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https://github.com/mjl-/mox.git
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642a328ae1
the idea is that clients may not support SCRAM-SHA-256, but may support SCRAM-SHA-1. if they do support the 256 variant, they'll use it. unfortunately, thunderbird does not support scram-sha-1 either.
374 lines
11 KiB
Go
374 lines
11 KiB
Go
// Package scram implements the SCRAM-SHA-* SASL authentication mechanism, RFC 7677 and RFC 5802.
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//
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// SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-SHA-1 allow a client to authenticate to a server using a
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// password without handing plaintext password over to the server. The client also
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// verifies the server knows (a derivative of) the password.
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package scram
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// todo: test with messages that contains extensions
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// todo: some tests for the parser
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// todo: figure out how invalid parameters etc should be handled. just abort? perhaps mostly a problem for imap.
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto/hmac"
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cryptorand "crypto/rand"
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"encoding/base64"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"hash"
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"strings"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2"
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"golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm"
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)
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// Errors at scram protocol level. Can be exchanged between client and server.
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var (
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ErrInvalidEncoding Error = "invalid-encoding"
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ErrExtensionsNotSupported Error = "extensions-not-supported"
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ErrInvalidProof Error = "invalid-proof"
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ErrChannelBindingsDontMatch Error = "channel-bindings-dont-match"
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ErrServerDoesSupportChannelBinding Error = "server-does-support-channel-binding"
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ErrChannelBindingNotSupported Error = "channel-binding-not-supported"
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ErrUnsupportedChannelBindingType Error = "unsupported-channel-binding-type"
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ErrUnknownUser Error = "unknown-user"
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ErrNoResources Error = "no-resources"
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ErrOtherError Error = "other-error"
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)
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var scramErrors = makeErrors()
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func makeErrors() map[string]Error {
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l := []Error{
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ErrInvalidEncoding,
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ErrExtensionsNotSupported,
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ErrInvalidProof,
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ErrChannelBindingsDontMatch,
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ErrServerDoesSupportChannelBinding,
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ErrChannelBindingNotSupported,
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ErrUnsupportedChannelBindingType,
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ErrUnknownUser,
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ErrNoResources,
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ErrOtherError,
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}
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m := map[string]Error{}
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for _, e := range l {
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m[string(e)] = e
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}
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return m
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}
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var (
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ErrNorm = errors.New("parameter not unicode normalized") // E.g. if client sends non-normalized username or authzid.
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ErrUnsafe = errors.New("unsafe parameter") // E.g. salt, nonce too short, or too few iterations.
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ErrProtocol = errors.New("protocol error") // E.g. server responded with a nonce not prefixed by the client nonce.
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)
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type Error string
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func (e Error) Error() string {
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return string(e)
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}
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// MakeRandom returns a cryptographically random buffer for use as salt or as
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// nonce.
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func MakeRandom() []byte {
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buf := make([]byte, 12)
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_, err := cryptorand.Read(buf)
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if err != nil {
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panic("generate random")
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}
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return buf
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}
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// SaltPassword returns a salted password.
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func SaltPassword(h func() hash.Hash, password string, salt []byte, iterations int) []byte {
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password = norm.NFC.String(password)
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return pbkdf2.Key([]byte(password), salt, iterations, h().Size(), h)
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}
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// HMAC returns the hmac with key over msg.
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func HMAC(h func() hash.Hash, key []byte, msg string) []byte {
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mac := hmac.New(h, key)
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mac.Write([]byte(msg))
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return mac.Sum(nil)
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}
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func xor(a, b []byte) {
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for i := range a {
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a[i] ^= b[i]
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}
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}
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// Server represents the server-side of a SCRAM-SHA-* authentication.
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type Server struct {
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Authentication string // Username for authentication, "authc". Always set and non-empty.
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Authorization string // If set, role of user to assume after authentication, "authz".
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h func() hash.Hash // sha1.New or sha256.New
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// Messages used in hash calculations.
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clientFirstBare string
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serverFirst string
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clientFinalWithoutProof string
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gs2header string
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clientNonce string // Client-part of the nonce.
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serverNonceOverride string // If set, server does not generate random nonce, but uses this. For tests with the test vector.
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nonce string // Full client + server nonce.
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}
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// NewServer returns a server given the first SCRAM message from a client.
