mox/webmail/webmail.go
Mechiel Lukkien 849b4ec9e9
add webmail
it was far down on the roadmap, but implemented earlier, because it's
interesting, and to help prepare for a jmap implementation. for jmap we need to
implement more client-like functionality than with just imap. internal data
structures need to change. jmap has lots of other requirements, so it's already
a big project. by implementing a webmail now, some of the required data
structure changes become clear and can be made now, so the later jmap
implementation can do things similarly to the webmail code. the webmail
frontend and webmail are written together, making their interface/api much
smaller and simpler than jmap.

one of the internal changes is that we now keep track of per-mailbox
total/unread/unseen/deleted message counts and mailbox sizes.  keeping this
data consistent after any change to the stored messages (through the code base)
is tricky, so mox now has a consistency check that verifies the counts are
correct, which runs only during tests, each time an internal account reference
is closed. we have a few more internal "changes" that are propagated for the
webmail frontend (that imap doesn't have a way to propagate on a connection),
like changes to the special-use flags on mailboxes, and used keywords in a
mailbox. more changes that will be required have revealed themselves while
implementing the webmail, and will be implemented next.

the webmail user interface is modeled after the mail clients i use or have
used: thunderbird, macos mail, mutt; and webmails i normally only use for
testing: gmail, proton, yahoo, outlook. a somewhat technical user is assumed,
but still the goal is to make this webmail client easy to use for everyone. the
user interface looks like most other mail clients: a list of mailboxes, a
search bar, a message list view, and message details. there is a top/bottom and
a left/right layout for the list/message view, default is automatic based on
screen size. the panes can be resized by the user. buttons for actions are just
text, not icons. clicking a button briefly shows the shortcut for the action in
the bottom right, helping with learning to operate quickly. any text that is
underdotted has a title attribute that causes more information to be displayed,
e.g. what a button does or a field is about. to highlight potential phishing
attempts, any text (anywhere in the webclient) that switches unicode "blocks"
(a rough approximation to (language) scripts) within a word is underlined
orange. multiple messages can be selected with familiar ui interaction:
clicking while holding control and/or shift keys.  keyboard navigation works
with arrows/page up/down and home/end keys, and also with a few basic vi-like
keys for list/message navigation. we prefer showing the text instead of
html (with inlined images only) version of a message. html messages are shown
in an iframe served from an endpoint with CSP headers to prevent dangerous
resources (scripts, external images) from being loaded. the html is also
sanitized, with javascript removed. a user can choose to load external
resources (e.g. images for tracking purposes).

the frontend is just (strict) typescript, no external frameworks. all
incoming/outgoing data is typechecked, both the api request parameters and
response types, and the data coming in over SSE. the types and checking code
are generated with sherpats, which uses the api definitions generated by
sherpadoc based on the Go code. so types from the backend are automatically
propagated to the frontend.  since there is no framework to automatically
propagate properties and rerender components, changes coming in over the SSE
connection are propagated explicitly with regular function calls.  the ui is
separated into "views", each with a "root" dom element that is added to the
visible document. these views have additional functions for getting changes
propagated, often resulting in the view updating its (internal) ui state (dom).
we keep the frontend compilation simple, it's just a few typescript files that
get compiled (combined and types stripped) into a single js file, no additional
runtime code needed or complicated build processes used.  the webmail is served
is served from a compressed, cachable html file that includes style and the
javascript, currently just over 225kb uncompressed, under 60kb compressed (not
minified, including comments). we include the generated js files in the
repository, to keep Go's easily buildable self-contained binaries.

authentication is basic http, as with the account and admin pages. most data
comes in over one long-term SSE connection to the backend. api requests signal
which mailbox/search/messages are requested over the SSE connection. fetching
individual messages, and making changes, are done through api calls. the
operations are similar to imap, so some code has been moved from package
imapserver to package store. the future jmap implementation will benefit from
these changes too. more functionality will probably be moved to the store
package in the future.

the quickstart enables webmail on the internal listener by default (for new
installs). users can enable it on the public listener if they want to. mox
localserve enables it too. to enable webmail on existing installs, add settings
like the following to the listeners in mox.conf, similar to AccountHTTP(S):

	WebmailHTTP:
		Enabled: true
	WebmailHTTPS:
		Enabled: true

special thanks to liesbeth, gerben, andrii for early user feedback.

there is plenty still to do, see the list at the top of webmail/webmail.ts.
feedback welcome as always.
