both when parsing our configs, and for incoming on smtp or in messages.
so we properly compare things like é and e+accent as equal, and accept the
different encodings of that same address.
transferring the data only once. we only do this when the recipient domains
are the same. when queuing, we now take care to set the same NextAttempt
timestamp, so queued messages are actually eligable for combined delivery.
this adds a DeliverMultiple to the smtp client. for pipelined requests, it will
send all RCPT TO (and MAIL and DATA) in one go, and handles the various
responses and error conditions, returning either an overal error, or per
recipient smtp responses. the results of the smtp LIMITS extension are also
available in the smtp client now.
this also takes the "LIMITS RCPTMAX" smtp extension into account: if the server
only accepts a single recipient, we won't send multiple.
if a server doesn't announce a RCPTMAX limit, but still has one (like mox does
for non-spf-verified transactions), we'll recognize code 452 and 552 (for
historic reasons) as temporary error, and try again in a separate transaction
immediately after. we don't yet implement "LIMITS MAILMAX", doesn't seem likely
in practice.
so you can still know when someone has put you on their blocklist (which may
affect delivery), without using them.
also query dnsbls for our ips more often when we do more outgoing connections
for delivery: once every 100 messages, but at least 5 mins and at most 3 hours
since the previous check.
the smtp extension, rfc 4865.
also implement in the webmail.
the queueing/delivery part hardly required changes: we just set the first
delivery time in the future instead of immediately.
still have to find the first client that implements it.
the http basic auth we had was very simple to reason about, and to implement.
but it has a major downside:
there is no way to logout, browsers keep sending credentials. ideally, browsers
themselves would show a button to stop sending credentials.
a related downside: the http auth mechanism doesn't indicate for which server
paths the credentials are.
another downside: the original password is sent to the server with each
request. though sending original passwords to web servers seems to be
considered normal.
our new approach uses session cookies, along with csrf values when we can. the
sessions are server-side managed, automatically extended on each use. this
makes it easy to invalidate sessions and keeps the frontend simpler (than with
long- vs short-term sessions and refreshing). the cookies are httponly,
samesite=strict, scoped to the path of the web interface. cookies are set
"secure" when set over https. the cookie is set by a successful call to Login.
a call to Logout invalidates a session. changing a password invalidates all
sessions for a user, but keeps the session with which the password was changed
alive. the csrf value is also random, and associated with the session cookie.
the csrf must be sent as header for api calls, or as parameter for direct form
posts (where we cannot set a custom header). rest-like calls made directly by
the browser, e.g. for images, don't have a csrf protection. the csrf value is
returned by the Login api call and stored in localstorage.
api calls without credentials return code "user:noAuth", and with bad
credentials return "user:badAuth". the api client recognizes this and triggers
a login. after a login, all auth-failed api calls are automatically retried.
only for "user:badAuth" is an error message displayed in the login form (e.g.
session expired).
in an ideal world, browsers would take care of most session management. a
server would indicate authentication is needed (like http basic auth), and the
browsers uses trusted ui to request credentials for the server & path. the
browser could use safer mechanism than sending original passwords to the
server, such as scram, along with a standard way to create sessions. for now,
web developers have to do authentication themselves: from showing the login
prompt, ensuring the right session/csrf cookies/localstorage/headers/etc are
sent with each request.
webauthn is a newer way to do authentication, perhaps we'll implement it in the
future. though hardware tokens aren't an attractive option for many users, and
it may be overkill as long as we still do old-fashioned authentication in smtp
& imap where passwords can be sent to the server.
for issue #58
all ui frontend code is now in typescript. we no longer need jshint, and we
build the frontend code during "make build".
this also changes tlsrpt types for a Report, not encoding field names with
dashes, but to keep them valid identifiers in javascript. this makes it more
conveniently to work with in the frontend, and works around a sherpats
limitation.
