mox/webmail/webmail.go
Mechiel Lukkien 594182aae5
webmail: rename query string param "token" to "singleUseToken" to be less scary in access logs
these singleusetokens can be redeemed once. so when you see it in the logs, it
can't be used again. they are short-lived anyway.

this change should help prevent me periodically investigating token handling...
2024-08-23 15:08:27 +02:00

933 lines
30 KiB
Go

// Package webmail implements a webmail client, serving html/js and providing an API for message actions and SSE endpoint for receiving real-time updates.
package webmail
// todo: should we be serving the messages/parts on a separate (sub)domain for user-content? to limit damage if the csp rules aren't enough.
import (
"archive/zip"
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"mime"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"runtime/debug"
"strconv"
"strings"
_ "embed"
"golang.org/x/net/html"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promauto"
"github.com/mjl-/bstore"
"github.com/mjl-/sherpa"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/message"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/metrics"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/mlog"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/mox-"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/moxio"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/store"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/webauth"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/webops"
)
var pkglog = mlog.New("webmail", nil)
type ctxKey string
// We pass the request to the sherpa handler so the TLS info can be used for
// the Received header in submitted messages. Most API calls need just the
// account name.
var requestInfoCtxKey ctxKey = "requestInfo"
type requestInfo struct {
Log mlog.Log
LoginAddress string
Account *store.Account // Nil only for methods Login and LoginPrep.
SessionToken store.SessionToken
Response http.ResponseWriter
Request *http.Request // For Proto and TLS connection state during message submit.
}
//go:embed webmail.html
var webmailHTML []byte
//go:embed webmail.js
var webmailJS []byte
//go:embed msg.html
var webmailmsgHTML []byte
//go:embed msg.js
var webmailmsgJS []byte
//go:embed text.html
var webmailtextHTML []byte
//go:embed text.js
var webmailtextJS []byte
var (
// Similar between ../webmail/webmail.go:/metricSubmission and ../smtpserver/server.go:/metricSubmission and ../webapisrv/server.go:/metricSubmission
metricSubmission = promauto.NewCounterVec(
prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "mox_webmail_submission_total",
Help: "Webmail message submission results, known values (those ending with error are server errors): ok, badfrom, messagelimiterror, recipientlimiterror, queueerror, storesenterror.",
},
[]string{
"result",
},
)
metricServerErrors = promauto.NewCounterVec(
prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "mox_webmail_errors_total",
Help: "Webmail server errors, known values: dkimsign, submit.",
},
[]string{
"error",
},
)
metricSSEConnections = promauto.NewGauge(
prometheus.GaugeOpts{
Name: "mox_webmail_sse_connections",
Help: "Number of active webmail SSE connections.",
},
)
)
func xcheckf(ctx context.Context, err error, format string, args ...any) {
if err == nil {
return
}
msg := fmt.Sprintf(format, args...)
errmsg := fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", msg, err)
pkglog.WithContext(ctx).Errorx(msg, err)
code := "server:error"
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
code = "user:error"
}
panic(&sherpa.Error{Code: code, Message: errmsg})
}
func xcheckuserf(ctx context.Context, err error, format string, args ...any) {
if err == nil {
return
}
msg := fmt.Sprintf(format, args...)
errmsg := fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", msg, err)
pkglog.WithContext(ctx).Errorx(msg, err)
panic(&sherpa.Error{Code: "user:error", Message: errmsg})
}
func xdbwrite(ctx context.Context, acc *store.Account, fn func(tx *bstore.Tx)) {
err := acc.DB.Write(ctx, func(tx *bstore.Tx) error {
fn(tx)
return nil
})
xcheckf(ctx, err, "transaction")
}
func xdbread(ctx context.Context, acc *store.Account, fn func(tx *bstore.Tx)) {
err := acc.DB.Read(ctx, func(tx *bstore.Tx) error {
fn(tx)
return nil
})
xcheckf(ctx, err, "transaction")
}
var webmailFile = &mox.WebappFile{
HTML: webmailHTML,
JS: webmailJS,
HTMLPath: filepath.FromSlash("webmail/webmail.html"),
JSPath: filepath.FromSlash("webmail/webmail.js"),
}
// Serve content, either from a file, or return the fallback data. Caller
// should already have set the content-type. We use this to return a file from
// the local file system (during development), or embedded in the binary (when
// deployed).