2023-08-07 21:57:03 +02:00

1065 lines
32 KiB
Go

// Package webmail implements a webmail client, serving html/js and providing an API for message actions and SSE endpoint for receiving real-time updates.
package webmail
// todo: should we be serving the messages/parts on a separate (sub)domain for user-content? to limit damage if the csp rules aren't enough.
import (
"archive/zip"
"bytes"
"compress/gzip"
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"mime"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"runtime/debug"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
_ "embed"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promauto"
"golang.org/x/net/html"
"github.com/mjl-/bstore"
"github.com/mjl-/sherpa"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/message"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/metrics"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/mlog"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/mox-"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/moxio"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/moxvar"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/store"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/webaccount"
)
func init() {
mox.LimitersInit()
}
var xlog = mlog.New("webmail")
// We pass the request to the sherpa handler so the TLS info can be used for
// the Received header in submitted messages. Most API calls need just the
// account name.
type ctxKey string
var requestInfoCtxKey ctxKey = "requestInfo"
type requestInfo struct {
LoginAddress string
AccountName string
Request *http.Request // For Proto and TLS connection state during message submit.
}
//go:embed webmail.html
var webmailHTML []byte
//go:embed webmail.js
var webmailJS []byte
//go:embed msg.html
var webmailmsgHTML []byte
//go:embed msg.js
var webmailmsgJS []byte
//go:embed text.html
var webmailtextHTML []byte
//go:embed text.js
var webmailtextJS []byte
var (
// Similar between ../webmail/webmail.go:/metricSubmission and ../smtpserver/server.go:/metricSubmission
metricSubmission = promauto.NewCounterVec(
prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "mox_webmail_submission_total",
Help: "Webmail message submission results, known values (those ending with error are server errors): ok, badfrom, messagelimiterror, recipientlimiterror, queueerror, storesenterror.",
},
[]string{
"result",
},
)
metricServerErrors = promauto.NewCounterVec(
prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "mox_webmail_errors_total",
Help: "Webmail server errors, known values: dkimsign, submit.",
},
[]string{
"error",
},
)
metricSSEConnections = promauto.NewGauge(
prometheus.GaugeOpts{
Name: "mox_webmail_sse_connections",
Help: "Number of active webmail SSE connections.",
},
)
)
func xcheckf(ctx context.Context, err error, format string, args ...any) {
if err == nil {
return
}
msg := fmt.Sprintf(format, args...)
errmsg := fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", msg, err)
xlog.WithContext(ctx).Errorx(msg, err)
panic(&sherpa.Error{Code: "server:error", Message: errmsg})
}
func xcheckuserf(ctx context.Context, err error, format string, args ...any) {
if err == nil {
return
}
msg := fmt.Sprintf(format, args...)
errmsg := fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", msg, err)
xlog.WithContext(ctx).Errorx(msg, err)
panic(&sherpa.Error{Code: "user:error", Message: errmsg})
}
func xdbwrite(ctx context.Context, acc *store.Account, fn func(tx *bstore.Tx)) {
err := acc.DB.Write(ctx, func(tx *bstore.Tx) error {
fn(tx)
return nil
})
xcheckf(ctx, err, "transaction")
}
func xdbread(ctx context.Context, acc *store.Account, fn func(tx *bstore.Tx)) {
err := acc.DB.Read(ctx, func(tx *bstore.Tx) error {
fn(tx)
return nil
})
xcheckf(ctx, err, "transaction")
}
// We merge the js into the html at first load, cache a gzipped version that is
// generated on first need, and respond with a Last-Modified header. For quickly
// serving a single, compressed, cacheable file.
type merged struct {
sync.Mutex
combined []byte
combinedGzip []byte
mtime time.Time // For Last-Modified and conditional request.
fallbackHTML, fallbackJS []byte // The embedded html/js files.
htmlPath, jsPath string // Paths used during development.
