmessage.js,raw}
// .../msg/<msgid>/{,msg}{text,html,htmlexternal}
// .../msg/<msgid>/{view,viewtext,download}/<partid>
if r.URL.Path == "/export" {
webops.Export(log, accName, w, r)
return
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/msg/") {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
t := strings.Split(r.URL.Path[len("/msg/"):], "/")
if len(t) < 2 {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(t[0], 10, 64)
if err != nil || id == 0 {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
// Many of the requests need either a message or a parsed part. Make it easy to
// fetch/prepare and cleanup. We only do all the work when the request seems legit
// (valid HTTP route and method).
xprepare := func() (acc *store.Account, m store.Message, msgr *store.MsgReader, p message.Part, cleanup func(), ok bool) {
if r.Method != "GET" {
http.Error(w, "405 - method not allowed - post required", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
defer func() {
if ok {
return
}
if msgr != nil {
err := msgr.Close()
log.Check(err, "closing message reader")
msgr = nil
}
if acc != nil {
err := acc.Close()
log.Check(err, "closing account")
acc = nil
}
}()
var err error
acc, err = store.OpenAccount(log, accName)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "open account")
m = store.Message{ID: id}
err = acc.DB.Get(ctx, &m)
if err == bstore.ErrAbsent || err == nil && m.Expunged {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
xcheckf(ctx, err, "get message")
msgr = acc.MessageReader(m)
p, err = m.LoadPart(msgr)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "load parsed message")
cleanup = func() {
err := msgr.Close()
log.Check(err, "closing message reader")
err = acc.Close()
log.Check(err, "closing account")
}
ok = true
return
}
h := w.Header()
// We set a Content-Security-Policy header that is as strict as possible, depending
// on the type of message/part/html/js. We have to be careful because we are
// returning data that is coming in from external places. E.g. HTML could contain
// javascripts that we don't want to execute, especially not on our domain. We load
// resources in an iframe. The CSP policy starts out with default-src 'none' to
// disallow loading anything, then start allowing what is safe, such as inlined
// datauri images and inline styles. Data can only be loaded when the request is
// coming from the same origin (so other sites cannot include resources
// (messages/parts)).
//
// We want to load resources in sandbox-mode, causing the page to be loaded as from
// a different origin. If sameOrigin is set, we have a looser CSP policy:
// allow-same-origin is set so resources are loaded as coming from this same
// origin. This is needed for the msg* endpoints that render a message, where we
// load the message body in a separate iframe again (with stricter CSP again),
// which we need to access for its inner height. If allowSelfScript is also set
// (for "msgtext"), the CSP leaves out the sandbox entirely.
//
// If allowExternal is set, we allow loading image, media (audio/video), styles and
// fronts from external URLs as well as inline URI's. By default we don't allow any
// loading of content, except inlined images (we do that ourselves for images
// embedded in the email), and we allow inline styles (which are safely constrained
// to an iframe).
//
// If allowSelfScript is set, inline scripts and scripts from our origin are
// allowed. Used to display a message including header. The header is rendered with
// javascript, the content is rendered in a separate iframe with a CSP that doesn't
// have allowSelfScript.
headers := func(sameOrigin, allowExternal, allowSelfScript, allowSelfImg bool) {
// allow-popups is needed to make opening links in new tabs work.
sb := "sandbox allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox; "
if sameOrigin && allowSelfScript {
// Sandbox with both allow-same-origin and allow-script would not provide security,
// and would give warning in console about that.
sb = ""
} else if sameOrigin {
sb = "sandbox allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox allow-same-origin; "
}
script := ""
if allowSelfScript {
script = "; script-src 'unsafe-inline' 'self'; frame-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'"
}
var csp string
if allowExternal {
csp = sb + "frame-ancestors 'self'; default-src 'none'; img-src data: http: https: 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'unsafe-inline' data: http: https:; font-src data: http: https: 'unsafe-inline'; media-src 'unsafe-inline' data: http: https:" + script
} else if allowSelfImg {
csp = sb + "frame-ancestors 'self'; default-src 'none'; img-src data: 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'" + script
} else {
csp = sb + "frame-ancestors 'self'; default-src 'none'; img-src data:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'" + script
}
h.Set("Content-Security-Policy", csp)
h.Set("X-Frame-Options", "sameorigin") // Duplicate with CSP, but better too much than too little.