func serveContentFallback(log mlog.Log, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, path string, fallback []byte) {
f, err := os.Open(path)
if err == nil {
defer f.Close()
st, err := f.Stat()
if err == nil {
http.ServeContent(w, r, "", st.ModTime(), f)
return
}
}
http.ServeContent(w, r, "", mox.FallbackMtime(log), bytes.NewReader(fallback))
}
func init() {
mox.NewWebmailHandler = func(maxMsgSize int64, basePath string, isForwarded bool, accountPath string) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(Handler(maxMsgSize, basePath, isForwarded, accountPath))
}
}
// Handler returns a handler for the webmail endpoints, customized for the max
// message size coming from the listener and cookiePath.
func Handler(maxMessageSize int64, cookiePath string, isForwarded bool, accountPath string) func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sh, err := makeSherpaHandler(maxMessageSize, cookiePath, isForwarded)
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "500 - internal server error - cannot handle requests", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
handle(sh, isForwarded, accountPath, w, r)
}
}
func handle(apiHandler http.Handler, isForwarded bool, accountPath string, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
log := pkglog.WithContext(ctx).With(slog.String("userauth", ""))
// Server-sent event connection, for all initial data (list of mailboxes), list of
// messages, and all events afterwards. Authenticated through a single use token in
// the query string, which it got from a Token API call.
if r.URL.Path == "/events" {
serveEvents(ctx, log, accountPath, w, r)
return
}
defer func() {
x := recover()
if x == nil {
return
}
err, ok := x.(*sherpa.Error)
if !ok {
log.WithContext(ctx).Error("handle panic", slog.Any("err", x))
debug.PrintStack()
metrics.PanicInc(metrics.Webmailhandle)
panic(x)
}
if strings.HasPrefix(err.Code, "user:") {
log.Debugx("webmail user error", err)
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - "+err.Message, http.StatusBadRequest)
} else {
log.Errorx("webmail server error", err)
http.Error(w, "500 - internal server error - "+err.Message, http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
}()
switch r.URL.Path {
case "/":
switch r.Method {
case "GET", "HEAD":
h := w.Header()
h.Set("X-Frame-Options", "deny")
h.Set("Referrer-Policy", "same-origin")
webmailFile.Serve(ctx, log, w, r)
default:
http.Error(w, "405 - method not allowed - use get", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
return
case "/msg.js", "/text.js":
switch r.Method {
default:
http.Error(w, "405 - method not allowed - use get", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
case "GET", "HEAD":
}
path := filepath.Join("webmail", r.URL.Path[1:])
var fallback = webmailmsgJS
if r.URL.Path == "/text.js" {
fallback = webmailtextJS
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8")
serveContentFallback(log, w, r, path, fallback)
return
}
isAPI := strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/")
// Only allow POST for calls, they will not work cross-domain without CORS.
if isAPI && r.URL.Path != "/api/" && r.Method != "POST" {
http.Error(w, "405 - method not allowed - use post", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
var loginAddress, accName string
var sessionToken store.SessionToken
// All other URLs, except the login endpoint require some authentication.
if r.URL.Path != "/api/LoginPrep" && r.URL.Path != "/api/Login" {
var ok bool
isExport := r.URL.Path == "/export"
requireCSRF := isAPI || isExport
accName, sessionToken, loginAddress, ok = webauth.Check(ctx, log, webauth.Accounts, "webmail", isForwarded, w, r, isAPI, requireCSRF, isExport)
if !ok {
// Response has been written already.
