2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
// Package queue is in charge of outgoing messages, queueing them when submitted,
// attempting a first delivery over SMTP, retrying with backoff and sending DSNs
// for delayed or failed deliveries.
package queue
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime/debug"
"sort"
"strings"
"time"
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
"golang.org/x/exp/slog"
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
"golang.org/x/net/proxy"
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promauto"
"github.com/mjl-/bstore"
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
"github.com/mjl-/mox/config"
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/dns"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/dsn"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/metrics"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/mlog"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/mox-"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/moxio"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/smtp"
implement dnssec-awareness throughout code, and dane for incoming/outgoing mail delivery
the vendored dns resolver code is a copy of the go stdlib dns resolver, with
awareness of the "authentic data" (i.e. dnssec secure) added, as well as support
for enhanced dns errors, and looking up tlsa records (for dane). ideally it
would be upstreamed, but the chances seem slim.
dnssec-awareness is added to all packages, e.g. spf, dkim, dmarc, iprev. their
dnssec status is added to the Received message headers for incoming email.
but the main reason to add dnssec was for implementing dane. with dane, the
verification of tls certificates can be done through certificates/public keys
published in dns (in the tlsa records). this only makes sense (is trustworthy)
if those dns records can be verified to be authentic.
mox now applies dane to delivering messages over smtp. mox already implemented
mta-sts for webpki/pkix-verification of certificates against the (large) pool
of CA's, and still enforces those policies when present. but it now also checks
for dane records, and will verify those if present. if dane and mta-sts are
both absent, the regular opportunistic tls with starttls is still done. and the
fallback to plaintext is also still done.
mox also makes it easy to setup dane for incoming deliveries, so other servers
can deliver with dane tls certificate verification. the quickstart now
generates private keys that are used when requesting certificates with acme.
the private keys are pre-generated because they must be static and known during
setup, because their public keys must be published in tlsa records in dns.
autocert would generate private keys on its own, so had to be forked to add the
option to provide the private key when requesting a new certificate. hopefully
upstream will accept the change and we can drop the fork.
with this change, using the quickstart to setup a new mox instance, the checks
at internet.nl result in a 100% score, provided the domain is dnssec-signed and
the network doesn't have any issues.
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/smtpclient"
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/store"
implement outgoing tls reports
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
2023-11-09 19:40:46 +03:00
"github.com/mjl-/mox/tlsrpt"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/tlsrptdb"
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
)
var (
metricConnection = promauto . NewCounterVec (
prometheus . CounterOpts {
Name : "mox_queue_connection_total" ,
Help : "Queue client connections, outgoing." ,
} ,
[ ] string {
"result" , // "ok", "timeout", "canceled", "error"
} ,
)
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
metricDelivery = promauto . NewHistogramVec (
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
prometheus . HistogramOpts {
Name : "mox_queue_delivery_duration_seconds" ,
Help : "SMTP client delivery attempt to single host." ,
Buckets : [ ] float64 { 0.01 , 0.05 , 0.100 , 0.5 , 1 , 5 , 10 , 20 , 30 , 60 , 120 } ,
} ,
[ ] string {
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
"attempt" , // Number of attempts.
"transport" , // empty for default direct delivery.
implement outgoing tls reports
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
2023-11-09 19:40:46 +03:00
"tlsmode" , // immediate, requiredstarttls, opportunistic, skip (from smtpclient.TLSMode), with optional +mtasts and/or +dane.
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
"result" , // ok, timeout, canceled, temperror, permerror, error
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} ,
)
)
2023-11-09 19:15:46 +03:00
var jitter = mox . NewPseudoRand ( )
2023-02-06 18:08:21 +03:00
add a "backup" subcommand to make consistent backups, and a "verifydata" subcommand to verify a backup before restoring, and add tests for future upgrades
the backup command will make consistent snapshots of all the database files. i
had been copying the db files before, and it usually works. but if the file is
modified during the backup, it is inconsistent and is likely to generate errors
when reading (can be at any moment in the future, when reading some db page).
"mox backup" opens the database file and writes out a copy in a transaction.
it also duplicates the message files.
before doing a restore, you could run "mox verifydata" on the to-be-restored
"data" directory. it check the database files, and compares the message files
with the database.
the new "gentestdata" subcommand generates a basic "data" directory, with a
queue and a few accounts. we will use it in the future along with "verifydata"
to test upgrades from old version to the latest version. both when going to the
next version, and when skipping several versions. the script test-upgrades.sh
executes these tests and doesn't do anything at the moment, because no releases
have this subcommand yet.
inspired by a failed upgrade attempt of a pre-release version.
2023-05-26 20:26:51 +03:00
var DBTypes = [ ] any { Msg { } } // Types stored in DB.
var DB * bstore . DB // Exported for making backups.
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
2023-03-12 12:38:02 +03:00
// Set for mox localserve, to prevent queueing.
var Localserve bool
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// Msg is a message in the queue.
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//
// Use MakeMsg to make a message with fields that Add needs. Add will further set
// queueing related fields.
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type Msg struct {
ID int64
Queued time . Time ` bstore:"default now" `
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
SenderAccount string // Failures are delivered back to this local account. Also used for routing.
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
SenderLocalpart smtp . Localpart // Should be a local user and domain.