}
var webmail = &merged{
fallbackHTML: webmailHTML,
fallbackJS: webmailJS,
htmlPath: "webmail/webmail.html",
jsPath: "webmail/webmail.js",
}
// fallbackMtime returns a time to use for the Last-Modified header in case we
// cannot find a file, e.g. when used in production.
func fallbackMtime(log *mlog.Log) time.Time {
p, err := os.Executable()
log.Check(err, "finding executable for mtime")
if err == nil {
st, err := os.Stat(p)
log.Check(err, "stat on executable for mtime")
if err == nil {
return st.ModTime()
}
}
log.Info("cannot find executable for webmail mtime, using current time")
return time.Now()
}
func (m *merged) serve(ctx context.Context, log *mlog.Log, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// We typically return the embedded file, but during development it's handy
// to load from disk.
fhtml, _ := os.Open(m.htmlPath)
if fhtml != nil {
defer fhtml.Close()
}
fjs, _ := os.Open(m.jsPath)
if fjs != nil {
defer fjs.Close()
}
html := m.fallbackHTML
js := m.fallbackJS
var diskmtime time.Time
var refreshdisk bool
if fhtml != nil && fjs != nil {
sth, err := fhtml.Stat()
xcheckf(ctx, err, "stat html")
stj, err := fjs.Stat()
xcheckf(ctx, err, "stat js")
maxmtime := sth.ModTime()
if stj.ModTime().After(maxmtime) {
maxmtime = stj.ModTime()
}
m.Lock()
refreshdisk = maxmtime.After(m.mtime) || m.combined == nil
m.Unlock()
if refreshdisk {
html, err = io.ReadAll(fhtml)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "reading html")
js, err = io.ReadAll(fjs)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "reading js")
diskmtime = maxmtime
}
}
gz := acceptsGzip(r)
var out []byte
var mtime time.Time
func() {
m.Lock()
defer m.Unlock()
if refreshdisk || m.combined == nil {
script := []byte(`<script>/* placeholder */</script>`)
index := bytes.Index(html, script)
if index < 0 {
xcheckf(ctx, errors.New("script not found"), "generating combined html")
}
var b bytes.Buffer
b.Write(html[:index])
fmt.Fprintf(&b, "<script>\n// Javascript is generated from typescript, don't modify the javascript because changes will be lost.\nconst moxversion = \"%s\";\n", moxvar.Version)
b.Write(js)
b.WriteString("\t\t</script>")
b.Write(html[index+len(script):])
out = b.Bytes()
m.combined = out
if refreshdisk {
m.mtime = diskmtime
} else {
m.mtime = fallbackMtime(log)
}
m.combinedGzip = nil
} else {
out = m.combined
}
if gz {
if m.combinedGzip == nil {
var b bytes.Buffer
gzw, err := gzip.NewWriterLevel(&b, gzip.BestCompression)
if err == nil {
_, err = gzw.Write(out)
}
if err == nil {
err = gzw.Close()
}
xcheckf(ctx, err, "gzipping combined html")
m.combinedGzip = b.Bytes()
}
out = m.combinedGzip
}
mtime = m.mtime
}()
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
http.ServeContent(gzipInjector{w, gz}, r, "", mtime, bytes.NewReader(out))
}
// gzipInjector is a http.ResponseWriter that optionally injects a
// Content-Encoding: gzip header, only in case of status 200 OK. Used with
// http.ServeContent to serve gzipped content if the client supports it. We cannot
// just unconditionally add the content-encoding header, because we don't know
// enough if we will be sending data: http.ServeContent may be sending a "not
// modified" response, and possibly others.
type gzipInjector struct {
http.ResponseWriter // Keep most methods.
gz bool
}
// WriteHeader adds a Content-Encoding: gzip header before actually writing the
// headers and status.
func (w gzipInjector) WriteHeader(statusCode int) {
if w.gz && statusCode == http.StatusOK {
w.ResponseWriter.Header().Set("Content-Encoding", "gzip")
}
w.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(statusCode)
}
// Serve content, either from a file, or return the fallback data. Caller
// should already have set the content-type. We use this to return a file from
// the local file system (during development), or embedded in the binary (when
// deployed).
func serveContentFallback(log *mlog.Log, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, path string, fallback []byte) {
f, err := os.Open(path)
if err == nil {
defer f.Close()
st, err := f.Stat()
if err == nil {
http.ServeContent(w, r, "", st.ModTime(), f)
}
}
http.ServeContent(w, r, "", fallbackMtime(log), bytes.NewReader(fallback))
}
// Escape mime content header parameter, such as content-type charset or
// content-disposition filename.
func escapeParam(s string) string {
// todo: follow ../rfc/2183?
basic := len(s) > 0
for _, c := range s {
if c >= 'a' && c <= 'z' || c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z' || c >= '0' && c <= '9' || c == '-' || c == '_' || c == '.' {
continue
}
basic = false
break
}
if basic {
return s
}
return `"` + strings.NewReplacer(`\`, `\\`, `"`, `\"`).Replace(s) + `"`
}
// Handler returns a handler for the webmail endpoints, customized for the max
// message size coming from the listener.