h.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
h.Set("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
}
switch {
case len(t) == 2 && t[1] == "attachments.zip":
acc, m, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
state := msgState{acc: acc, m: m, msgr: msgr, part: &p}
// note: state is cleared by cleanup
mi, err := messageItem(log, m, &state)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "parsing message")
headers(false, false, false, false)
h.Set("Content-Type", "application/zip")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, max-age=0")
var subjectSlug string
if p.Envelope != nil {
s := p.Envelope.Subject
s = strings.ToLower(s)
s = regexp.MustCompile("[^a-z0-9_.-]").ReplaceAllString(s, "-")
s = regexp.MustCompile("--*").ReplaceAllString(s, "-")
s = strings.TrimLeft(s, "-")
s = strings.TrimRight(s, "-")
if s != "" {
s = "-" + s
}
subjectSlug = s
}
filename := fmt.Sprintf("email-%d-attachments-%s%s.zip", m.ID, m.Received.Format("20060102-150405"), subjectSlug)
cd := mime.FormatMediaType("attachment", map[string]string{"filename": filename})
h.Set("Content-Disposition", cd)
zw := zip.NewWriter(w)
names := map[string]bool{}
for _, a := range mi.Attachments {
ap := a.Part
_, name, err := ap.DispositionFilename()
if err != nil && errors.Is(err, message.ErrParamEncoding) {
log.Debugx("parsing disposition header for filename", err)
} else {
xcheckf(ctx, err, "reading disposition header")
}
if name != "" {
name = filepath.Base(name)
}
mt := strings.ToLower(ap.MediaType + "/" + ap.MediaSubType)
if name == "" || names[name] {
ext := filepath.Ext(name)
if ext == "" {
// Handle just a few basic types.
extensions := map[string]string{
"text/plain": ".txt",
"text/html": ".html",
"image/jpeg": ".jpg",
"image/png": ".png",
"image/gif": ".gif",
"application/zip": ".zip",
}
ext = extensions[mt]
if ext == "" {
ext = ".bin"
}
}
var stem string
if name != "" && strings.HasSuffix(name, ext) {
stem = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ext)
} else {
stem = "attachment"
for _, index := range a.Path {
stem += fmt.Sprintf("-%d", index)
}
}
name = stem + ext
seq := 0
for names[name] {
seq++
name = stem + fmt.Sprintf("-%d", seq) + ext
}
}
names[name] = true
fh := zip.FileHeader{
Name: name,
Modified: m.Received,
}
nodeflate := map[string]bool{
"application/x-bzip2": true,
"application/zip": true,
"application/x-zip-compressed": true,
"application/gzip": true,
"application/x-gzip": true,
"application/vnd.rar": true,
"application/x-rar-compressed": true,
"application/x-7z-compressed": true,
}
// Sniff content-type as well for compressed data.
buf := make([]byte, 512)
n, _ := io.ReadFull(ap.Reader(), buf)
var sniffmt string
if n > 0 {
sniffmt = strings.ToLower(http.DetectContentType(buf[:n]))
}
deflate := ap.MediaType != "VIDEO" && ap.MediaType != "AUDIO" && (ap.MediaType != "IMAGE" || ap.MediaSubType == "BMP") && !nodeflate[mt] && !nodeflate[sniffmt]
if deflate {
fh.Method = zip.Deflate
}
// We cannot return errors anymore: we have already sent an application/zip header.
if zf, err := zw.CreateHeader(&fh); err != nil {
log.Check(err, "adding to zip file")
return
} else if _, err := io.Copy(zf, ap.Reader()); err != nil {
log.Check(err, "writing to zip file")
return
}
}
err = zw.Close()
log.Check(err, "final write to zip file")
// Raw display of a message, as text/plain.