SenderDomain dns . IPDomain
RecipientLocalpart smtp . Localpart // Typically a remote user and domain.
RecipientDomain dns . IPDomain
RecipientDomainStr string // For filtering.
Attempts int // Next attempt is based on last attempt and exponential back off based on attempts.
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MaxAttempts int // Max number of attempts before giving up. If 0, then the default of 8 attempts is used instead.
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DialedIPs map [ string ] [ ] net . IP // For each host, the IPs that were dialed. Used for IP selection for later attempts.
NextAttempt time . Time // For scheduling.
LastAttempt * time . Time
LastError string
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
Has8bit bool // Whether message contains bytes with high bit set, determines whether 8BITMIME SMTP extension is needed.
SMTPUTF8 bool // Whether message requires use of SMTPUTF8.
IsDMARCReport bool // Delivery failures for DMARC reports are handled differently.
IsTLSReport bool // Delivery failures for TLS reports are handled differently.
Size int64 // Full size of message, combined MsgPrefix with contents of message file.
MessageID string // Used when composing a DSN, in its References header.
MsgPrefix [ ] byte
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
// If set, this message is a DSN and this is a version using utf-8, for the case
// the remote MTA supports smtputf8. In this case, Size and MsgPrefix are not
// relevant.
DSNUTF8 [ ] byte
// If non-empty, the transport to use for this message. Can be set through cli or
// admin interface. If empty (the default for a submitted message), regular routing
// rules apply.
Transport string
implement "requiretls", rfc 8689
with requiretls, the tls verification mode/rules for email deliveries can be
changed by the sender/submitter. in two ways:
1. "requiretls" smtp extension to always enforce verified tls (with mta-sts or
dnssec+dane), along the entire delivery path until delivery into the final
destination mailbox (so entire transport is verified-tls-protected).
2. "tls-required: no" message header, to ignore any tls and tls verification
errors even if the recipient domain has a policy that requires tls verification
(mta-sts and/or dnssec+dane), allowing delivery of non-sensitive messages in
case of misconfiguration/interoperability issues (at least useful for sending
tls reports).
we enable requiretls by default (only when tls is active), for smtp and
submission. it can be disabled through the config.
for each delivery attempt, we now store (per recipient domain, in the account
of the sender) whether the smtp server supports starttls and requiretls. this
support is shown (after having sent a first message) in the webmail when
sending a message (the previous 3 bars under the address input field are now 5
bars, the first for starttls support, the last for requiretls support). when
all recipient domains for a message are known to implement requiretls,
requiretls is automatically selected for sending (instead of "default" tls
behaviour). users can also select the "fallback to insecure" to add the
"tls-required: no" header.
new metrics are added for insight into requiretls errors and (some, not yet
all) cases where tls-required-no ignored a tls/verification error.
the admin can change the requiretls status for messages in the queue. so with
default delivery attempts, when verified tls is required by failing, an admin
could potentially change the field to "tls-required: no"-behaviour.
messages received (over smtp) with the requiretls option, get a comment added
to their Received header line, just before "id", after "with".
2023-10-24 11:06:16 +03:00
// RequireTLS influences TLS verification during delivery.
//
// If nil, the recipient domain policy is followed (MTA-STS and/or DANE), falling
// back to optional opportunistic non-verified STARTTLS.
//
// If RequireTLS is true (through SMTP REQUIRETLS extension or webmail submit),
// MTA-STS or DANE is required, as well as REQUIRETLS support by the next hop
// server.
//
// If RequireTLS is false (through messag header "TLS-Required: No"), the recipient
// domain's policy is ignored if it does not lead to a successful TLS connection,
// i.e. falling back to SMTP delivery with unverified STARTTLS or plain text.
RequireTLS * bool
// ../rfc/8689:250
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}
// Sender of message as used in MAIL FROM.
func ( m Msg ) Sender ( ) smtp . Path {
return smtp . Path { Localpart : m . SenderLocalpart , IPDomain : m . SenderDomain }
}
// Recipient of message as used in RCPT TO.
func ( m Msg ) Recipient ( ) smtp . Path {
return smtp . Path { Localpart : m . RecipientLocalpart , IPDomain : m . RecipientDomain }
}
// MessagePath returns the path where the message is stored.
func ( m Msg ) MessagePath ( ) string {
return mox . DataDirPath ( filepath . Join ( "queue" , store . MessagePath ( m . ID ) ) )
}
// Init opens the queue database without starting delivery.
func Init ( ) error {
make mox compile on windows, without "mox serve" but with working "mox localserve"
getting mox to compile required changing code in only a few places where
package "syscall" was used: for accessing file access times and for umask
handling. an open problem is how to start a process as an unprivileged user on
windows. that's why "mox serve" isn't implemented yet. and just finding a way
to implement it now may not be good enough in the near future: we may want to
starting using a more complete privilege separation approach, with a process
handling sensitive tasks (handling private keys, authentication), where we may
want to pass file descriptors between processes. how would that work on
windows?
anyway, getting mox to compile for windows doesn't mean it works properly on
windows. the largest issue: mox would normally open a file, rename or remove
it, and finally close it. this happens during message delivery. that doesn't
work on windows, the rename/remove would fail because the file is still open.