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//
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// The sequence for data and calls on a server:
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//
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// - Read initial data from client, call NewServer (this call), then ServerFirst and write to the client.
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// - Read response from client, call Finish or FinishFinal and write the resulting string.
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func NewServer(h func() hash.Hash, clientFirst []byte) (server *Server, rerr error) {
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p := newParser(clientFirst)
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defer p.recover(&rerr)
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server = &Server{h: h}
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// ../rfc/5802:949 ../rfc/5802:910
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gs2cbindFlag := p.xbyte()
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switch gs2cbindFlag {
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case 'n', 'y':
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case 'p':
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p.xerrorf("gs2 header with p: %w", ErrChannelBindingNotSupported)
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}
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p.xtake(",")
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if !p.take(",") {
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server.Authorization = p.xauthzid()
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if norm.NFC.String(server.Authorization) != server.Authorization {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: authzid", ErrNorm)
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}
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p.xtake(",")
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}
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server.gs2header = p.s[:p.o]
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server.clientFirstBare = p.s[p.o:]
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// ../rfc/5802:945
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if p.take("m=") {
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p.xerrorf("unexpected mandatory extension: %w", ErrExtensionsNotSupported)
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}
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server.Authentication = p.xusername()
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if norm.NFC.String(server.Authentication) != server.Authentication {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: username", ErrNorm)
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}
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p.xtake(",")
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server.clientNonce = p.xnonce()
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if len(server.clientNonce) < 8 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: client nonce too short", ErrUnsafe)
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}
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// Extensions, we don't recognize them.
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for p.take(",") {
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p.xattrval()
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}
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p.xempty()
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return server, nil
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}
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// ServerFirst returns the string to send back to the client. To be called after NewServer.
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func (s *Server) ServerFirst(iterations int, salt []byte) (string, error) {
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// ../rfc/5802:959
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serverNonce := s.serverNonceOverride
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if serverNonce == "" {
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serverNonce = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(MakeRandom())
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}
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s.nonce = s.clientNonce + serverNonce
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s.serverFirst = fmt.Sprintf("r=%s,s=%s,i=%d", s.nonce, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(salt), iterations)
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return s.serverFirst, nil
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}
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// Finish takes the final client message, and the salted password (probably
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// from server storage), verifies the client, and returns a message to return
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// to the client. If err is nil, authentication was successful. If the
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// authorization requested is not acceptable, the server should call
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// FinishError instead.
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func (s *Server) Finish(clientFinal []byte, saltedPassword []byte) (serverFinal string, rerr error) {
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p := newParser(clientFinal)
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defer p.recover(&rerr)
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cbind := p.xchannelBinding()
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if cbind != s.gs2header {
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return "e=" + string(ErrChannelBindingsDontMatch), ErrChannelBindingsDontMatch
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}
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p.xtake(",")
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nonce := p.xnonce()
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if nonce != s.nonce {
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return "e=" + string(ErrInvalidProof), ErrInvalidProof
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}
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for !p.peek(",p=") {
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p.xtake(",")
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p.xattrval() // Ignored.
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}
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s.clientFinalWithoutProof = p.s[:p.o]
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p.xtake(",")
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proof := p.xproof()
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p.xempty()
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msg := s.clientFirstBare + "," + s.serverFirst + "," + s.clientFinalWithoutProof
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clientKey := HMAC(s.h, saltedPassword, "Client Key")
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h := s.h()
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h.Write(clientKey)
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storedKey := h.Sum(nil)
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clientSig := HMAC(s.h, storedKey, msg)
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xor(clientSig, clientKey) // Now clientProof.
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if !bytes.Equal(clientSig, proof) {
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return "e=" + string(ErrInvalidProof), ErrInvalidProof
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}
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serverKey := HMAC(s.h, saltedPassword, "Server Key")
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serverSig := HMAC(s.h, serverKey, msg)
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return fmt.Sprintf("v=%s", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(serverSig)), nil
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}
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// FinishError returns an error message to write to the client for the final
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// server message.
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func (s *Server) FinishError(err Error) string {
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return "e=" + string(err)
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}
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// Client represents the client-side of a SCRAM-SHA-* authentication.
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type Client struct {
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authc string
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authz string
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h func() hash.Hash // sha1.New or sha256.New
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// Messages used in hash calculations.