case len(t) == 2 && t[1] == "raw":
_, _, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
// We intentially use text/plain. We certainly don't want to return a format that
// browsers or users would think of executing. We do set the charset if available
// on the outer part. If present, we assume it may be relevant for other parts. If
// not, there is not much we could do better...
headers(false, false, false, false)
ct := "text/plain"
params := map[string]string{}
if charset := p.ContentTypeParams["charset"]; charset != "" {
params["charset"] = charset
}
h.Set("Content-Type", mime.FormatMediaType(ct, params))
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, max-age=0")
_, err := io.Copy(w, &moxio.AtReader{R: msgr})
log.Check(err, "writing raw")
case len(t) == 2 && (t[1] == "msgtext" || t[1] == "msghtml" || t[1] == "msghtmlexternal"):
// msg.html has a javascript tag with message data, and javascript to render the
// message header like the regular webmail.html and to load the message body in a
// separate iframe with a separate request with stronger CSP.
acc, m, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
state := msgState{acc: acc, m: m, msgr: msgr, part: &p}
// note: state is cleared by cleanup
pm, err := parsedMessage(log, m, &state, true, true)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "getting parsed message")
if t[1] == "msgtext" && len(pm.Texts) == 0 || t[1] != "msgtext" && !pm.HasHTML {
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - no such part", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
sameorigin := true
loadExternal := t[1] == "msghtmlexternal"
allowSelfScript := true
headers(sameorigin, loadExternal, allowSelfScript, false)
h.Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, max-age=0")
path := filepath.FromSlash("webmail/msg.html")
fallback := webmailmsgHTML
serveContentFallback(log, w, r, path, fallback, true)
case len(t) == 2 && t[1] == "parsedmessage.js":
// Used by msg.html, for the msg* endpoints, for the data needed to show all data
// except the message body.
// This is js with data inside instead so we can load it synchronously, which we do
// to get a "loaded" event after the page was actually loaded.
acc, m, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
state := msgState{acc: acc, m: m, msgr: msgr, part: &p}
// note: state is cleared by cleanup
pm, err := parsedMessage(log, m, &state, true, true)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "parsing parsedmessage")
pmjson, err := json.Marshal(pm)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "marshal parsedmessage")
m.MsgPrefix = nil
m.ParsedBuf = nil
mi := MessageItem{m, pm.envelope, pm.attachments, pm.isSigned, pm.isEncrypted, pm.firstLine, false}
mijson, err := json.Marshal(mi)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "marshal messageitem")
headers(false, false, false, false)
h.Set("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, max-age=0")
_, err = fmt.Fprintf(w, "window.messageItem = %s;\nwindow.parsedMessage = %s;\n", mijson, pmjson)
log.Check(err, "writing parsedmessage.js")
case len(t) == 2 && t[1] == "text":
// Returns text.html whichs loads the message data with a javascript tag and
// renders just the text content with the same code as webmail.html. Used by the
// iframe in the msgtext endpoint. Not used by the regular webmail viewer, it
// renders the text itself, with the same shared js code.
acc, m, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
state := msgState{acc: acc, m: m, msgr: msgr, part: &p}
// note: state is cleared by cleanup
pm, err := parsedMessage(log, m, &state, true, true)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "parsing parsedmessage")
if len(pm.Texts) == 0 {
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - no text part in message", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Needed for inner document height for outer iframe height in separate message view.
sameorigin := true
allowSelfScript := true
allowSelfImg := true
headers(sameorigin, false, allowSelfScript, allowSelfImg)
h.Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, max-age=0")
// We typically return the embedded file, but during development it's handy to load
// from disk.
path := filepath.FromSlash("webmail/text.html")
fallback := webmailtextHTML
serveContentFallback(log, w, r, path, fallback, true)
case len(t) == 2 && (t[1] == "html" || t[1] == "htmlexternal"):
// Returns the first HTML part, with "cid:" URIs replaced with an inlined datauri
// if the referenced Content-ID attachment can be found.