so this commit swaps many "remove" and "close" calls. renames are a longer
story: message delivery had two ways to deliver: with "consuming" the
(temporary) message file (which would rename it to its final destination), and
without consuming (by hardlinking the file, falling back to copying). the last
delivery to a recipient of a message (and the only one in the common case of a
single recipient) would consume the message, and the earlier recipients would
not. during delivery, the already open message file was used, to parse the
message. we still want to use that open message file, and the caller now stays
responsible for closing it, but we no longer try to rename (consume) the file.
we always hardlink (or copy) during delivery (this works on windows), and the
caller is responsible for closing and removing (in that order) the original
temporary file. this does cost one syscall more. but it makes the delivery code
(responsibilities) a bit simpler.
there is one more obvious issue: the file system path separator. mox already
used the "filepath" package to join paths in many places, but not everywhere.
and it still used strings with slashes for local file access. with this commit,
the code now uses filepath.FromSlash for path strings with slashes, uses
"filepath" in a few more places where it previously didn't. also switches from
"filepath" to regular "path" package when handling mailbox names in a few
places, because those always use forward slashes, regardless of local file
system conventions. windows can handle forward slashes when opening files, so
test code that passes path strings with forward slashes straight to go stdlib
file i/o functions are left unchanged to reduce code churn. the regular
non-test code, or test code that uses path strings in places other than
standard i/o functions, does have the paths converted for consistent paths
(otherwise we would end up with paths with mixed forward/backward slashes in
log messages).
windows cannot dup a listening socket. for "mox localserve", it isn't
important, and we can work around the issue. the current approach for "mox
serve" (forking a process and passing file descriptors of listening sockets on
"privileged" ports) won't work on windows. perhaps it isn't needed on windows,
and any user can listen on "privileged" ports? that would be welcome.
on windows, os.Open cannot open a directory, so we cannot call Sync on it after
message delivery. a cursory internet search indicates that directories cannot
be synced on windows. the story is probably much more nuanced than that, with
long deep technical details/discussions/disagreement/confusion, like on unix.
for "mox localserve" we can get away with making syncdir a no-op.
2023-10-14 11:54:07 +03:00
qpath := mox . DataDirPath ( filepath . FromSlash ( "queue/index.db" ) )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
os . MkdirAll ( filepath . Dir ( qpath ) , 0770 )
isNew := false
if _ , err := os . Stat ( qpath ) ; err != nil && os . IsNotExist ( err ) {
isNew = true
}
var err error
add a "backup" subcommand to make consistent backups, and a "verifydata" subcommand to verify a backup before restoring, and add tests for future upgrades
the backup command will make consistent snapshots of all the database files. i
had been copying the db files before, and it usually works. but if the file is
modified during the backup, it is inconsistent and is likely to generate errors
when reading (can be at any moment in the future, when reading some db page).
"mox backup" opens the database file and writes out a copy in a transaction.
it also duplicates the message files.
before doing a restore, you could run "mox verifydata" on the to-be-restored
"data" directory. it check the database files, and compares the message files
with the database.
the new "gentestdata" subcommand generates a basic "data" directory, with a
queue and a few accounts. we will use it in the future along with "verifydata"
to test upgrades from old version to the latest version. both when going to the
next version, and when skipping several versions. the script test-upgrades.sh
executes these tests and doesn't do anything at the moment, because no releases
have this subcommand yet.
inspired by a failed upgrade attempt of a pre-release version.
2023-05-26 20:26:51 +03:00
DB , err = bstore . Open ( mox . Shutdown , qpath , & bstore . Options { Timeout : 5 * time . Second , Perm : 0660 } , DBTypes ... )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
if err != nil {
if isNew {
os . Remove ( qpath )
}
return fmt . Errorf ( "open queue database: %s" , err )
}
return nil
}
// Shutdown closes the queue database. The delivery process isn't stopped. For tests only.
func Shutdown ( ) {
add a "backup" subcommand to make consistent backups, and a "verifydata" subcommand to verify a backup before restoring, and add tests for future upgrades
the backup command will make consistent snapshots of all the database files. i
had been copying the db files before, and it usually works. but if the file is
modified during the backup, it is inconsistent and is likely to generate errors
when reading (can be at any moment in the future, when reading some db page).
"mox backup" opens the database file and writes out a copy in a transaction.
it also duplicates the message files.
before doing a restore, you could run "mox verifydata" on the to-be-restored
"data" directory. it check the database files, and compares the message files
with the database.
the new "gentestdata" subcommand generates a basic "data" directory, with a
queue and a few accounts. we will use it in the future along with "verifydata"
to test upgrades from old version to the latest version. both when going to the
next version, and when skipping several versions. the script test-upgrades.sh
executes these tests and doesn't do anything at the moment, because no releases
have this subcommand yet.
inspired by a failed upgrade attempt of a pre-release version.
2023-05-26 20:26:51 +03:00
err := DB . Close ( )
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
if err != nil {
mlog . New ( "queue" , nil ) . Errorx ( "closing queue db" , err )
}
add a "backup" subcommand to make consistent backups, and a "verifydata" subcommand to verify a backup before restoring, and add tests for future upgrades
the backup command will make consistent snapshots of all the database files. i
had been copying the db files before, and it usually works. but if the file is
modified during the backup, it is inconsistent and is likely to generate errors
when reading (can be at any moment in the future, when reading some db page).