return
}
}
if isAPI {
var acc *store.Account
if accName != "" {
log = log.With(slog.String("account", accName))
var err error
acc, err = store.OpenAccount(log, accName)
if err != nil {
log.Errorx("open account", err)
http.Error(w, "500 - internal server error - error opening account", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
defer func() {
err := acc.Close()
log.Check(err, "closing account")
}()
}
reqInfo := requestInfo{log, loginAddress, acc, sessionToken, w, r}
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, requestInfoCtxKey, reqInfo)
apiHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
return
}
// We are now expecting the following URLs:
// .../export
// .../msg/<msgid>/{attachments.zip,parsedmessage.js,raw}
// .../msg/<msgid>/{,msg}{text,html,htmlexternal}
// .../msg/<msgid>/{view,viewtext,download}/<partid>
if r.URL.Path == "/export" {
webops.Export(log, accName, w, r)
return
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/msg/") {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
t := strings.Split(r.URL.Path[len("/msg/"):], "/")
if len(t) < 2 {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
id, err := strconv.ParseInt(t[0], 10, 64)
if err != nil || id == 0 {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
// Many of the requests need either a message or a parsed part. Make it easy to
// fetch/prepare and cleanup. We only do all the work when the request seems legit
// (valid HTTP route and method).
xprepare := func() (acc *store.Account, m store.Message, msgr *store.MsgReader, p message.Part, cleanup func(), ok bool) {
if r.Method != "GET" {
http.Error(w, "405 - method not allowed - post required", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
defer func() {
if ok {
return
}
if msgr != nil {
err := msgr.Close()
log.Check(err, "closing message reader")
msgr = nil
}
if acc != nil {
err := acc.Close()
log.Check(err, "closing account")
acc = nil
}
}()
var err error
acc, err = store.OpenAccount(log, accName)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "open account")
m = store.Message{ID: id}
err = acc.DB.Get(ctx, &m)
if err == bstore.ErrAbsent || err == nil && m.Expunged {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
xcheckf(ctx, err, "get message")
msgr = acc.MessageReader(m)
p, err = m.LoadPart(msgr)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "load parsed message")
cleanup = func() {
err := msgr.Close()
log.Check(err, "closing message reader")
err = acc.Close()
log.Check(err, "closing account")
}
ok = true
return
}
h := w.Header()
// We set a Content-Security-Policy header that is as strict as possible, depending
// on the type of message/part/html/js. We have to be careful because we are
// returning data that is coming in from external places. E.g. HTML could contain
// javascripts that we don't want to execute, especially not on our domain. We load
// resources in an iframe. The CSP policy starts out with default-src 'none' to
// disallow loading anything, then start allowing what is safe, such as inlined
// datauri images and inline styles. Data can only be loaded when the request is
// coming from the same origin (so other sites cannot include resources
// (messages/parts)).
//
// We want to load resources in sandbox-mode, causing the page to be loaded as from
// a different origin. If sameOrigin is set, we have a looser CSP policy:
// allow-same-origin is set so resources are loaded as coming from this same
// origin. This is needed for the msg* endpoints that render a message, where we
// load the message body in a separate iframe again (with stricter CSP again),
// which we need to access for its inner height. If allowSelfScript is also set
// (for "msgtext"), the CSP leaves out the sandbox entirely.
//
// If allowExternal is set, we allow loading image, media (audio/video), styles and
// fronts from external URLs as well as inline URI's. By default we don't allow any
// loading of content, except inlined images (we do that ourselves for images
// embedded in the email), and we allow inline styles (which are safely constrained
// to an iframe).
//
// If allowSelfScript is set, inline scripts and scripts from our origin are
// allowed. Used to display a message including header. The header is rendered with
// javascript, the content is rendered in a separate iframe with a CSP that doesn't
// have allowSelfScript.
headers := func(sameOrigin, allowExternal, allowSelfScript, allowSelfImg bool) {
// allow-popups is needed to make opening links in new tabs work.
sb := "sandbox allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox; "
if sameOrigin && allowSelfScript {
// Sandbox with both allow-same-origin and allow-script would not provide security,
// and would give warning in console about that.