func Handler(maxMessageSize int64) func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sh, err := makeSherpaHandler(maxMessageSize)
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "500 - internal server error - cannot handle requests", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
handle(sh, w, r)
}
}
func handle(apiHandler http.Handler, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
log := xlog.WithContext(ctx).Fields(mlog.Field("userauth", ""))
// Server-sent event connection, for all initial data (list of mailboxes), list of
// messages, and all events afterwards. Authenticated through a token in the query
// string, which it got from a Token API call.
if r.URL.Path == "/events" {
serveEvents(ctx, log, w, r)
return
}
// HTTP Basic authentication for all requests.
loginAddress, accName := webaccount.CheckAuth(ctx, log, "webmail", w, r)
if accName == "" {
// Error response already sent.
return
}
if lw, ok := w.(interface{ AddField(f mlog.Pair) }); ok {
lw.AddField(mlog.Field("authaccount", accName))
}
defer func() {
x := recover()
if x == nil {
return
}
err, ok := x.(*sherpa.Error)
if !ok {
log.WithContext(ctx).Error("handle panic", mlog.Field("err", x))
debug.PrintStack()
metrics.PanicInc("webmail-handle")
panic(x)
}
if strings.HasPrefix(err.Code, "user:") {
log.Debugx("webmail user error", err)
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - "+err.Message, http.StatusBadRequest)
} else {
log.Errorx("webmail server error", err)
http.Error(w, "500 - internal server error - "+err.Message, http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
}()
switch r.URL.Path {
case "/":
switch r.Method {
default:
http.Error(w, "405 - method not allowed - use get", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
case "GET", "HEAD":
}
webmail.serve(ctx, log, w, r)
return
case "/msg.js", "/text.js":
switch r.Method {
default:
http.Error(w, "405 - method not allowed - use get", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
case "GET", "HEAD":
}
path := filepath.Join("webmail", r.URL.Path[1:])
var fallback = webmailmsgJS
if r.URL.Path == "/text.js" {
fallback = webmailtextJS
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8")
serveContentFallback(log, w, r, path, fallback)
return
}
// API calls.
if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/") {
reqInfo := requestInfo{loginAddress, accName, r}
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, requestInfoCtxKey, reqInfo)
apiHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
return
}
// We are now expecting the following URLs:
// .../msg/<msgid>/{attachments.zip,parsedmessage.js,raw}
// .../msg/<msgid>/{,msg}{text,html,htmlexternal}
// .../msg/<msgid>/{view,viewtext,download}/<partid>
if !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/msg/") {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
t := strings.Split(r.URL.Path[len("/msg/"):], "/")
if len(t) < 2 {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(t[0], 10, 64)
if err != nil || id == 0 {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
// Many of the requests need either a message or a parsed part. Make it easy to
// fetch/prepare and cleanup. We only do all the work when the request seems legit
// (valid HTTP route and method).
xprepare := func() (acc *store.Account, m store.Message, msgr *store.MsgReader, p message.Part, cleanup func(), ok bool) {
if r.Method != "GET" {
http.Error(w, "405 - method not allowed - post required", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
defer func() {
if ok {
return
}
if msgr != nil {
err := msgr.Close()
log.Check(err, "closing message reader")
msgr = nil
}
if acc != nil {
err := acc.Close()
log.Check(err, "closing account")
acc = nil
}
}()
var err error
acc, err = store.OpenAccount(accName)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "open account")
m = store.Message{ID: id}
err = acc.DB.Get(ctx, &m)
if err == bstore.ErrAbsent || err == nil && m.Expunged {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
xcheckf(ctx, err, "get message")
msgr = acc.MessageReader(m)
p, err = m.LoadPart(msgr)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "load parsed message")
cleanup = func() {
err := msgr.Close()
log.Check(err, "closing message reader")
err = acc.Close()
log.Check(err, "closing account")
}
ok = true
return
}
h := w.Header()
// We set a Content-Security-Policy header that is as strict as possible, depending
// on the type of message/part/html/js. We have to be careful because we are
// returning data that is coming in from external places. E.g. HTML could contain
// javascripts that we don't want to execute, especially not on our domain. We load
// resources in an iframe. The CSP policy starts out with default-src 'none' to
// disallow loading anything, then start allowing what is safe, such as inlined
// datauri images and inline styles. Data can only be loaded when the request is
// coming from the same origin (so other sites cannot include resources
// (messages/parts)).