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clientFirstBare string
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serverFirst string
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clientFinalWithoutProof string
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authMessage string
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gs2header string
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clientNonce string
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nonce string // Full client + server nonce.
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saltedPassword []byte
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}
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// NewClient returns a client for authentication authc, optionally for
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// authorization with role authz, for the hash (sha1.New or sha256.New).
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//
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// The sequence for data and calls on a client:
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//
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// - ClientFirst, write result to server.
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// - Read response from server, feed to ServerFirst, write response to server.
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// - Read response from server, feed to ServerFinal.
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func NewClient(h func() hash.Hash, authc, authz string) *Client {
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authc = norm.NFC.String(authc)
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authz = norm.NFC.String(authz)
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return &Client{authc: authc, authz: authz, h: h}
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}
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// ClientFirst returns the first client message to write to the server.
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// No channel binding is done/supported.
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// A random nonce is generated.
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func (c *Client) ClientFirst() (clientFirst string, rerr error) {
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c.gs2header = fmt.Sprintf("n,%s,", saslname(c.authz))
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if c.clientNonce == "" {
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c.clientNonce = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(MakeRandom())
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}
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c.clientFirstBare = fmt.Sprintf("n=%s,r=%s", saslname(c.authc), c.clientNonce)
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return c.gs2header + c.clientFirstBare, nil
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}
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// ServerFirst processes the first response message from the server. The
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// provided nonce, salt and iterations are checked. If valid, a final client
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// message is calculated and returned. This message must be written to the
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// server. It includes proof that the client knows the password.
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func (c *Client) ServerFirst(serverFirst []byte, password string) (clientFinal string, rerr error) {
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c.serverFirst = string(serverFirst)
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p := newParser(serverFirst)
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defer p.recover(&rerr)
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// ../rfc/5802:959
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if p.take("m=") {
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p.xerrorf("unsupported mandatory extension: %w", ErrExtensionsNotSupported)
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}
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c.nonce = p.xnonce()
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p.xtake(",")
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salt := p.xsalt()
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p.xtake(",")
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iterations := p.xiterations()
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// We ignore extensions that we don't know about.
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for p.take(",") {
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p.xattrval()
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}
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p.xempty()
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if !strings.HasPrefix(c.nonce, c.clientNonce) {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: server dropped our nonce", ErrProtocol)
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}
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if len(c.nonce)-len(c.clientNonce) < 8 {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: server nonce too short", ErrUnsafe)
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}
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if len(salt) < 8 {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: salt too short", ErrUnsafe)
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}
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if iterations < 2048 {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: too few iterations", ErrUnsafe)
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}
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c.clientFinalWithoutProof = fmt.Sprintf("c=%s,r=%s", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(c.gs2header)), c.nonce)
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c.authMessage = c.clientFirstBare + "," + c.serverFirst + "," + c.clientFinalWithoutProof
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c.saltedPassword = SaltPassword(c.h, password, salt, iterations)
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clientKey := HMAC(c.h, c.saltedPassword, "Client Key")
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h := c.h()
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h.Write(clientKey)
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storedKey := h.Sum(nil)
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clientSig := HMAC(c.h, storedKey, c.authMessage)
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xor(clientSig, clientKey) // Now clientProof.
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clientProof := clientSig
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r := c.clientFinalWithoutProof + ",p=" + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(clientProof)
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return r, nil
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}
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// ServerFinal processes the final message from the server, verifying that the
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// server knows the password.
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func (c *Client) ServerFinal(serverFinal []byte) (rerr error) {
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p := newParser(serverFinal)
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defer p.recover(&rerr)
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if p.take("e=") {
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errstr := p.xvalue()
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var err error = scramErrors[errstr]
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if err == Error("") {
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err = errors.New(errstr)
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("error from server: %w", err)
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}
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p.xtake("v=")
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verifier := p.xbase64()
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serverKey := HMAC(c.h, c.saltedPassword, "Server Key")
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serverSig := HMAC(c.h, serverKey, c.authMessage)
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if !bytes.Equal(verifier, serverSig) {
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return fmt.Errorf("incorrect server signature")
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Convert "," to =2C and "=" to =3D.
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func saslname(s string) string {
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var r string
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for _, c := range s {
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if c == ',' {
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r += "=2C"
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} else if c == '=' {
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r += "=3D"
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} else {
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r += string(c)
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}
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}
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return r
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}
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