sb = ""
} else if sameOrigin {
sb = "sandbox allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox allow-same-origin; "
}
script := ""
if allowSelfScript {
script = "; script-src 'unsafe-inline' 'self'; frame-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'"
}
var csp string
if allowExternal {
csp = sb + "frame-ancestors 'self'; default-src 'none'; img-src data: http: https: 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'unsafe-inline' data: http: https:; font-src data: http: https: 'unsafe-inline'; media-src 'unsafe-inline' data: http: https:" + script
} else if allowSelfImg {
csp = sb + "frame-ancestors 'self'; default-src 'none'; img-src data: 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'" + script
} else {
csp = sb + "frame-ancestors 'self'; default-src 'none'; img-src data:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'" + script
}
h.Set("Content-Security-Policy", csp)
h.Set("X-Frame-Options", "sameorigin") // Duplicate with CSP, but better too much than too little.
h.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
h.Set("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
}
switch {
case len(t) == 2 && t[1] == "attachments.zip":
acc, m, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
state := msgState{acc: acc, m: m, msgr: msgr, part: &p}
// note: state is cleared by cleanup
mi, err := messageItem(log, m, &state)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "parsing message")
headers(false, false, false, false)
h.Set("Content-Type", "application/zip")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, max-age=0")
var subjectSlug string
if p.Envelope != nil {
s := p.Envelope.Subject
s = strings.ToLower(s)
s = regexp.MustCompile("[^a-z0-9_.-]").ReplaceAllString(s, "-")
s = regexp.MustCompile("--*").ReplaceAllString(s, "-")
s = strings.TrimLeft(s, "-")
s = strings.TrimRight(s, "-")
if s != "" {
s = "-" + s
}
subjectSlug = s
}
filename := fmt.Sprintf("email-%d-attachments-%s%s.zip", m.ID, m.Received.Format("20060102-150405"), subjectSlug)
cd := mime.FormatMediaType("attachment", map[string]string{"filename": filename})
h.Set("Content-Disposition", cd)
zw := zip.NewWriter(w)
names := map[string]bool{}
for _, a := range mi.Attachments {
ap := a.Part
name := tryDecodeParam(log, ap.ContentTypeParams["name"])
if name == "" {
// We don't check errors, this is all best-effort.
h, _ := ap.Header()
disposition := h.Get("Content-Disposition")
_, params, _ := mime.ParseMediaType(disposition)
name = tryDecodeParam(log, params["filename"])
}
if name != "" {
name = filepath.Base(name)
}
mt := strings.ToLower(ap.MediaType + "/" + ap.MediaSubType)
if name == "" || names[name] {
ext := filepath.Ext(name)
if ext == "" {
// Handle just a few basic types.
extensions := map[string]string{
"text/plain": ".txt",
"text/html": ".html",
"image/jpeg": ".jpg",
"image/png": ".png",
"image/gif": ".gif",
"application/zip": ".zip",
}
ext = extensions[mt]
if ext == "" {
ext = ".bin"
}
}
var stem string
if name != "" && strings.HasSuffix(name, ext) {
stem = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ext)
} else {
stem = "attachment"
for _, index := range a.Path {
stem += fmt.Sprintf("-%d", index)
}
}
name = stem + ext
seq := 0
for names[name] {
seq++
name = stem + fmt.Sprintf("-%d", seq) + ext
}
}
names[name] = true
fh := zip.FileHeader{
Name: name,
Modified: m.Received,
}
nodeflate := map[string]bool{
"application/x-bzip2": true,
"application/zip": true,
"application/x-zip-compressed": true,
"application/gzip": true,
"application/x-gzip": true,
"application/vnd.rar": true,
"application/x-rar-compressed": true,
"application/x-7z-compressed": true,
}
// Sniff content-type as well for compressed data.
buf := make([]byte, 512)
n, _ := io.ReadFull(ap.Reader(), buf)
var sniffmt string
if n > 0 {
sniffmt = strings.ToLower(http.DetectContentType(buf[:n]))
}
deflate := ap.MediaType != "VIDEO" && ap.MediaType != "AUDIO" && (ap.MediaType != "IMAGE" || ap.MediaSubType == "BMP") && !nodeflate[mt] && !nodeflate[sniffmt]
if deflate {
fh.Method = zip.Deflate
}
// We cannot return errors anymore: we have already sent an application/zip header.
