Mechiel Lukkien 8ca198882e security fix: use correct domain for mta-sts, that of the email address ... the original next-hop domain. not anything after resolving cname's, because then it takes just a single injected dns cname record to lead us to an unrelated server (that we would verify, but it's the wrong server). also don't fallback to just strict tls when something is wrong. we must use the policy to check if an mx host is allowed. the whole idea is that unsigned dns records cannot be trusted. i noticed this while implementing dane.		2023-10-14 22:30:43 +02:00
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direct.go	security fix: use correct domain for mta-sts, that of the email address	2023-10-14 22:30:43 +02:00
dsn.go	make mox compile on windows, without "mox serve" but with working "mox localserve"	2023-10-14 10:54:07 +02:00
queue.go	make mox compile on windows, without "mox serve" but with working "mox localserve"	2023-10-14 10:54:07 +02:00
queue_test.go	make mox compile on windows, without "mox serve" but with working "mox localserve"	2023-10-14 10:54:07 +02:00
submit.go	implement dnssec-awareness throughout code, and dane for incoming/outgoing mail delivery	2023-10-10 12:09:35 +02:00