//
// We want to load resources in sandbox-mode, causing the page to be loaded as from
// a different origin. If sameOrigin is set, we have a looser CSP policy:
// allow-same-origin is set so resources are loaded as coming from this same
// origin. This is needed for the msg* endpoints that render a message, where we
// load the message body in a separate iframe again (with stricter CSP again),
// which we need to access for its inner height. If allowSelfScript is also set
// (for "msgtext"), the CSP leaves out the sandbox entirely.
//
// If allowExternal is set, we allow loading image, media (audio/video), styles and
// fronts from external URLs as well as inline URI's. By default we don't allow any
// loading of content, except inlined images (we do that ourselves for images
// embedded in the email), and we allow inline styles (which are safely constrained
// to an iframe).
//
// If allowSelfScript is set, inline scripts and scripts from our origin are
// allowed. Used to display a message including header. The header is rendered with
// javascript, the content is rendered in a separate iframe with a CSP that doesn't
// have allowSelfScript.
headers := func(sameOrigin, allowExternal, allowSelfScript bool) {
// allow-popups is needed to make opening links in new tabs work.
sb := "sandbox allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox; "
if sameOrigin && allowSelfScript {
// Sandbox with both allow-same-origin and allow-script would not provide security,
// and would give warning in console about that.
sb = ""
} else if sameOrigin {
sb = "sandbox allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox allow-same-origin; "
}
script := ""
if allowSelfScript {
script = "; script-src 'unsafe-inline' 'self'; frame-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'"
}
var csp string
if allowExternal {
csp = sb + "frame-ancestors 'self'; default-src 'none'; img-src data: http: https: 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'unsafe-inline' data: http: https:; font-src data: http: https: 'unsafe-inline'; media-src 'unsafe-inline' data: http: https:" + script
} else {
csp = sb + "frame-ancestors 'self'; default-src 'none'; img-src data:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'" + script
}
h.Set("Content-Security-Policy", csp)
h.Set("X-Frame-Options", "sameorigin") // Duplicate with CSP, but better too much than too little.
h.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
h.Set("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
}
switch {
case len(t) == 2 && t[1] == "attachments.zip":
acc, m, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
state := msgState{acc: acc, m: m, msgr: msgr, part: &p}
// note: state is cleared by cleanup
mi, err := messageItem(log, m, &state)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "parsing message")
headers(false, false, false)
h.Set("Content-Type", "application/zip")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache, max-age=0")
var subjectSlug string
if p.Envelope != nil {
s := p.Envelope.Subject
s = strings.ToLower(s)
s = regexp.MustCompile("[^a-z0-9_.-]").ReplaceAllString(s, "-")
s = regexp.MustCompile("--*").ReplaceAllString(s, "-")
s = strings.TrimLeft(s, "-")
s = strings.TrimRight(s, "-")
if s != "" {
s = "-" + s
}
subjectSlug = s
}
filename := fmt.Sprintf("email-%d-attachments-%s%s.zip", m.ID, m.Received.Format("20060102-150405"), subjectSlug)
h.Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf(`attachment; filename=%s`, escapeParam(filename)))
zw := zip.NewWriter(w)
names := map[string]bool{}
for _, a := range mi.Attachments {
ap := a.Part
name := ap.ContentTypeParams["name"]
if name == "" {
// We don't check errors, this is all best-effort.
h, _ := ap.Header()
disposition := h.Get("Content-Disposition")
_, params, _ := mime.ParseMediaType(disposition)
name = params["filename"]
}
if name != "" {
name = filepath.Base(name)
}
mt := strings.ToLower(ap.MediaType + "/" + ap.MediaSubType)
if name == "" || names[name] {
ext := filepath.Ext(name)
if ext == "" {
// Handle just a few basic types.
extensions := map[string]string{
"text/plain": ".txt",
"text/html": ".html",
"image/jpeg": ".jpg",
"image/png": ".png",
"image/gif": ".gif",
"application/zip": ".zip",
}
ext = extensions[mt]
if ext == "" {
ext = ".bin"
}
}
var stem string
if name != "" && strings.HasSuffix(name, ext) {
stem = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ext)
} else {
stem = "attachment"
for _, index := range a.Path {
stem += fmt.Sprintf("-%d", index)
}
}
name = stem + ext
seq := 0
for names[name] {
seq++
name = stem + fmt.Sprintf("-%d", seq) + ext
}
}
names[name] = true
fh := zip.FileHeader{
Name: name,
Modified: m.Received,
}
nodeflate := map[string]bool{
"application/x-bzip2": true,
"application/zip": true,
"application/x-zip-compressed": true,
"application/gzip": true,
"application/x-gzip": true,
"application/vnd.rar": true,
"application/x-rar-compressed": true,
"application/x-7z-compressed": true,
}
// Sniff content-type as well for compressed data.