if zf, err := zw.CreateHeader(&fh); err != nil {
log.Check(err, "adding to zip file")
return
} else if _, err := io.Copy(zf, ap.Reader()); err != nil {
log.Check(err, "writing to zip file")
return
}
}
err = zw.Close()
log.Check(err, "final write to zip file")
// Raw display of a message, as text/plain.
case len(t) == 2 && t[1] == "raw":
_, _, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
// We intentially use text/plain. We certainly don't want to return a format that
// browsers or users would think of executing. We do set the charset if available
// on the outer part. If present, we assume it may be relevant for other parts. If
// not, there is not much we could do better...
headers(false, false, false, false)
ct := "text/plain"
params := map[string]string{}
if charset := p.ContentTypeParams["charset"]; charset != "" {
params["charset"] = charset
}
h.Set("Content-Type", mime.FormatMediaType(ct, params))
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, max-age=0")
_, err := io.Copy(w, &moxio.AtReader{R: msgr})
log.Check(err, "writing raw")
case len(t) == 2 && (t[1] == "msgtext" || t[1] == "msghtml" || t[1] == "msghtmlexternal"):
// msg.html has a javascript tag with message data, and javascript to render the
// message header like the regular webmail.html and to load the message body in a
// separate iframe with a separate request with stronger CSP.
acc, m, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
state := msgState{acc: acc, m: m, msgr: msgr, part: &p}
// note: state is cleared by cleanup
pm, err := parsedMessage(log, m, &state, true, true)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "getting parsed message")
if t[1] == "msgtext" && len(pm.Texts) == 0 || t[1] != "msgtext" && !pm.HasHTML {
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - no such part", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
sameorigin := true
loadExternal := t[1] == "msghtmlexternal"
allowSelfScript := true
headers(sameorigin, loadExternal, allowSelfScript, false)
h.Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, max-age=0")
path := filepath.FromSlash("webmail/msg.html")
fallback := webmailmsgHTML
serveContentFallback(log, w, r, path, fallback)
case len(t) == 2 && t[1] == "parsedmessage.js":
// Used by msg.html, for the msg* endpoints, for the data needed to show all data
// except the message body.
// This is js with data inside instead so we can load it synchronously, which we do
// to get a "loaded" event after the page was actually loaded.
acc, m, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
state := msgState{acc: acc, m: m, msgr: msgr, part: &p}
// note: state is cleared by cleanup
pm, err := parsedMessage(log, m, &state, true, true)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "parsing parsedmessage")
pmjson, err := json.Marshal(pm)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "marshal parsedmessage")
m.MsgPrefix = nil
m.ParsedBuf = nil
mi := MessageItem{m, pm.envelope, pm.attachments, pm.isSigned, pm.isEncrypted, pm.firstLine, false}
mijson, err := json.Marshal(mi)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "marshal messageitem")
headers(false, false, false, false)
h.Set("Content-Type", "application/javascript; charset=utf-8")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, max-age=0")
_, err = fmt.Fprintf(w, "window.messageItem = %s;\nwindow.parsedMessage = %s;\n", mijson, pmjson)
log.Check(err, "writing parsedmessage.js")
case len(t) == 2 && t[1] == "text":
// Returns text.html whichs loads the message data with a javascript tag and
// renders just the text content with the same code as webmail.html. Used by the
// iframe in the msgtext endpoint. Not used by the regular webmail viewer, it
// renders the text itself, with the same shared js code.
acc, m, msgr, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
state := msgState{acc: acc, m: m, msgr: msgr, part: &p}
// note: state is cleared by cleanup
pm, err := parsedMessage(log, m, &state, true, true)
xcheckf(ctx, err, "parsing parsedmessage")
if len(pm.Texts) == 0 {
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - no text part in message", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Needed for inner document height for outer iframe height in separate message view.
sameorigin := true
allowSelfScript := true
allowSelfImg := true
headers(sameorigin, false, allowSelfScript, allowSelfImg)
h.Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, max-age=0")
// We typically return the embedded file, but during development it's handy to load
// from disk.
path := filepath.FromSlash("webmail/text.html")
fallback := webmailtextHTML
serveContentFallback(log, w, r, path, fallback)
case len(t) == 2 && (t[1] == "html" || t[1] == "htmlexternal"):
// Returns the first HTML part, with "cid:" URIs replaced with an inlined datauri
// if the referenced Content-ID attachment can be found.