"mox backup" opens the database file and writes out a copy in a transaction.
it also duplicates the message files.
before doing a restore, you could run "mox verifydata" on the to-be-restored
"data" directory. it check the database files, and compares the message files
with the database.
the new "gentestdata" subcommand generates a basic "data" directory, with a
queue and a few accounts. we will use it in the future along with "verifydata"
to test upgrades from old version to the latest version. both when going to the
next version, and when skipping several versions. the script test-upgrades.sh
executes these tests and doesn't do anything at the moment, because no releases
have this subcommand yet.
inspired by a failed upgrade attempt of a pre-release version.
2023-05-26 20:26:51 +03:00
DB = nil
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
// List returns all messages in the delivery queue.
// Ordered by earliest delivery attempt first.
2023-05-22 15:40:36 +03:00
func List ( ctx context . Context ) ( [ ] Msg , error ) {
add a "backup" subcommand to make consistent backups, and a "verifydata" subcommand to verify a backup before restoring, and add tests for future upgrades
the backup command will make consistent snapshots of all the database files. i
had been copying the db files before, and it usually works. but if the file is
modified during the backup, it is inconsistent and is likely to generate errors
when reading (can be at any moment in the future, when reading some db page).
"mox backup" opens the database file and writes out a copy in a transaction.
it also duplicates the message files.
before doing a restore, you could run "mox verifydata" on the to-be-restored
"data" directory. it check the database files, and compares the message files
with the database.
the new "gentestdata" subcommand generates a basic "data" directory, with a
queue and a few accounts. we will use it in the future along with "verifydata"
to test upgrades from old version to the latest version. both when going to the
next version, and when skipping several versions. the script test-upgrades.sh
executes these tests and doesn't do anything at the moment, because no releases
have this subcommand yet.
inspired by a failed upgrade attempt of a pre-release version.
2023-05-26 20:26:51 +03:00
qmsgs , err := bstore . QueryDB [ Msg ] ( ctx , DB ) . List ( )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
if err != nil {
return nil , err
}
sort . Slice ( qmsgs , func ( i , j int ) bool {
a := qmsgs [ i ]
b := qmsgs [ j ]
la := a . LastAttempt != nil
lb := b . LastAttempt != nil
if ! la && lb {
return true
} else if la && ! lb {
return false
}
if ! la && ! lb || a . LastAttempt . Equal ( * b . LastAttempt ) {
return a . ID < b . ID
}
return a . LastAttempt . Before ( * b . LastAttempt )
} )
return qmsgs , nil
}
2023-02-08 21:42:21 +03:00
// Count returns the number of messages in the delivery queue.
2023-05-22 15:40:36 +03:00
func Count ( ctx context . Context ) ( int , error ) {
add a "backup" subcommand to make consistent backups, and a "verifydata" subcommand to verify a backup before restoring, and add tests for future upgrades
the backup command will make consistent snapshots of all the database files. i
had been copying the db files before, and it usually works. but if the file is
modified during the backup, it is inconsistent and is likely to generate errors
when reading (can be at any moment in the future, when reading some db page).
"mox backup" opens the database file and writes out a copy in a transaction.
it also duplicates the message files.
before doing a restore, you could run "mox verifydata" on the to-be-restored
"data" directory. it check the database files, and compares the message files
with the database.
the new "gentestdata" subcommand generates a basic "data" directory, with a
queue and a few accounts. we will use it in the future along with "verifydata"
to test upgrades from old version to the latest version. both when going to the
next version, and when skipping several versions. the script test-upgrades.sh
executes these tests and doesn't do anything at the moment, because no releases
have this subcommand yet.
inspired by a failed upgrade attempt of a pre-release version.
2023-05-26 20:26:51 +03:00
return bstore . QueryDB [ Msg ] ( ctx , DB ) . Count ( )
2023-02-08 21:42:21 +03:00
}
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
// MakeMsg is a convenience function that sets the commonly used fields for a Msg.
func MakeMsg ( senderAccount string , sender , recipient smtp . Path , has8bit , smtputf8 bool , size int64 , messageID string , prefix [ ] byte , requireTLS * bool ) Msg {
return Msg {
SenderAccount : mox . Conf . Static . Postmaster . Account ,
SenderLocalpart : sender . Localpart ,
SenderDomain : sender . IPDomain ,
RecipientLocalpart : recipient . Localpart ,
RecipientDomain : recipient . IPDomain ,
Has8bit : has8bit ,
SMTPUTF8 : smtputf8 ,
Size : size ,
MessageID : messageID ,
MsgPrefix : prefix ,
RequireTLS : requireTLS ,
}
}
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
// Add a new message to the queue. The queue is kicked immediately to start a
// first delivery attempt.
//
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
// ID must be 0 and will be set after inserting in the queue.
//
// Add sets derived fields like RecipientDomainStr, and fields related to queueing,
// such as Queued, NextAttempt, LastAttempt, LastError.