buf := make([]byte, 512)
n, _ := io.ReadFull(ap.Reader(), buf)
var sniffmt string
if n > 0 {
sniffmt = strings.ToLower(http.DetectContentType(buf[:n]))
}
deflate := ap.MediaType != "VIDEO" && ap.MediaType != "AUDIO" && (ap.MediaType != "IMAGE" || ap.MediaSubType == "BMP") && !nodeflate[mt] && !nodeflate[sniffmt]
if deflate {
fh.Method = zip.Deflate
}
// We cannot return errors anymore: we have already sent an application/zip header.
if zf, err := zw.CreateHeader(&fh); err != nil {
log.Check(err, "adding to zip file")
return
} else if _, err := io.Copy(zf, ap.Reader()); err != nil {
log.Check(err, "writing to zip file")
return
}
}
err = zw.Close()
log.Check(err, "final write to zip file")
// Raw display of a message, as text/plain.
case len(t) == 2 && t[1] == "raw":
_, _, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
// We intentially use text/plain. We certainly don't want to return a format that
// browsers or users would think of executing. We do set the charset if available
// on the outer part. If present, we assume it may be relevant for other parts. If
// not, there is not much we could do better...
headers(false, false, false)
ct := "text/plain"
if charset := p.ContentTypeParams["charset"]; charset != "" {
ct += fmt.Sprintf("; charset=%s", escapeParam(charset))
}
h.Set("Content-Type", ct)
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache, max-age=0")
_, err := io.Copy(w, &moxio.AtReader{R: msgr})
log.Check(err, "writing raw")
case len(t) == 2 && (t[1] == "msgtext" || t[1] == "msghtml" || t[1] == "msghtmlexternal"):
// msg.html has a javascript tag with message data, and javascript to render the
// message header like the regular webmail.html and to load the message body in a
// separate iframe with a separate request with stronger CSP.
acc, m, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
state := msgState{acc: acc, m: m, msgr: msgr, part: &p}
// note: state is cleared by cleanup
pm, err := parsedMessage(log, m, &state, true, true)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "getting parsed message")
if t[1] == "msgtext" && len(pm.Texts) == 0 || t[1] != "msgtext" && !pm.HasHTML {
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - no such part", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
sameorigin := true
loadExternal := t[1] == "msghtmlexternal"
allowSelfScript := true
headers(sameorigin, loadExternal, allowSelfScript)
h.Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache, max-age=0")
path := "webmail/msg.html"
fallback := webmailmsgHTML
serveContentFallback(log, w, r, path, fallback)
case len(t) == 2 && t[1] == "parsedmessage.js":
// Used by msg.html, for the msg* endpoints, for the data needed to show all data
// except the message body.
// This is js with data inside instead so we can load it synchronously, which we do
// to get a "loaded" event after the page was actually loaded.
acc, m, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
state := msgState{acc: acc, m: m, msgr: msgr, part: &p}
// note: state is cleared by cleanup
pm, err := parsedMessage(log, m, &state, true, true)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "parsing parsedmessage")
pmjson, err := json.Marshal(pm)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "marshal parsedmessage")
m.MsgPrefix = nil
m.ParsedBuf = nil
mi := MessageItem{m, pm.envelope, pm.attachments, pm.isSigned, pm.isEncrypted, pm.firstLine}
mijson, err := json.Marshal(mi)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "marshal messageitem")
headers(false, false, false)
h.Set("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache, max-age=0")
_, err = fmt.Fprintf(w, "window.messageItem = %s;\nwindow.parsedMessage = %s;\n", mijson, pmjson)
log.Check(err, "writing parsedmessage.js")
case len(t) == 2 && t[1] == "text":
// Returns text.html whichs loads the message data with a javascript tag and
// renders just the text content with the same code as webmail.html. Used by the
// iframe in the msgtext endpoint. Not used by the regular webmail viewer, it
// renders the text itself, with the same shared js code.