_, _, _, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
setHeaders := func() {
// Needed for inner document height for outer iframe height in separate message
// view. We only need that when displaying as a separate message on the msghtml*
// endpoints. When displaying in the regular webmail, we don't need to know the
// inner height so we load it as different origin, which should be safer.
sameorigin := r.URL.Query().Get("sameorigin") == "true"
allowExternal := strings.HasSuffix(t[1], "external")
headers(sameorigin, allowExternal, false, false)
h.Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, max-age=0")
}
// todo: skip certain html parts? e.g. with content-disposition: attachment?
var done bool
var usePart func(p *message.Part, parents []*message.Part)
usePart = func(p *message.Part, parents []*message.Part) {
if done {
return
}
mt := p.MediaType + "/" + p.MediaSubType
switch mt {
case "TEXT/HTML":
done = true
err := inlineSanitizeHTML(log, setHeaders, w, p, parents)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - "+err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
}
return
}
parents = append(parents, p)
for _, sp := range p.Parts {
usePart(&sp, parents)
}
}
usePart(&p, nil)
if !done {
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - no html part in message", http.StatusBadRequest)
}
case len(t) == 3 && (t[1] == "view" || t[1] == "viewtext" || t[1] == "download"):
// View any part, as referenced in the last element path. "0" is the whole message,
// 0.0 is the first subpart, etc. "view" returns it with the content-type from the
// message (could be dangerous, but we set strict CSP headers), "viewtext" returns
// data with a text/plain content-type so the browser will attempt to display it,
// and "download" adds a content-disposition header causing the browser the
// download the file.
_, _, _, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
paths := strings.Split(t[2], ".")
if len(paths) == 0 || paths[0] != "0" {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
ap := p
for _, e := range paths[1:] {
index, err := strconv.ParseInt(e, 10, 32)
if err != nil || index < 0 || int(index) >= len(ap.Parts) {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
ap = ap.Parts[int(index)]
}
headers(false, false, false, false)
var ct string
if t[1] == "viewtext" {
ct = "text/plain"
} else {
ct = strings.ToLower(ap.MediaType + "/" + ap.MediaSubType)
}
h.Set("Content-Type", ct)
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, max-age=0")
if t[1] == "download" {
_, name, err := ap.DispositionFilename()
if err != nil && errors.Is(err, message.ErrParamEncoding) {
log.Debugx("parsing disposition/filename", err)
} else {
xcheckf(ctx, err, "reading disposition/filename")
}
if name == "" {
name = "attachment.bin"
}
cd := mime.FormatMediaType("attachment", map[string]string{"filename": name})
h.Set("Content-Disposition", cd)
}
_, err := io.Copy(w, ap.Reader())
if err != nil && !moxio.IsClosed(err) {
log.Errorx("copying attachment", err)
}
default:
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
}
// inlineSanitizeHTML writes the part as HTML, with "cid:" URIs for html "src"
// attributes inlined and with potentially dangerous tags removed (javascript). The
// sanitizing is just a first layer of defense, CSP headers block execution of
// scripts. If the HTML becomes too large, an error is returned. Before writing
// HTML, setHeaders is called to write the required headers for content-type and
// CSP. On error, setHeader is not called, no output is written and the caller
// should write an error response.
func inlineSanitizeHTML(log mlog.Log, setHeaders func(), w io.Writer, p *message.Part, parents []*message.Part) error {
// Prepare cids if there is a chance we will use them.
cids := map[string]*message.Part{}
for _, parent := range parents {
if parent.MediaType+"/"+parent.MediaSubType == "MULTIPART/RELATED" && p.DecodedSize < 2*1024*1024 {
for i, rp := range parent.Parts {
if rp.ContentID != "" {
cids[strings.ToLower(rp.ContentID)] = &parent.Parts[i]
}
}
}
}
node, err := html.Parse(p.ReaderUTF8OrBinary())
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("parsing html: %v", err)
}
// We track size, if it becomes too much, we abort and still copy as regular html.