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
func Add ( ctx context . Context , log mlog . Log , qm * Msg , msgFile * os . File ) error {
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
// todo: Add should accept multiple rcptTo if they are for the same domain. so we can queue them for delivery in one (or just a few) session(s), transferring the data only once. ../rfc/5321:3759
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
if qm . ID != 0 {
return fmt . Errorf ( "id of queued message must be 0" )
}
qm . Queued = time . Now ( )
qm . DialedIPs = nil
qm . NextAttempt = qm . Queued
qm . LastAttempt = nil
qm . LastError = ""
qm . RecipientDomainStr = formatIPDomain ( qm . RecipientDomain )
2023-03-12 12:38:02 +03:00
if Localserve {
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
if qm . SenderAccount == "" {
return fmt . Errorf ( "cannot queue with localserve without local account" )
add webmail
it was far down on the roadmap, but implemented earlier, because it's
interesting, and to help prepare for a jmap implementation. for jmap we need to
implement more client-like functionality than with just imap. internal data
structures need to change. jmap has lots of other requirements, so it's already
a big project. by implementing a webmail now, some of the required data
structure changes become clear and can be made now, so the later jmap
implementation can do things similarly to the webmail code. the webmail
frontend and webmail are written together, making their interface/api much
smaller and simpler than jmap.
one of the internal changes is that we now keep track of per-mailbox
total/unread/unseen/deleted message counts and mailbox sizes. keeping this
data consistent after any change to the stored messages (through the code base)
is tricky, so mox now has a consistency check that verifies the counts are
correct, which runs only during tests, each time an internal account reference
is closed. we have a few more internal "changes" that are propagated for the
webmail frontend (that imap doesn't have a way to propagate on a connection),
like changes to the special-use flags on mailboxes, and used keywords in a
mailbox. more changes that will be required have revealed themselves while
implementing the webmail, and will be implemented next.
the webmail user interface is modeled after the mail clients i use or have
used: thunderbird, macos mail, mutt; and webmails i normally only use for
testing: gmail, proton, yahoo, outlook. a somewhat technical user is assumed,
but still the goal is to make this webmail client easy to use for everyone. the
user interface looks like most other mail clients: a list of mailboxes, a
search bar, a message list view, and message details. there is a top/bottom and
a left/right layout for the list/message view, default is automatic based on
screen size. the panes can be resized by the user. buttons for actions are just
text, not icons. clicking a button briefly shows the shortcut for the action in
the bottom right, helping with learning to operate quickly. any text that is
underdotted has a title attribute that causes more information to be displayed,
e.g. what a button does or a field is about. to highlight potential phishing
attempts, any text (anywhere in the webclient) that switches unicode "blocks"
(a rough approximation to (language) scripts) within a word is underlined
orange. multiple messages can be selected with familiar ui interaction:
clicking while holding control and/or shift keys. keyboard navigation works
with arrows/page up/down and home/end keys, and also with a few basic vi-like
keys for list/message navigation. we prefer showing the text instead of
html (with inlined images only) version of a message. html messages are shown
in an iframe served from an endpoint with CSP headers to prevent dangerous
resources (scripts, external images) from being loaded. the html is also
sanitized, with javascript removed. a user can choose to load external
resources (e.g. images for tracking purposes).
the frontend is just (strict) typescript, no external frameworks. all
incoming/outgoing data is typechecked, both the api request parameters and
response types, and the data coming in over SSE. the types and checking code
are generated with sherpats, which uses the api definitions generated by
sherpadoc based on the Go code. so types from the backend are automatically
propagated to the frontend. since there is no framework to automatically
propagate properties and rerender components, changes coming in over the SSE
connection are propagated explicitly with regular function calls. the ui is
separated into "views", each with a "root" dom element that is added to the
visible document. these views have additional functions for getting changes
propagated, often resulting in the view updating its (internal) ui state (dom).
we keep the frontend compilation simple, it's just a few typescript files that
get compiled (combined and types stripped) into a single js file, no additional
runtime code needed or complicated build processes used. the webmail is served
is served from a compressed, cachable html file that includes style and the
javascript, currently just over 225kb uncompressed, under 60kb compressed (not
minified, including comments). we include the generated js files in the
repository, to keep Go's easily buildable self-contained binaries.
authentication is basic http, as with the account and admin pages. most data
comes in over one long-term SSE connection to the backend. api requests signal
which mailbox/search/messages are requested over the SSE connection. fetching
individual messages, and making changes, are done through api calls. the
operations are similar to imap, so some code has been moved from package
imapserver to package store. the future jmap implementation will benefit from
these changes too. more functionality will probably be moved to the store
package in the future.
the quickstart enables webmail on the internal listener by default (for new
installs). users can enable it on the public listener if they want to. mox
localserve enables it too. to enable webmail on existing installs, add settings
like the following to the listeners in mox.conf, similar to AccountHTTP(S):
WebmailHTTP:
Enabled: true
WebmailHTTPS:
Enabled: true
special thanks to liesbeth, gerben, andrii for early user feedback.
there is plenty still to do, see the list at the top of webmail/webmail.ts.
feedback welcome as always.