_, _, _, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
setHeaders := func() {
// Needed for inner document height for outer iframe height in separate message
// view. We only need that when displaying as a separate message on the msghtml*
// endpoints. When displaying in the regular webmail, we don't need to know the
// inner height so we load it as different origin, which should be safer.
sameorigin := r.URL.Query().Get("sameorigin") == "true"
allowExternal := strings.HasSuffix(t[1], "external")
headers(sameorigin, allowExternal, false, false)
h.Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, max-age=0")
}
// todo: skip certain html parts? e.g. with content-disposition: attachment?
var done bool
var usePart func(p *message.Part, parents []*message.Part)
usePart = func(p *message.Part, parents []*message.Part) {
if done {
return
}
mt := p.MediaType + "/" + p.MediaSubType
switch mt {
case "TEXT/HTML":
done = true
err := inlineSanitizeHTML(log, setHeaders, w, p, parents)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - "+err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
}
return
}
parents = append(parents, p)
for _, sp := range p.Parts {
usePart(&sp, parents)
}
}
usePart(&p, nil)
if !done {
http.Error(w, "400 - bad request - no html part in message", http.StatusBadRequest)
}
case len(t) == 3 && (t[1] == "view" || t[1] == "viewtext" || t[1] == "download"):
// View any part, as referenced in the last element path. "0" is the whole message,
// 0.0 is the first subpart, etc. "view" returns it with the content-type from the
// message (could be dangerous, but we set strict CSP headers), "viewtext" returns
// data with a text/plain content-type so the browser will attempt to display it,
// and "download" adds a content-disposition header causing the browser the
// download the file.
_, _, _, p, cleanup, ok := xprepare()
if !ok {
return
}
defer cleanup()
paths := strings.Split(t[2], ".")
if len(paths) == 0 || paths[0] != "0" {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
ap := p
for _, e := range paths[1:] {
index, err := strconv.ParseInt(e, 10, 32)
if err != nil || index < 0 || int(index) >= len(ap.Parts) {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
ap = ap.Parts[int(index)]
}
headers(false, false, false, false)
var ct string
if t[1] == "viewtext" {
ct = "text/plain"
} else {
ct = strings.ToLower(ap.MediaType + "/" + ap.MediaSubType)
}
h.Set("Content-Type", ct)
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-store, max-age=0")
if t[1] == "download" {
name := tryDecodeParam(log, ap.ContentTypeParams["name"])
if name == "" {
// We don't check errors, this is all best-effort.
h, _ := ap.Header()
disposition := h.Get("Content-Disposition")
_, params, _ := mime.ParseMediaType(disposition)
name = tryDecodeParam(log, params["filename"])
}
if name == "" {
name = "attachment.bin"
}
cd := mime.FormatMediaType("attachment", map[string]string{"filename": name})
h.Set("Content-Disposition", cd)
}
_, err := io.Copy(w, ap.Reader())
if err != nil && !moxio.IsClosed(err) {
log.Errorx("copying attachment", err)
}
default:
http.NotFound(w, r)
}
}
// inlineSanitizeHTML writes the part as HTML, with "cid:" URIs for html "src"
// attributes inlined and with potentially dangerous tags removed (javascript). The
// sanitizing is just a first layer of defense, CSP headers block execution of
// scripts. If the HTML becomes too large, an error is returned. Before writing
// HTML, setHeaders is called to write the required headers for content-type and
// CSP. On error, setHeader is not called, no output is written and the caller
// should write an error response.
func inlineSanitizeHTML(log mlog.Log, setHeaders func(), w io.Writer, p *message.Part, parents []*message.Part) error {
// Prepare cids if there is a chance we will use them.
cids := map[string]*message.Part{}
for _, parent := range parents {
if parent.MediaType+"/"+parent.MediaSubType == "MULTIPART/RELATED" && p.DecodedSize < 2*1024*1024 {
for i, rp := range parent.Parts {
if rp.ContentID != "" {
cids[strings.ToLower(rp.ContentID)] = &parent.Parts[i]
}
}
}
}
node, err := html.Parse(p.ReaderUTF8OrBinary())
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("parsing html: %v", err)
}
// We track size, if it becomes too much, we abort and still copy as regular html.