acc, m, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
state := msgState{acc: acc, m: m, msgr: msgr, part: &p}
// note: state is cleared by cleanup
pm, err := parsedMessage(log, m, &state, true, true)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "parsing parsedmessage")
if len(pm.Texts) == 0 {
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - no text part in message", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Needed for inner document height for outer iframe height in separate message view.
sameorigin := true
allowSelfScript := true
headers(sameorigin, false, allowSelfScript)
h.Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache, max-age=0")
// We typically return the embedded file, but during development it's handy to load
// from disk.
path := "webmail/text.html"
fallback := webmailtextHTML
serveContentFallback(log, w, r, path, fallback)
case len(t) == 2 && (t[1] == "html" || t[1] == "htmlexternal"):
// Returns the first HTML part, with "cid:" URIs replaced with an inlined datauri
// if the referenced Content-ID attachment can be found.
_, _, _, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
setHeaders := func() {
// Needed for inner document height for outer iframe height in separate message
// view. We only need that when displaying as a separate message on the msghtml*
// endpoints. When displaying in the regular webmail, we don't need to know the
// inner height so we load it as different origin, which should be safer.
sameorigin := r.URL.Query().Get("sameorigin") == "true"
allowExternal := strings.HasSuffix(t[1], "external")
headers(sameorigin, allowExternal, false)
h.Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache, max-age=0")
}
// todo: skip certain html parts? e.g. with content-disposition: attachment?
var done bool
var usePart func(p *message.Part, parents []*message.Part)
usePart = func(p *message.Part, parents []*message.Part) {
if done {
return
}
mt := p.MediaType + "/" + p.MediaSubType
switch mt {
case "TEXT/HTML":
done = true
err := inlineSanitizeHTML(log, setHeaders, w, p, parents)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - "+err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
}
return
}
parents = append(parents, p)
for _, sp := range p.Parts {
usePart(&sp, parents)
}
}
usePart(&p, nil)
if !done {
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - no html part in message", http.StatusBadRequest)
}
case len(t) == 3 && (t[1] == "view" || t[1] == "viewtext" || t[1] == "download"):
// View any part, as referenced in the last element path. "0" is the whole message,
// 0.0 is the first subpart, etc. "view" returns it with the content-type from the
// message (could be dangerous, but we set strict CSP headers), "viewtext" returns
// data with a text/plain content-type so the browser will attempt to display it,
// and "download" adds a content-disposition header causing the browser the
// download the file.
_, _, _, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
paths := strings.Split(t[2], ".")
if len(paths) == 0 || paths[0] != "0" {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
ap := p
for _, e := range paths[1:] {
index, err := strconv.ParseInt(e, 10, 32)
if err != nil || index < 0 || int(index) >= len(ap.Parts) {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
ap = ap.Parts[int(index)]
}
headers(false, false, false)
var ct string
if t[1] == "viewtext" {
ct = "text/plain"
} else {
ct = strings.ToLower(ap.MediaType + "/" + ap.MediaSubType)
}
h.Set("Content-Type", ct)
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache, max-age=0")
if t[1] == "download" {
name := ap.ContentTypeParams["name"]
if name == "" {
// We don't check errors, this is all best-effort.
h, _ := ap.Header()
disposition := h.Get("Content-Disposition")
_, params, _ := mime.ParseMediaType(disposition)
name = params["filename"]
}
if name == "" {
name = "attachment.bin"
}
h.Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf(`attachment; filename=%s`, escapeParam(name)))
}
_, err := io.Copy(w, ap.Reader())
if err != nil && !moxio.IsClosed(err) {
log.Errorx("copying attachment", err)
}
default:
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
}
func acceptsGzip(r *http.Request) bool {
s := r.Header.Get("Accept-Encoding")
t := strings.Split(s, ",")
for _, e := range t {
e = strings.TrimSpace(e)
tt := strings.Split(e, ";")
if len(tt) > 1 && t[1] == "q=0" {
continue
}
if tt[0] == "gzip" {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// inlineSanitizeHTML writes the part as HTML, with "cid:" URIs for html "src"
// attributes inlined and with potentially dangerous tags removed (javascript). The
// sanitizing is just a first layer of defense, CSP headers block execution of
// scripts. If the HTML becomes too large, an error is returned. Before writing
// HTML, setHeaders is called to write the required headers for content-type and
// CSP. On error, setHeader is not called, no output is written and the caller
// should write an error response.
func inlineSanitizeHTML(log *mlog.Log, setHeaders func(), w io.Writer, p *message.Part, parents []*message.Part) error {
// Prepare cids if there is a chance we will use them.