2023-08-07 22:57:03 +03:00
}
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
acc , err := store . OpenAccount ( log , qm . SenderAccount )
add webmail
it was far down on the roadmap, but implemented earlier, because it's
interesting, and to help prepare for a jmap implementation. for jmap we need to
implement more client-like functionality than with just imap. internal data
structures need to change. jmap has lots of other requirements, so it's already
a big project. by implementing a webmail now, some of the required data
structure changes become clear and can be made now, so the later jmap
implementation can do things similarly to the webmail code. the webmail
frontend and webmail are written together, making their interface/api much
smaller and simpler than jmap.
one of the internal changes is that we now keep track of per-mailbox
total/unread/unseen/deleted message counts and mailbox sizes. keeping this
data consistent after any change to the stored messages (through the code base)
is tricky, so mox now has a consistency check that verifies the counts are
correct, which runs only during tests, each time an internal account reference
is closed. we have a few more internal "changes" that are propagated for the
webmail frontend (that imap doesn't have a way to propagate on a connection),
like changes to the special-use flags on mailboxes, and used keywords in a
mailbox. more changes that will be required have revealed themselves while
implementing the webmail, and will be implemented next.
the webmail user interface is modeled after the mail clients i use or have
used: thunderbird, macos mail, mutt; and webmails i normally only use for
testing: gmail, proton, yahoo, outlook. a somewhat technical user is assumed,
but still the goal is to make this webmail client easy to use for everyone. the
user interface looks like most other mail clients: a list of mailboxes, a
search bar, a message list view, and message details. there is a top/bottom and
a left/right layout for the list/message view, default is automatic based on
screen size. the panes can be resized by the user. buttons for actions are just
text, not icons. clicking a button briefly shows the shortcut for the action in
the bottom right, helping with learning to operate quickly. any text that is
underdotted has a title attribute that causes more information to be displayed,
e.g. what a button does or a field is about. to highlight potential phishing
attempts, any text (anywhere in the webclient) that switches unicode "blocks"
(a rough approximation to (language) scripts) within a word is underlined
orange. multiple messages can be selected with familiar ui interaction:
clicking while holding control and/or shift keys. keyboard navigation works
with arrows/page up/down and home/end keys, and also with a few basic vi-like
keys for list/message navigation. we prefer showing the text instead of
html (with inlined images only) version of a message. html messages are shown
in an iframe served from an endpoint with CSP headers to prevent dangerous
resources (scripts, external images) from being loaded. the html is also
sanitized, with javascript removed. a user can choose to load external
resources (e.g. images for tracking purposes).
the frontend is just (strict) typescript, no external frameworks. all
incoming/outgoing data is typechecked, both the api request parameters and
response types, and the data coming in over SSE. the types and checking code
are generated with sherpats, which uses the api definitions generated by
sherpadoc based on the Go code. so types from the backend are automatically
propagated to the frontend. since there is no framework to automatically
propagate properties and rerender components, changes coming in over the SSE
connection are propagated explicitly with regular function calls. the ui is
separated into "views", each with a "root" dom element that is added to the
visible document. these views have additional functions for getting changes
propagated, often resulting in the view updating its (internal) ui state (dom).
we keep the frontend compilation simple, it's just a few typescript files that
get compiled (combined and types stripped) into a single js file, no additional
runtime code needed or complicated build processes used. the webmail is served
is served from a compressed, cachable html file that includes style and the
javascript, currently just over 225kb uncompressed, under 60kb compressed (not
minified, including comments). we include the generated js files in the
repository, to keep Go's easily buildable self-contained binaries.
authentication is basic http, as with the account and admin pages. most data
comes in over one long-term SSE connection to the backend. api requests signal
which mailbox/search/messages are requested over the SSE connection. fetching
individual messages, and making changes, are done through api calls. the
operations are similar to imap, so some code has been moved from package
imapserver to package store. the future jmap implementation will benefit from
these changes too. more functionality will probably be moved to the store
package in the future.
the quickstart enables webmail on the internal listener by default (for new
installs). users can enable it on the public listener if they want to. mox
localserve enables it too. to enable webmail on existing installs, add settings
like the following to the listeners in mox.conf, similar to AccountHTTP(S):
WebmailHTTP:
Enabled: true
WebmailHTTPS:
Enabled: true
special thanks to liesbeth, gerben, andrii for early user feedback.
there is plenty still to do, see the list at the top of webmail/webmail.ts.
feedback welcome as always.
2023-08-07 22:57:03 +03:00
if err != nil {
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
return fmt . Errorf ( "opening sender account for immediate delivery with localserve: %v" , err )
add webmail
it was far down on the roadmap, but implemented earlier, because it's
interesting, and to help prepare for a jmap implementation. for jmap we need to
implement more client-like functionality than with just imap. internal data
structures need to change. jmap has lots of other requirements, so it's already
a big project. by implementing a webmail now, some of the required data
structure changes become clear and can be made now, so the later jmap
implementation can do things similarly to the webmail code. the webmail
frontend and webmail are written together, making their interface/api much
smaller and simpler than jmap.
one of the internal changes is that we now keep track of per-mailbox
total/unread/unseen/deleted message counts and mailbox sizes. keeping this
data consistent after any change to the stored messages (through the code base)
is tricky, so mox now has a consistency check that verifies the counts are
correct, which runs only during tests, each time an internal account reference
is closed. we have a few more internal "changes" that are propagated for the
webmail frontend (that imap doesn't have a way to propagate on a connection),
like changes to the special-use flags on mailboxes, and used keywords in a
mailbox. more changes that will be required have revealed themselves while
implementing the webmail, and will be implemented next.
