before, we showed the xn-- ascii names, along with the unicode name. but users
of internationalized email don't want to see any xn-- names. we now put those
in an html title attribute for some cases, so you can still see them if you
really want to, by hovering.
after talking to arnt at fosdem.
broken in previous update. the tricky part keeps being about when browsers fire
'load' and 'hashchange' events for the outer and two inner documents. the
previous change attempted to prevent a history item being set on the first
load. that behaviour seems to be kept.
message.Writer.Write() adds missing \r's, but the buffer of "last bytes
written" was only being updated while writing the message headers, not while
writing the body. so for Write()'s in the body section (depending on
buffering), we were compensating based on the "last bytes written" as set
during the last write in the header section. that could cause a spurious \r to
be added when a Write starts with \n while the previous Write did properly
end with \r.
for issue #117, thanks haraldrudell for reporting and investigating
you can configure a domain only to accept dmarc/tls reports. those domains
won't have addresses for that domain configured (the reporting destination
address is for another domain). we already handled such domains specially in a
few places. but we were considering ourselves authoritative for such domains if
an smtp client would send a message to the domain during submit. and we would
reject all recipient addresses. but we should be trying to deliver those
messages to the actual mx hosts for the domain, which we will now do.
in some cases, they were interpreted as meaning "the first sequence/uid", but
it should always be "the last sequence/uid", just like patterns of the form
"123:*".
this wrong interpretation was used in the "fetch" command when combined with
"changedsince", and in the search command for some parameters, and during
expunge with an explicit uid range. the form "*" and "*:123" aren't very
common.
- on the two index pages, show rows with alternating background color so the
files in the 2nd column are more easily matched to the name in the 1st
column.
- unbreak browser history when navigating files/line numbers. changing an
iframe src attribute adds an entry to the history. that happens on "back" to,
causing a 2nd "back" to go forward again. instead of replacing the iframe src,
we now replace the iframe, as that doesn't cause an entry to be added to the
browser history. dark browser magic...
if a browser is ahead just a few seconds, we would show "-<1min", not great.
just show "<1min" in that case. we'll still show negative age if drift is more
than 1 minute, which seems like a good hint to get time fixed on either client
or server.
most content is in markdown files in website/, some is taken out of the repo
README and rfc/index.txt. a Go file generates html. static files are kept in a
separate repo due to size.
the http basic auth we had was very simple to reason about, and to implement.
but it has a major downside:
there is no way to logout, browsers keep sending credentials. ideally, browsers
themselves would show a button to stop sending credentials.
a related downside: the http auth mechanism doesn't indicate for which server
paths the credentials are.
another downside: the original password is sent to the server with each
request. though sending original passwords to web servers seems to be
considered normal.
our new approach uses session cookies, along with csrf values when we can. the
sessions are server-side managed, automatically extended on each use. this
makes it easy to invalidate sessions and keeps the frontend simpler (than with
long- vs short-term sessions and refreshing). the cookies are httponly,
samesite=strict, scoped to the path of the web interface. cookies are set
"secure" when set over https. the cookie is set by a successful call to Login.
a call to Logout invalidates a session. changing a password invalidates all
sessions for a user, but keeps the session with which the password was changed
alive. the csrf value is also random, and associated with the session cookie.
the csrf must be sent as header for api calls, or as parameter for direct form
posts (where we cannot set a custom header). rest-like calls made directly by
the browser, e.g. for images, don't have a csrf protection. the csrf value is
returned by the Login api call and stored in localstorage.
api calls without credentials return code "user:noAuth", and with bad
credentials return "user:badAuth". the api client recognizes this and triggers
a login. after a login, all auth-failed api calls are automatically retried.
only for "user:badAuth" is an error message displayed in the login form (e.g.
session expired).
in an ideal world, browsers would take care of most session management. a
server would indicate authentication is needed (like http basic auth), and the
browsers uses trusted ui to request credentials for the server & path. the
browser could use safer mechanism than sending original passwords to the
server, such as scram, along with a standard way to create sessions. for now,
web developers have to do authentication themselves: from showing the login
prompt, ensuring the right session/csrf cookies/localstorage/headers/etc are
sent with each request.
webauthn is a newer way to do authentication, perhaps we'll implement it in the
future. though hardware tokens aren't an attractive option for many users, and
it may be overkill as long as we still do old-fashioned authentication in smtp
& imap where passwords can be sent to the server.
for issue #58
mox was already strict in its "\r\n.\r\n" handling for end-of-message in an
smtp transaction.
due to a mostly unrelated bug, sequences of "\nX\n", including "\n.\n" were
rejected with a "local processing error".
the sequence "\r\n.\n" dropped the dot, not necessarily a big problem, this is
unlikely to happen in a legimate transaction and the behaviour not
unreasonable.
we take this opportunity to reject all bare \r. we detect all slightly
incorrect combinations of "\r\n.\r\n" with an error mentioning smtp smuggling,
in part to appease the tools checking for it.
smtp errors are 500 "bad syntax", and mention smtp smuggling.
the imapserver started with imap4rev2-only and utf8=only. to prevent potential
issues with imaputf7, which makes "&" special, we refused any mailbox with an
"&" in the name. we already tried decoding utf7, falling back to using a
mailbox name verbatim. that behaviour wasn't great. we now treat the enabled
extensions IMAP4rev2 and/or UTF8=ACCEPT as indication whether mailbox names are
in imaputf7. if they are, the encoding must be correct.
we now also send mailbox names in imaputf7 when imap4rev2/utf8=accept isn't
enabled.
and we now allow "*" and "%" (wildcard characters for matching) in mailbox
names. not ideal for IMAP LIST with patterns, but not enough reason to refuse
them in mailbox names. people that migrate may run into this, possibly as
blocker.
we also allow "#" in mailbox names, but not as first character, to prevent
potential clashes with IMAP namespaces in the future.
based on report from Damian Poddebniak using
https://github.com/duesee/imap-flow and issue #110, thanks for reporting!
all ui frontend code is now in typescript. we no longer need jshint, and we
build the frontend code during "make build".
this also changes tlsrpt types for a Report, not encoding field names with
dashes, but to keep them valid identifiers in javascript. this makes it more
conveniently to work with in the frontend, and works around a sherpats
limitation.
the autoconfig/autodiscover endpoints, and the printed client settings (in
quickstart, in the admin interface) now all point to the cname record (called
"client settings domain"). it is configurable per domain, and set to
"mail.<domain>" by default. for existing mox installs, the domain can be added
by editing the config file.
this makes it easier for a domain to migrate to another server in the future.
client settings don't have to be updated, the cname can just be changed.
before, the hostname of the mail server was configured in email clients.
migrating away would require changing settings in all clients.
if a client settings domain is configured, a TLS certificate for the name will
be requested through ACME, or must be configured manually.
to get the security benefits (detecting mitm attempts), explicitly configure
clients to use a scram plus variant, e.g. scram-sha-256-plus. unfortunately,
not many clients support it yet.
imapserver scram plus support seems to work with the latest imtest (imap test
client) from cyrus-sasl. no success yet with mutt (with gsasl) though.
should prevent potential mitm attacks. especially when done close to the
machine itself (where a http/tls challenge is intercepted to get a valid
certificate), as seen on the internet last month.