var totalSize int64
if err := inlineNode(node, cids, &totalSize); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("inline cid uris in html nodes: %w", err)
}
sanitizeNode(node)
setHeaders()
err = html.Render(w, node)
log.Check(err, "writing html")
return nil
}
// We inline cid: URIs into data: URIs. If a cid is missing in the
// multipart/related, we ignore the error and continue with other HTML nodes. It
// will probably just result in a "broken image". We limit the max size we
// generate. We only replace "src" attributes that start with "cid:". A cid URI
// could theoretically occur in many more places, like link href, and css url().
// That's probably not common though. Let's wait for someone to need it.
func inlineNode(node *html.Node, cids map[string]*message.Part, totalSize *int64) error {
for i, a := range node.Attr {
if a.Key != "src" || !caselessPrefix(a.Val, "cid:") || a.Namespace != "" {
continue
}
cid := a.Val[4:]
ap := cids["<"+strings.ToLower(cid)+">"]
if ap == nil {
// Missing cid, can happen with email, no need to stop returning data.
continue
}
*totalSize += ap.DecodedSize
if *totalSize >= 10*1024*1024 {
return fmt.Errorf("html too large")
}
var sb strings.Builder
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(&sb, "data:%s;base64,", strings.ToLower(ap.MediaType+"/"+ap.MediaSubType)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing datauri: %v", err)
}
w := base64.NewEncoder(base64.StdEncoding, &sb)
if _, err := io.Copy(w, ap.Reader()); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("writing base64 datauri: %v", err)
}
node.Attr[i].Val = sb.String()
}
for node = node.FirstChild; node != nil; node = node.NextSibling {
if err := inlineNode(node, cids, totalSize); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func caselessPrefix(k, pre string) bool {
return len(k) >= len(pre) && strings.EqualFold(k[:len(pre)], pre)
}
var targetable = map[string]bool{
"a": true,
"area": true,
"form": true,
"base": true,
}
// sanitizeNode removes script elements, on* attributes, javascript: href
// attributes, adds target="_blank" to all links and to a base tag.
func sanitizeNode(node *html.Node) {
i := 0
var haveTarget, haveRel bool
for i < len(node.Attr) {
a := node.Attr[i]
// Remove dangerous attributes.
if strings.HasPrefix(a.Key, "on") || a.Key == "href" && caselessPrefix(a.Val, "javascript:") || a.Key == "src" && caselessPrefix(a.Val, "data:text/html") {
copy(node.Attr[i:], node.Attr[i+1:])
node.Attr = node.Attr[:len(node.Attr)-1]
continue
}
if a.Key == "target" {
node.Attr[i].Val = "_blank"
haveTarget = true
}
if a.Key == "rel" && targetable[node.Data] {
node.Attr[i].Val = "noopener noreferrer"
haveRel = true
}
i++
}
// Ensure target attribute is set for elements that can have it.
if !haveTarget && node.Type == html.ElementNode && targetable[node.Data] {
node.Attr = append(node.Attr, html.Attribute{Key: "target", Val: "_blank"})
haveTarget = true
}
if haveTarget && !haveRel {
node.Attr = append(node.Attr, html.Attribute{Key: "rel", Val: "noopener noreferrer"})
}
parent := node
node = node.FirstChild
var haveBase bool
for node != nil {
// Set next now, we may remove cur, which clears its NextSibling.
cur := node
node = node.NextSibling
// Remove script elements.
if cur.Type == html.ElementNode && cur.Data == "script" {
parent.RemoveChild(cur)
continue
}
sanitizeNode(cur)
}
if parent.Type == html.ElementNode && parent.Data == "head" && !haveBase {
n := html.Node{Type: html.ElementNode, Data: "base", Attr: []html.Attribute{{Key: "target", Val: "_blank"}, {Key: "rel", Val: "noopener noreferrer"}}}
parent.AppendChild(&n)
}
}