Commit graph

6 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Mechiel Lukkien
d1b87cdb0d
replace packages slog and slices from golang.org/x/exp with stdlib
since we are now at go1.21 as minimum.
2024-02-08 14:49:01 +01:00
Mechiel Lukkien
d1b66035a9
add more documentation, examples with tests to illustrate reusable components 2023-12-14 20:20:17 +01:00
Mechiel Lukkien
72ac1fde29
expose fewer internals in packages, for easier software reuse
- prometheus is now behind an interface, they aren't dependencies for the
  reusable components anymore.
- some dependencies have been inverted: instead of packages importing a main
  package to get configuration, the main package now sets configuration in
  these packages. that means fewer internals are pulled in.
- some functions now have new parameters for values that were retrieved from
  package "mox-".
2023-12-14 15:39:36 +01:00
Mechiel Lukkien
5b20cba50a
switch to slog.Logger for logging, for easier reuse of packages by external software
we don't want external software to include internal details like mlog.
slog.Logger is/will be the standard.

we still have mlog for its helper functions, and its handler that logs in
concise logfmt used by mox.

packages that are not meant for reuse still pass around mlog.Log for
convenience.

we use golang.org/x/exp/slog because we also support the previous Go toolchain
version. with the next Go release, we'll switch to the builtin slog.
2023-12-14 13:45:52 +01:00
Mechiel Lukkien
2f5d6069bf
implement "requiretls", rfc 8689
with requiretls, the tls verification mode/rules for email deliveries can be
changed by the sender/submitter. in two ways:

1. "requiretls" smtp extension to always enforce verified tls (with mta-sts or
dnssec+dane), along the entire delivery path until delivery into the final
destination mailbox (so entire transport is verified-tls-protected).

2. "tls-required: no" message header, to ignore any tls and tls verification
errors even if the recipient domain has a policy that requires tls verification
(mta-sts and/or dnssec+dane), allowing delivery of non-sensitive messages in
case of misconfiguration/interoperability issues (at least useful for sending
tls reports).

we enable requiretls by default (only when tls is active), for smtp and
submission. it can be disabled through the config.

for each delivery attempt, we now store (per recipient domain, in the account
of the sender) whether the smtp server supports starttls and requiretls. this
support is shown (after having sent a first message) in the webmail when
sending a message (the previous 3 bars under the address input field are now 5
bars, the first for starttls support, the last for requiretls support). when
all recipient domains for a message are known to implement requiretls,
requiretls is automatically selected for sending (instead of "default" tls
behaviour). users can also select the "fallback to insecure" to add the
"tls-required: no" header.

new metrics are added for insight into requiretls errors and (some, not yet
all) cases where tls-required-no ignored a tls/verification error.

the admin can change the requiretls status for messages in the queue. so with
default delivery attempts, when verified tls is required by failing, an admin
could potentially change the field to "tls-required: no"-behaviour.

messages received (over smtp) with the requiretls option, get a comment added
to their Received header line, just before "id", after "with".
2023-10-24 10:10:46 +02:00
Mechiel Lukkien
daa908e9f4
implement dnssec-awareness throughout code, and dane for incoming/outgoing mail delivery
the vendored dns resolver code is a copy of the go stdlib dns resolver, with
awareness of the "authentic data" (i.e. dnssec secure) added, as well as support
for enhanced dns errors, and looking up tlsa records (for dane). ideally it
would be upstreamed, but the chances seem slim.

dnssec-awareness is added to all packages, e.g. spf, dkim, dmarc, iprev. their
dnssec status is added to the Received message headers for incoming email.

but the main reason to add dnssec was for implementing dane. with dane, the
verification of tls certificates can be done through certificates/public keys
published in dns (in the tlsa records). this only makes sense (is trustworthy)
if those dns records can be verified to be authentic.

mox now applies dane to delivering messages over smtp. mox already implemented
mta-sts for webpki/pkix-verification of certificates against the (large) pool
of CA's, and still enforces those policies when present. but it now also checks
for dane records, and will verify those if present. if dane and mta-sts are
both absent, the regular opportunistic tls with starttls is still done. and the
fallback to plaintext is also still done.

mox also makes it easy to setup dane for incoming deliveries, so other servers
can deliver with dane tls certificate verification. the quickstart now
generates private keys that are used when requesting certificates with acme.
the private keys are pre-generated because they must be static and known during
setup, because their public keys must be published in tlsa records in dns.
autocert would generate private keys on its own, so had to be forked to add the
option to provide the private key when requesting a new certificate. hopefully
upstream will accept the change and we can drop the fork.

with this change, using the quickstart to setup a new mox instance, the checks
at internet.nl result in a 100% score, provided the domain is dnssec-signed and
the network doesn't have any issues.
2023-10-10 12:09:35 +02:00