mirror of
https://github.com/mjl-/mox.git
synced 2024-12-26 16:33:47 +03:00
01bcd98a42
part of PR #50 by bobobo1618
371 lines
14 KiB
Go
371 lines
14 KiB
Go
package smtpserver
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"net"
|
|
"os"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/mjl-/bstore"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/mjl-/mox/dkim"
|
|
"github.com/mjl-/mox/dmarc"
|
|
"github.com/mjl-/mox/dmarcrpt"
|
|
"github.com/mjl-/mox/dns"
|
|
"github.com/mjl-/mox/dnsbl"
|
|
"github.com/mjl-/mox/iprev"
|
|
"github.com/mjl-/mox/mlog"
|
|
"github.com/mjl-/mox/mox-"
|
|
"github.com/mjl-/mox/smtp"
|
|
"github.com/mjl-/mox/store"
|
|
"github.com/mjl-/mox/subjectpass"
|
|
"github.com/mjl-/mox/tlsrpt"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
type delivery struct {
|
|
m *store.Message
|
|
dataFile *os.File
|
|
rcptAcc rcptAccount
|
|
acc *store.Account
|
|
msgFrom smtp.Address
|
|
dnsBLs []dns.Domain
|
|
dmarcUse bool
|
|
dmarcResult dmarc.Result
|
|
dkimResults []dkim.Result
|
|
iprevStatus iprev.Status
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type analysis struct {
|
|
accept bool
|
|
mailbox string
|
|
code int
|
|
secode string
|
|
userError bool
|
|
errmsg string
|
|
err error // For our own logging, not sent to remote.
|
|
dmarcReport *dmarcrpt.Feedback // Validated dmarc aggregate report, not yet stored.
|
|
tlsReport *tlsrpt.Report // Validated TLS report, not yet stored.
|
|
reason string // If non-empty, reason for this decision. Can be one of reputationMethod and a few other tokens.
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
reasonListAllow = "list-allow"
|
|
reasonDMARCPolicy = "dmarc-policy"
|
|
reasonReputationError = "reputation-error"
|
|
reasonReporting = "reporting"
|
|
reasonSPFPolicy = "spf-policy"
|
|
reasonJunkClassifyError = "junk-classify-error"
|
|
reasonJunkFilterError = "junk-filter-error"
|
|
reasonGiveSubjectpass = "give-subjectpass"
|
|
reasonNoBadSignals = "no-bad-signals"
|
|
reasonJunkContent = "junk-content"
|
|
reasonJunkContentStrict = "junk-content-strict"
|
|
reasonDNSBlocklisted = "dns-blocklisted"
|
|
reasonSubjectpass = "subjectpass"
|
|
reasonSubjectpassError = "subjectpass-error"
|
|
reasonIPrev = "iprev" // No or mil junk reputation signals, and bad iprev.
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func analyze(ctx context.Context, log *mlog.Log, resolver dns.Resolver, d delivery) analysis {
|
|
mailbox := d.rcptAcc.destination.Mailbox
|
|
if mailbox == "" {
|
|
mailbox = "Inbox"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If destination mailbox has a mailing list domain (for SPF/DKIM) configured,
|
|
// check it for a pass.
|
|
rs := store.MessageRuleset(log, d.rcptAcc.destination, d.m, d.m.MsgPrefix, d.dataFile)
|
|
if rs != nil {
|
|
mailbox = rs.Mailbox
|
|
}
|
|
if rs != nil && !rs.ListAllowDNSDomain.IsZero() {
|
|
ld := rs.ListAllowDNSDomain
|
|
// todo: on temporary failures, reject temporarily?
|
|
if d.m.MailFromValidated && ld.Name() == d.m.MailFromDomain {
|
|
return analysis{accept: true, mailbox: mailbox, reason: reasonListAllow}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, r := range d.dkimResults {
|
|
if r.Status == dkim.StatusPass && r.Sig.Domain == ld {
|
|
return analysis{accept: true, mailbox: mailbox, reason: reasonListAllow}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// For forwarded messages, we have different junk analysis. We don't reject for
|
|
// failing DMARC, and we clear fields that could implicate the forwarding mail
|
|
// server during future classifications on incoming messages (the forwarding mail
|
|
// server isn't responsible for the message).
|
|
if rs != nil && rs.IsForward {
|
|
d.dmarcUse = false
|
|
d.m.IsForward = true
|
|
d.m.RemoteIPMasked1 = ""
|
|
d.m.RemoteIPMasked2 = ""
|
|
d.m.RemoteIPMasked3 = ""
|
|
d.m.OrigEHLODomain = d.m.EHLODomain
|
|
d.m.EHLODomain = ""
|
|
d.m.MailFromDomain = "" // Still available in MailFrom.
