these singleusetokens can be redeemed once. so when you see it in the logs, it
can't be used again. they are short-lived anyway.
this change should help prevent me periodically investigating token handling...
before, we would just say "session expired". now we say "session expired (after
12 hours inactivity)" (for admin) or "session expired (after 24 hours
inactivity)" for account/webmail. for unknown sessions in the admin interface,
we also explain that server restarts and 10 more new sessions can be the
reason.
for issue #202 by ally9335
since we have more of our own styling (probably since dark mode), we weren't
indicating anymore that a button was disabled. this actually only applies to
the button for the current mailbox of a message, when attempting to move it.
we now don't show any hover effects in that case, and we show the button
semitransparent.
before, the iframe was consuming the mouse events, preventing the dragging to
the right from working properly. the workaround was to drag over the area with
the header, above the message iframe.
with this change, we disable pointer events over the entire right area, which
includes the iframe.
otherwise, in dark mode, the plain text iframe content would be black text on
the white background of the iframe as set by webmail. i can't find a way to set
the content text on the iframe that contains it.
- keep them on the right side of the window (more important now that we can resize)
- merge the close & cancel buttons into a close button, with a popup asking what to do for changes not saved as draft.
this started with looking into the dark mode of PR #163 by mattfbacon. it's a
very good solution, especially for the amount of code. while looking into dark
mode, some common problems with inverting colors are:
- box-shadow start "glowing" which isn't great. likewise, semitransparent
layers would become brighter, not darker.
- while popups/overlays in light mode just stay the same white, in dark mode
they should become lighter than the regular content because box shadows don't
give enough contrast in dark mode.
while looking at adding explicit styles for dark mode, it turns out that's
easier when we work more with css rules/classes instead of inline styles (so we
can use the @media rule).
so we now also create css rules instead of working with inline styles a lot.
benefits:
- creating css rules is useful for items that repeat. they'll have a single css
class. changing a style on a css class is now reflected in all elements of that
kind (with that class)
- css class names are helpful when inspecting the DOM while developing: they
typically describe the function of the element.
most css classes are defined near where they are used, often while making the
element using the class (the css rule is created on first use).
this changes moves colors used for styling to a single place in webmail/lib.ts.
each property can get two values: one for regular/light mode, one for dark mode.
that should prevent forgetting one of them and makes it easy to configure both.
this change sets colors for the dark mode. i think the popups look better than
in PR #163, but in other ways it may be worse. this is a start, we can tweak
the styling.
if we can reduce the number of needed colors some more, we could make them
configurable in the webmail settings in the future. so this is also a step
towards making the ui looks configurable as discussed in issue #107.
per mailbox, or for all mailboxes, in maildir/mbox format, in tar/tgz/zip
archive or without archive format for single mbox, single or recursive. the
webaccount already had an option to export all mailboxes, it now looks similar
to the webmail version.
if the message has a list-id header, we assume this is a (mailing) list
message, and we require a dkim/spf-verified domain (we prefer the shortest that
is a suffix of the list-id value). the rule we would add will mark such
messages as from a mailing list, changing filtering rules on incoming messages
(not enforcing dmarc policies). messages will be matched on list-id header and
will only match if they have the same dkim/spf-verified domain.
if the message doesn't have a list-id header, we'll ask to match based on
"message from" address.
we don't ask the user in several cases:
- if the destination/source mailbox is a special-use mailbox (e.g.
trash,archive,sent,junk; inbox isn't included)
- if the rule already exist (no point in adding it again).
- if the user said "no, not for this list-id/from-address" in the past.
- if the user said "no, not for messages moved to this mailbox" in the past.
we'll add the rule if the message was moved out of the inbox.
if the message was moved to the inbox, we check if there is a matching rule
that we can remove.
we now remember the "no" answers (for list-id, msg-from-addr and mailbox) in
the account database.
to implement the msgfrom rules, this adds support to rulesets for matching on
message "from" address. before, we could match on smtp from address (and other
fields). rulesets now also have a field for comments. webmail adds a note that
it created the rule, with the date.
manual editing of the rulesets is still in the webaccount page. this webmail
functionality is just a convenient way to add/remove common rules.
in top-left direction. keep textarea filling the height.
remember size in localstorage, only apply either width and/or height when
viewport width/height was the same as when the remembered width/height was set
(independently).
no visual indicator other than a cursor indicating resizability.
the regular send shortcut is control+Enter. the shift enables "archive thread".
there is no configuration option, you'll always get the button, but only for
reply/forward, not for new compose.
we may do "send and move thread to thrash", but let's wait until people want it.
for github issue #135 by mattfbacon
actually, this fix can reduce focus changes for more operations. withStatus is
often used to show an operation in progress in the status bar, only when the
operation isn't done within 1 second. we would restore focus to the element
before the operation started. that was done because we disable elements
sometimes (preventing duplicate form submission). for things like the
autocomplete, with the tab key, which also moves focus to the next element, we
don't want that focus switched back again.