the webmail user interface is modeled after the mail clients i use or have
used: thunderbird, macos mail, mutt; and webmails i normally only use for
testing: gmail, proton, yahoo, outlook. a somewhat technical user is assumed,
but still the goal is to make this webmail client easy to use for everyone. the
user interface looks like most other mail clients: a list of mailboxes, a
search bar, a message list view, and message details. there is a top/bottom and
a left/right layout for the list/message view, default is automatic based on
screen size. the panes can be resized by the user. buttons for actions are just
text, not icons. clicking a button briefly shows the shortcut for the action in
the bottom right, helping with learning to operate quickly. any text that is
underdotted has a title attribute that causes more information to be displayed,
e.g. what a button does or a field is about. to highlight potential phishing
attempts, any text (anywhere in the webclient) that switches unicode "blocks"
(a rough approximation to (language) scripts) within a word is underlined
orange. multiple messages can be selected with familiar ui interaction:
clicking while holding control and/or shift keys. keyboard navigation works
with arrows/page up/down and home/end keys, and also with a few basic vi-like
keys for list/message navigation. we prefer showing the text instead of
html (with inlined images only) version of a message. html messages are shown
in an iframe served from an endpoint with CSP headers to prevent dangerous
resources (scripts, external images) from being loaded. the html is also
sanitized, with javascript removed. a user can choose to load external
resources (e.g. images for tracking purposes).
the frontend is just (strict) typescript, no external frameworks. all
incoming/outgoing data is typechecked, both the api request parameters and
response types, and the data coming in over SSE. the types and checking code
are generated with sherpats, which uses the api definitions generated by
sherpadoc based on the Go code. so types from the backend are automatically
propagated to the frontend. since there is no framework to automatically
propagate properties and rerender components, changes coming in over the SSE
connection are propagated explicitly with regular function calls. the ui is
separated into "views", each with a "root" dom element that is added to the
visible document. these views have additional functions for getting changes
propagated, often resulting in the view updating its (internal) ui state (dom).
we keep the frontend compilation simple, it's just a few typescript files that
get compiled (combined and types stripped) into a single js file, no additional
runtime code needed or complicated build processes used. the webmail is served
is served from a compressed, cachable html file that includes style and the
javascript, currently just over 225kb uncompressed, under 60kb compressed (not
minified, including comments). we include the generated js files in the
repository, to keep Go's easily buildable self-contained binaries.
authentication is basic http, as with the account and admin pages. most data
comes in over one long-term SSE connection to the backend. api requests signal
which mailbox/search/messages are requested over the SSE connection. fetching
individual messages, and making changes, are done through api calls. the
operations are similar to imap, so some code has been moved from package
imapserver to package store. the future jmap implementation will benefit from
these changes too. more functionality will probably be moved to the store
package in the future.
the quickstart enables webmail on the internal listener by default (for new
installs). users can enable it on the public listener if they want to. mox
localserve enables it too. to enable webmail on existing installs, add settings
like the following to the listeners in mox.conf, similar to AccountHTTP(S):
WebmailHTTP:
Enabled: true
WebmailHTTPS:
Enabled: true
special thanks to liesbeth, gerben, andrii for early user feedback.
there is plenty still to do, see the list at the top of webmail/webmail.ts.
feedback welcome as always.
2023-08-07 22:57:03 +03:00
}
defer func ( ) {
err := acc . Close ( )
log . Check ( err , "closing account" )
} ( )
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
m := store . Message { Size : qm . Size , MsgPrefix : qm . MsgPrefix }
add webmail
it was far down on the roadmap, but implemented earlier, because it's
interesting, and to help prepare for a jmap implementation. for jmap we need to
implement more client-like functionality than with just imap. internal data
structures need to change. jmap has lots of other requirements, so it's already
a big project. by implementing a webmail now, some of the required data
structure changes become clear and can be made now, so the later jmap
implementation can do things similarly to the webmail code. the webmail
frontend and webmail are written together, making their interface/api much
smaller and simpler than jmap.
one of the internal changes is that we now keep track of per-mailbox
total/unread/unseen/deleted message counts and mailbox sizes. keeping this
data consistent after any change to the stored messages (through the code base)
is tricky, so mox now has a consistency check that verifies the counts are
correct, which runs only during tests, each time an internal account reference
is closed. we have a few more internal "changes" that are propagated for the
webmail frontend (that imap doesn't have a way to propagate on a connection),
like changes to the special-use flags on mailboxes, and used keywords in a
mailbox. more changes that will be required have revealed themselves while
implementing the webmail, and will be implemented next.