|
|
d.m.OrigDKIMDomains = d.m.DKIMDomains
|
|
dkimdoms := []string{}
|
|
for _, dom := range d.m.DKIMDomains {
|
|
if dom != rs.VerifiedDNSDomain.Name() {
|
|
dkimdoms = append(dkimdoms, dom)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
d.m.DKIMDomains = dkimdoms
|
|
log.Info("forwarded message, clearing identifying signals of forwarding mail server")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
reject := func(code int, secode string, errmsg string, err error, reason string) analysis {
|
|
accept := false
|
|
if rs != nil && rs.AcceptRejectsToMailbox != "" {
|
|
accept = true
|
|
mailbox = rs.AcceptRejectsToMailbox
|
|
d.m.IsReject = true
|
|
// Don't draw attention, but don't go so far as to mark as junk.
|
|
d.m.Seen = true
|
|
log.Info("accepting reject to configured mailbox due to ruleset")
|
|
}
|
|
return analysis{accept, mailbox, code, secode, err == nil, errmsg, err, nil, nil, reason}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if d.dmarcUse && d.dmarcResult.Reject {
|
|
return reject(smtp.C550MailboxUnavail, smtp.SePol7MultiAuthFails26, "rejecting per dmarc policy", nil, reasonDMARCPolicy)
|
|
}
|
|
// todo: should we also reject messages that have a dmarc pass but an spf record "v=spf1 -all"? suggested by m3aawg best practices.
|
|
|
|
// If destination is the DMARC reporting mailbox, do additional checks and keep
|
|
// track of the report. We'll check reputation, defaulting to accept.
|
|
var dmarcReport *dmarcrpt.Feedback
|
|
if d.rcptAcc.destination.DMARCReports {
|
|
// Messages with DMARC aggregate reports must have a dmarc pass. ../rfc/7489:1866
|
|
if d.dmarcResult.Status != dmarc.StatusPass {
|
|
log.Info("received dmarc report without dmarc pass, not processing as dmarc report")
|
|
} else if report, err := dmarcrpt.ParseMessageReport(store.FileMsgReader(d.m.MsgPrefix, d.dataFile)); err != nil {
|
|
log.Infox("parsing dmarc report", err)
|
|
} else if d, err := dns.ParseDomain(report.PolicyPublished.Domain); err != nil {
|
|
log.Infox("parsing domain in dmarc report", err)
|
|
} else if _, ok := mox.Conf.Domain(d); !ok {
|
|
log.Info("dmarc report for domain not configured, ignoring", mlog.Field("domain", d))
|
|
} else if report.ReportMetadata.DateRange.End > time.Now().Unix()+60 {
|
|
log.Info("dmarc report with end date in the future, ignoring", mlog.Field("domain", d), mlog.Field("end", time.Unix(report.ReportMetadata.DateRange.End, 0)))
|
|
} else {
|
|
dmarcReport = report
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Similar to DMARC reporting, we check for the required DKIM. We'll check
|
|
// reputation, defaulting to accept.
|
|
var tlsReport *tlsrpt.Report
|
|
if d.rcptAcc.destination.TLSReports {
|
|
// Valid DKIM signature for domain must be present. We take "valid" to assume
|
|
// "passing", not "syntactically valid". We also check for "tlsrpt" as service.
|
|
// This check is optional, but if anyone goes through the trouble to explicitly
|
|
// list allowed services, they would be surprised to see them ignored.
|
|
// ../rfc/8460:320
|
|
ok := false
|
|
for _, r := range d.dkimResults {
|
|
if r.Status == dkim.StatusPass && r.Sig.Domain == d.msgFrom.Domain && r.Sig.Length < 0 && r.Record.ServiceAllowed("tlsrpt") {
|
|
ok = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
log.Info("received mail to tlsrpt without acceptable DKIM signature, not processing as tls report")
|
|
} else if report, err := tlsrpt.ParseMessage(store.FileMsgReader(d.m.MsgPrefix, d.dataFile)); err != nil {
|
|
log.Infox("parsing tls report", err)
|
|
} else {
|
|
var known bool
|
|
for _, p := range report.Policies {
|
|
log.Info("tlsrpt policy domain", mlog.Field("domain", p.Policy.Domain))
|
|
if d, err := dns.ParseDomain(p.Policy.Domain); err != nil {
|
|
log.Infox("parsing domain in tls report", err)
|
|
} else if _, ok := mox.Conf.Domain(d); ok {
|
|
known = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !known {
|
|
log.Info("tls report without one of configured domains, ignoring")
|
|
} else {
|
|
tlsReport = report
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Determine if message is acceptable based on DMARC domain, DKIM identities, or
|
|
// host-based reputation.