var totalSize int64
if err := inlineNode(node, cids, &totalSize); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("inline cid uris in html nodes: %w", err)
}
sanitizeNode(node)
setHeaders()
err = html.Render(w, node)
log.Check(err, "writing html")
return nil
}
// We inline cid: URIs into data: URIs. If a cid is missing in the
// multipart/related, we ignore the error and continue with other HTML nodes. It
// will probably just result in a "broken image". We limit the max size we
// generate. We only replace "src" attributes that start with "cid:". A cid URI
// could theoretically occur in many more places, like link href, and css url().
// That's probably not common though. Let's wait for someone to need it.
func inlineNode(node *html.Node, cids map[string]*message.Part, totalSize *int64) error {
for i, a := range node.Attr {
if a.Key != "src" || !caselessPrefix(a.Val, "cid:") || a.Namespace != "" {
continue
}
cid := a.Val[4:]
ap := cids["<"+strings.ToLower(cid)+">"]
if ap == nil {
// Missing cid, can happen with email, no need to stop returning data.
continue
}
*totalSize += ap.DecodedSize
if *totalSize >= 10*1024*1024 {
return fmt.Errorf("html too large")
}
var sb strings.Builder
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(&sb, "data:%s;base64,", strings.ToLower(ap.MediaType+"/"+ap.MediaSubType)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing datauri: %v", err)
}
w := base64.NewEncoder(base64.StdEncoding, &sb)
if _, err := io.Copy(w, ap.Reader()); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing base64 datauri: %v", err)
}
node.Attr[i].Val = sb.String()
}
for node = node.FirstChild; node != nil; node = node.NextSibling {
if err := inlineNode(node, cids, totalSize); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func caselessPrefix(k, pre string) bool {
return len(k) >= len(pre) && strings.EqualFold(k[:len(pre)], pre)
}
var targetable = map[string]bool{
"a": true,
"area": true,
"form": true,
"base": true,
}
// sanitizeNode removes script elements, on* attributes, javascript: href
// attributes, adds target="_blank" to all links and to a base tag.
func sanitizeNode(node *html.Node) {
i := 0
var haveTarget, haveRel bool
for i < len(node.Attr) {
a := node.Attr[i]
// Remove dangerous attributes.
if strings.HasPrefix(a.Key, "on") || a.Key == "href" && caselessPrefix(a.Val, "javascript:") || a.Key == "src" && caselessPrefix(a.Val, "data:text/html") {
copy(node.Attr[i:], node.Attr[i+1:])
node.Attr = node.Attr[:len(node.Attr)-1]
continue
}
if a.Key == "target" {
node.Attr[i].Val = "_blank"
haveTarget = true
}
if a.Key == "rel" && targetable[node.Data] {
node.Attr[i].Val = "noopener noreferrer"
haveRel = true
}
i++
}
// Ensure target attribute is set for elements that can have it.
if !haveTarget && node.Type == html.ElementNode && targetable[node.Data] {
node.Attr = append(node.Attr, html.Attribute{Key: "target", Val: "_blank"})
haveTarget = true
}
if haveTarget && !haveRel {
node.Attr = append(node.Attr, html.Attribute{Key: "rel", Val: "noopener noreferrer"})
}
parent := node
node = node.FirstChild
var haveBase bool
for node != nil {
// Set next now, we may remove cur, which clears its NextSibling.
cur := node
node = node.NextSibling
// Remove script elements.
if cur.Type == html.ElementNode && cur.Data == "script" {
parent.RemoveChild(cur)
continue
}
sanitizeNode(cur)
}
if parent.Type == html.ElementNode && parent.Data == "head" && !haveBase {
n := html.Node{Type: html.ElementNode, Data: "base", Attr: []html.Attribute{{Key: "target", Val: "_blank"}, {Key: "rel", Val: "noopener noreferrer"}}}
parent.AppendChild(&n)
}
}