cids := map[string]*message.Part{}
for _, parent := range parents {
if parent.MediaType+"/"+parent.MediaSubType == "MULTIPART/RELATED" && p.DecodedSize < 2*1024*1024 {
for i, rp := range parent.Parts {
if rp.ContentID != "" {
cids[strings.ToLower(rp.ContentID)] = &parent.Parts[i]
}
}
}
}
node, err := html.Parse(p.ReaderUTF8OrBinary())
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("parsing html: %v", err)
}
// We track size, if it becomes too much, we abort and still copy as regular html.
var totalSize int64
if err := inlineNode(node, cids, &totalSize); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("inline cid uris in html nodes: %w", err)
}
sanitizeNode(node)
setHeaders()
err = html.Render(w, node)
log.Check(err, "writing html")
return nil
}
// We inline cid: URIs into data: URIs. If a cid is missing in the
// multipart/related, we ignore the error and continue with other HTML nodes. It
// will probably just result in a "broken image". We limit the max size we
// generate. We only replace "src" attributes that start with "cid:". A cid URI
// could theoretically occur in many more places, like link href, and css url().
// That's probably not common though. Let's wait for someone to need it.
func inlineNode(node *html.Node, cids map[string]*message.Part, totalSize *int64) error {
for i, a := range node.Attr {
if a.Key != "src" || !caselessPrefix(a.Val, "cid:") || a.Namespace != "" {
continue
}
cid := a.Val[4:]
ap := cids["<"+strings.ToLower(cid)+">"]
if ap == nil {
// Missing cid, can happen with email, no need to stop returning data.
continue
}
*totalSize += ap.DecodedSize
if *totalSize >= 10*1024*1024 {
return fmt.Errorf("html too large")
}
var sb strings.Builder
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(&sb, "data:%s;base64,", strings.ToLower(ap.MediaType+"/"+ap.MediaSubType)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing datauri: %v", err)
}
w := base64.NewEncoder(base64.StdEncoding, &sb)
if _, err := io.Copy(w, ap.Reader()); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing base64 datauri: %v", err)
}
node.Attr[i].Val = sb.String()
}
for node = node.FirstChild; node != nil; node = node.NextSibling {
if err := inlineNode(node, cids, totalSize); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func caselessPrefix(k, pre string) bool {
return len(k) >= len(pre) && strings.EqualFold(k[:len(pre)], pre)
}
var targetable = map[string]bool{
"a": true,
"area": true,
"form": true,
"base": true,
}
// sanitizeNode removes script elements, on* attributes, javascript: href
// attributes, adds target="_blank" to all links and to a base tag.
func sanitizeNode(node *html.Node) {
i := 0
var haveTarget, haveRel bool
for i < len(node.Attr) {
a := node.Attr[i]
// Remove dangerous attributes.
if strings.HasPrefix(a.Key, "on") || a.Key == "href" && caselessPrefix(a.Val, "javascript:") || a.Key == "src" && caselessPrefix(a.Val, "data:text/html") {
copy(node.Attr[i:], node.Attr[i+1:])
node.Attr = node.Attr[:len(node.Attr)-1]
continue
}
if a.Key == "target" {
node.Attr[i].Val = "_blank"
haveTarget = true
}
if a.Key == "rel" && targetable[node.Data] {
node.Attr[i].Val = "noopener noreferrer"
haveRel = true
}
i++
}
// Ensure target attribute is set for elements that can have it.
if !haveTarget && node.Type == html.ElementNode && targetable[node.Data] {
node.Attr = append(node.Attr, html.Attribute{Key: "target", Val: "_blank"})
haveTarget = true
}
if haveTarget && !haveRel {
node.Attr = append(node.Attr, html.Attribute{Key: "rel", Val: "noopener noreferrer"})
}
parent := node
node = node.FirstChild
var haveBase bool
for node != nil {
// Set next now, we may remove cur, which clears its NextSibling.
cur := node
node = node.NextSibling
// Remove script elements.
if cur.Type == html.ElementNode && cur.Data == "script" {
parent.RemoveChild(cur)
continue
}
sanitizeNode(cur)
}
if parent.Type == html.ElementNode && parent.Data == "head" && !haveBase {
n := html.Node{Type: html.ElementNode, Data: "base", Attr: []html.Attribute{{Key: "target", Val: "_blank"}, {Key: "rel", Val: "noopener noreferrer"}}}
parent.AppendChild(&n)
}
}