|
|
var isjunk *bool
|
|
var conclusive bool
|
|
var method reputationMethod
|
|
var reason string
|
|
var err error
|
|
d.acc.WithRLock(func() {
|
|
err = d.acc.DB.Read(ctx, func(tx *bstore.Tx) error {
|
|
// Set message MailboxID to which mail will be delivered. Reputation is
|
|
// per-mailbox. If referenced mailbox is not found (e.g. does not yet exist), we
|
|
// can still determine a reputation because we also base it on outgoing
|
|
// messages and those are account-global.
|
|
mb, err := d.acc.MailboxFind(tx, mailbox)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("finding destination mailbox: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if mb != nil {
|
|
// We want to deliver to mb.ID, but this message may be rejected and sent to the
|
|
// Rejects mailbox instead, with MailboxID overwritten. Record the ID in
|
|
// MailboxDestinedID too. If the message is later moved out of the Rejects mailbox,
|
|
// we'll adjust the MailboxOrigID so it gets taken into account during reputation
|
|
// calculating in future deliveries. If we end up delivering to the intended
|
|
// mailbox (i.e. not rejecting), MailboxDestinedID is cleared during delivery so we
|
|
// don't store it unnecessarily.
|
|
d.m.MailboxID = mb.ID
|
|
d.m.MailboxDestinedID = mb.ID
|
|
} else {
|
|
log.Debug("mailbox not found in database", mlog.Field("mailbox", mailbox))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
isjunk, conclusive, method, err = reputation(tx, log, d.m)
|
|
reason = string(method)
|
|
return err
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Infox("determining reputation", err, mlog.Field("message", d.m))
|
|
return reject(smtp.C451LocalErr, smtp.SeSys3Other0, "error processing", err, reasonReputationError)
|
|
}
|
|
log.Info("reputation analyzed", mlog.Field("conclusive", conclusive), mlog.Field("isjunk", isjunk), mlog.Field("method", string(method)))
|
|
if conclusive {
|
|
if !*isjunk {
|
|
return analysis{accept: true, mailbox: mailbox, dmarcReport: dmarcReport, tlsReport: tlsReport, reason: reason}
|
|
}
|
|
return reject(smtp.C451LocalErr, smtp.SeSys3Other0, "error processing", err, string(method))
|
|
} else if dmarcReport != nil || tlsReport != nil {
|
|
log.Info("accepting dmarc reporting or tlsrpt message without reputation")
|
|
return analysis{accept: true, mailbox: mailbox, dmarcReport: dmarcReport, tlsReport: tlsReport, reason: reasonReporting}
|
|
}
|
|
// If there was no previous message from sender or its domain, and we have an SPF
|
|
// (soft)fail, reject the message.
|
|
switch method {
|
|
case methodDKIMSPF, methodIP1, methodIP2, methodIP3, methodNone:
|
|
switch d.m.MailFromValidation {
|
|
case store.ValidationFail, store.ValidationSoftfail:
|
|
return reject(smtp.C451LocalErr, smtp.SeSys3Other0, "error processing", nil, reasonSPFPolicy)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Senders without reputation and without iprev pass, are likely spam.
|
|
var suspiciousIPrevFail bool
|
|
switch method {
|
|
case methodDKIMSPF, methodIP1, methodIP2, methodIP3, methodNone:
|
|
suspiciousIPrevFail = d.iprevStatus != iprev.StatusPass
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// With already a mild junk signal, an iprev fail on top is enough to reject.