the smtp extension, rfc 4865.
also implement in the webmail.
the queueing/delivery part hardly required changes: we just set the first
delivery time in the future instead of immediately.
still have to find the first client that implements it.
to start composing a message.
the help popup now has a button to register the "mailto:" links with the mox
webmail (typically only works over https, not all browsers support it).
the mailto links are specified in 6068. we support the to/cc/bcc/subject/body
parameters. other parameters should be seen as custom headers, but we don't
support messages with custom headers at all at the moment, so we ignore them.
we now also turn text of the form "mailto:user@host" into a clickable link
(will not be too common). we could be recognizing any "x@x.x" as email address
and make them clickable in the future.
thanks to Hans-Jörg for explaining this functionality.
before, we showed the xn-- ascii names, along with the unicode name. but users
of internationalized email don't want to see any xn-- names. we now put those
in an html title attribute for some cases, so you can still see them if you
really want to, by hovering.
after talking to arnt at fosdem.
if a browser is ahead just a few seconds, we would show "-<1min", not great.
just show "<1min" in that case. we'll still show negative age if drift is more
than 1 minute, which seems like a good hint to get time fixed on either client
or server.
the http basic auth we had was very simple to reason about, and to implement.
but it has a major downside:
there is no way to logout, browsers keep sending credentials. ideally, browsers
themselves would show a button to stop sending credentials.
a related downside: the http auth mechanism doesn't indicate for which server
paths the credentials are.
another downside: the original password is sent to the server with each
request. though sending original passwords to web servers seems to be
considered normal.
our new approach uses session cookies, along with csrf values when we can. the
sessions are server-side managed, automatically extended on each use. this
makes it easy to invalidate sessions and keeps the frontend simpler (than with
long- vs short-term sessions and refreshing). the cookies are httponly,
samesite=strict, scoped to the path of the web interface. cookies are set
"secure" when set over https. the cookie is set by a successful call to Login.
a call to Logout invalidates a session. changing a password invalidates all
sessions for a user, but keeps the session with which the password was changed
alive. the csrf value is also random, and associated with the session cookie.
the csrf must be sent as header for api calls, or as parameter for direct form
posts (where we cannot set a custom header). rest-like calls made directly by
the browser, e.g. for images, don't have a csrf protection. the csrf value is
returned by the Login api call and stored in localstorage.
api calls without credentials return code "user:noAuth", and with bad
credentials return "user:badAuth". the api client recognizes this and triggers
a login. after a login, all auth-failed api calls are automatically retried.
only for "user:badAuth" is an error message displayed in the login form (e.g.
session expired).
in an ideal world, browsers would take care of most session management. a
server would indicate authentication is needed (like http basic auth), and the
browsers uses trusted ui to request credentials for the server & path. the
browser could use safer mechanism than sending original passwords to the
server, such as scram, along with a standard way to create sessions. for now,
web developers have to do authentication themselves: from showing the login
prompt, ensuring the right session/csrf cookies/localstorage/headers/etc are
sent with each request.
webauthn is a newer way to do authentication, perhaps we'll implement it in the
future. though hardware tokens aren't an attractive option for many users, and
it may be overkill as long as we still do old-fashioned authentication in smtp
& imap where passwords can be sent to the server.
for issue #58
i'm not sure this is good enough.
this is based on field MsgFromValidation, but it doesn't hold the full DMARC information.
we also don't know mailing list-status for all historic messages.
so the red underline can occur too often.
with requiretls, the tls verification mode/rules for email deliveries can be
changed by the sender/submitter. in two ways:
1. "requiretls" smtp extension to always enforce verified tls (with mta-sts or
dnssec+dane), along the entire delivery path until delivery into the final
destination mailbox (so entire transport is verified-tls-protected).
2. "tls-required: no" message header, to ignore any tls and tls verification
errors even if the recipient domain has a policy that requires tls verification
(mta-sts and/or dnssec+dane), allowing delivery of non-sensitive messages in
case of misconfiguration/interoperability issues (at least useful for sending
tls reports).
we enable requiretls by default (only when tls is active), for smtp and
submission. it can be disabled through the config.
for each delivery attempt, we now store (per recipient domain, in the account
of the sender) whether the smtp server supports starttls and requiretls. this
support is shown (after having sent a first message) in the webmail when
sending a message (the previous 3 bars under the address input field are now 5
bars, the first for starttls support, the last for requiretls support). when
all recipient domains for a message are known to implement requiretls,
requiretls is automatically selected for sending (instead of "default" tls
behaviour). users can also select the "fallback to insecure" to add the
"tls-required: no" header.
new metrics are added for insight into requiretls errors and (some, not yet
all) cases where tls-required-no ignored a tls/verification error.
the admin can change the requiretls status for messages in the queue. so with
default delivery attempts, when verified tls is required by failing, an admin
could potentially change the field to "tls-required: no"-behaviour.
messages received (over smtp) with the requiretls option, get a comment added
to their Received header line, just before "id", after "with".