|
|
if suspiciousIPrevFail && isjunk != nil && *isjunk {
|
|
return reject(smtp.C451LocalErr, smtp.SeSys3Other0, "error processing", nil, reasonIPrev)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var subjectpassKey string
|
|
conf, _ := d.acc.Conf()
|
|
if conf.SubjectPass.Period > 0 {
|
|
subjectpassKey, err = d.acc.Subjectpass(d.rcptAcc.canonicalAddress)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorx("get key for verifying subject token", err)
|
|
return reject(smtp.C451LocalErr, smtp.SeSys3Other0, "error processing", err, reasonSubjectpassError)
|
|
}
|
|
err = subjectpass.Verify(d.dataFile, []byte(subjectpassKey), conf.SubjectPass.Period)
|
|
pass := err == nil
|
|
log.Infox("pass by subject token", err, mlog.Field("pass", pass))
|
|
if pass {
|
|
return analysis{accept: true, mailbox: mailbox, reason: reasonSubjectpass}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
reason = reasonNoBadSignals
|
|
accept := true
|
|
var junkSubjectpass bool
|
|
f, jf, err := d.acc.OpenJunkFilter(ctx, log)
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
err := f.Close()
|
|
log.Check(err, "closing junkfilter")
|
|
}()
|
|
contentProb, _, _, _, err := f.ClassifyMessageReader(ctx, store.FileMsgReader(d.m.MsgPrefix, d.dataFile), d.m.Size)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Errorx("testing for spam", err)
|
|
return reject(smtp.C451LocalErr, smtp.SeSys3Other0, "error processing", err, reasonJunkClassifyError)
|
|
}
|
|
// todo: if isjunk is not nil (i.e. there was inconclusive reputation), use it in the probability calculation. give reputation a score of 0.25 or .75 perhaps?
|
|
// todo: if there aren't enough historic messages, we should just let messages in.
|
|
// todo: we could require nham and nspam to be above a certain number when there were plenty of words in the message, and in the database. can indicate a spammer is misspelling words. however, it can also mean a message in a different language/script...
|
|
|
|
// If we don't accept, we may still respond with a "subjectpass" hint below.
|
|
// We add some jitter to the threshold we use. So we don't act as too easy an
|
|
// oracle for words that are a strong indicator of haminess.
|
|
// todo: we should rate-limit uses of the junkfilter.
|
|
jitter := (jitterRand.Float64() - 0.5) / 10
|
|
threshold := jf.Threshold + jitter
|
|
|
|
// With an iprev fail, we set a higher bar for content.
|
|
reason = reasonJunkContent
|
|
if suspiciousIPrevFail && threshold > 0.25 {
|
|
threshold = 0.25
|
|
log.Info("setting junk threshold due to iprev fail", mlog.Field("threshold", 0.25))
|
|
reason = reasonJunkContentStrict
|
|
}
|
|
accept = contentProb <= threshold
|
|
junkSubjectpass = contentProb < threshold-0.2
|
|
log.Info("content analyzed", mlog.Field("accept", accept), mlog.Field("contentprob", contentProb), mlog.Field("subjectpass", junkSubjectpass))
|
|
} else if err != store.ErrNoJunkFilter {
|
|
log.Errorx("open junkfilter", err)
|
|
return reject(smtp.C451LocalErr, smtp.SeSys3Other0, "error processing", err, reasonJunkFilterError)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If content looks good, we'll still look at DNS block lists for a reason to
|
|
// reject. We normally won't get here if we've communicated with this sender
|
|
// before.
|
|
var dnsblocklisted bool
|
|
if accept {
|
|
blocked := func(zone dns.Domain) bool {
|
|
dnsblctx, dnsblcancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 30*time.Second)
|
|
defer dnsblcancel()
|
|
if !checkDNSBLHealth(dnsblctx, resolver, zone) {
|
|
log.Info("dnsbl not healthy, skipping", mlog.Field("zone", zone))
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status, expl, err := dnsbl.Lookup(dnsblctx, resolver, zone, net.ParseIP(d.m.RemoteIP))
|
|
dnsblcancel()
|
|
if status == dnsbl.StatusFail {
|
|
log.Info("rejecting due to listing in dnsbl", mlog.Field("zone", zone), mlog.Field("explanation", expl))
|
|
return true
|
|
} else if err != nil {
|
|
log.Infox("dnsbl lookup", err, mlog.Field("zone", zone), mlog.Field("status", status))
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Note: We don't check in parallel, we are in no hurry to accept possible spam.
|
|
for _, zone := range d.dnsBLs {
|
|
if blocked(zone) {
|
|
accept = false
|
|
dnsblocklisted = true
|
|
reason = reasonDNSBlocklisted
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if accept {
|
|
return analysis{accept: true, mailbox: mailbox, reason: reasonNoBadSignals}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if subjectpassKey != "" && d.dmarcResult.Status == dmarc.StatusPass && method == methodNone && (dnsblocklisted || junkSubjectpass) {
|
|
log.Info("permanent reject with subjectpass hint of moderately spammy email without reputation")
|
|
pass := subjectpass.Generate(d.msgFrom, []byte(subjectpassKey), time.Now())
|
|
return reject(smtp.C550MailboxUnavail, smtp.SePol7DeliveryUnauth1, subjectpass.Explanation+pass, nil, reasonGiveSubjectpass)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return reject(smtp.C451LocalErr, smtp.SeSys3Other0, "error processing", nil, reason)
|
|
}
|