the webmail user interface is modeled after the mail clients i use or have
used: thunderbird, macos mail, mutt; and webmails i normally only use for
testing: gmail, proton, yahoo, outlook. a somewhat technical user is assumed,
but still the goal is to make this webmail client easy to use for everyone. the
user interface looks like most other mail clients: a list of mailboxes, a
search bar, a message list view, and message details. there is a top/bottom and
a left/right layout for the list/message view, default is automatic based on
screen size. the panes can be resized by the user. buttons for actions are just
text, not icons. clicking a button briefly shows the shortcut for the action in
the bottom right, helping with learning to operate quickly. any text that is
underdotted has a title attribute that causes more information to be displayed,
e.g. what a button does or a field is about. to highlight potential phishing
attempts, any text (anywhere in the webclient) that switches unicode "blocks"
(a rough approximation to (language) scripts) within a word is underlined
orange. multiple messages can be selected with familiar ui interaction:
clicking while holding control and/or shift keys. keyboard navigation works
with arrows/page up/down and home/end keys, and also with a few basic vi-like
keys for list/message navigation. we prefer showing the text instead of
html (with inlined images only) version of a message. html messages are shown
in an iframe served from an endpoint with CSP headers to prevent dangerous
resources (scripts, external images) from being loaded. the html is also
sanitized, with javascript removed. a user can choose to load external
resources (e.g. images for tracking purposes).
the frontend is just (strict) typescript, no external frameworks. all
incoming/outgoing data is typechecked, both the api request parameters and
response types, and the data coming in over SSE. the types and checking code
are generated with sherpats, which uses the api definitions generated by
sherpadoc based on the Go code. so types from the backend are automatically
propagated to the frontend. since there is no framework to automatically
propagate properties and rerender components, changes coming in over the SSE
connection are propagated explicitly with regular function calls. the ui is
separated into "views", each with a "root" dom element that is added to the
visible document. these views have additional functions for getting changes
propagated, often resulting in the view updating its (internal) ui state (dom).
we keep the frontend compilation simple, it's just a few typescript files that
get compiled (combined and types stripped) into a single js file, no additional
runtime code needed or complicated build processes used. the webmail is served
is served from a compressed, cachable html file that includes style and the
javascript, currently just over 225kb uncompressed, under 60kb compressed (not
minified, including comments). we include the generated js files in the
repository, to keep Go's easily buildable self-contained binaries.
authentication is basic http, as with the account and admin pages. most data
comes in over one long-term SSE connection to the backend. api requests signal
which mailbox/search/messages are requested over the SSE connection. fetching
individual messages, and making changes, are done through api calls. the
operations are similar to imap, so some code has been moved from package
imapserver to package store. the future jmap implementation will benefit from
these changes too. more functionality will probably be moved to the store
package in the future.
the quickstart enables webmail on the internal listener by default (for new
installs). users can enable it on the public listener if they want to. mox
localserve enables it too. to enable webmail on existing installs, add settings
like the following to the listeners in mox.conf, similar to AccountHTTP(S):
WebmailHTTP:
Enabled: true
WebmailHTTPS:
Enabled: true
special thanks to liesbeth, gerben, andrii for early user feedback.
there is plenty still to do, see the list at the top of webmail/webmail.ts.
feedback welcome as always.
2023-08-07 22:57:03 +03:00
conf , _ := acc . Conf ( )
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
dest := conf . Destinations [ qm . Sender ( ) . String ( ) ]
add webmail
it was far down on the roadmap, but implemented earlier, because it's
interesting, and to help prepare for a jmap implementation. for jmap we need to
implement more client-like functionality than with just imap. internal data
structures need to change. jmap has lots of other requirements, so it's already
a big project. by implementing a webmail now, some of the required data
structure changes become clear and can be made now, so the later jmap
implementation can do things similarly to the webmail code. the webmail
frontend and webmail are written together, making their interface/api much
smaller and simpler than jmap.
one of the internal changes is that we now keep track of per-mailbox
total/unread/unseen/deleted message counts and mailbox sizes. keeping this
data consistent after any change to the stored messages (through the code base)
is tricky, so mox now has a consistency check that verifies the counts are
correct, which runs only during tests, each time an internal account reference
is closed. we have a few more internal "changes" that are propagated for the
webmail frontend (that imap doesn't have a way to propagate on a connection),
like changes to the special-use flags on mailboxes, and used keywords in a
mailbox. more changes that will be required have revealed themselves while
implementing the webmail, and will be implemented next.
the webmail user interface is modeled after the mail clients i use or have
used: thunderbird, macos mail, mutt; and webmails i normally only use for
testing: gmail, proton, yahoo, outlook. a somewhat technical user is assumed,
but still the goal is to make this webmail client easy to use for everyone. the
user interface looks like most other mail clients: a list of mailboxes, a
search bar, a message list view, and message details. there is a top/bottom and
a left/right layout for the list/message view, default is automatic based on
screen size. the panes can be resized by the user. buttons for actions are just
text, not icons. clicking a button briefly shows the shortcut for the action in
the bottom right, helping with learning to operate quickly. any text that is
underdotted has a title attribute that causes more information to be displayed,
e.g. what a button does or a field is about. to highlight potential phishing
attempts, any text (anywhere in the webclient) that switches unicode "blocks"
(a rough approximation to (language) scripts) within a word is underlined
orange. multiple messages can be selected with familiar ui interaction:
clicking while holding control and/or shift keys. keyboard navigation works
with arrows/page up/down and home/end keys, and also with a few basic vi-like
keys for list/message navigation. we prefer showing the text instead of
html (with inlined images only) version of a message. html messages are shown
in an iframe served from an endpoint with CSP headers to prevent dangerous
resources (scripts, external images) from being loaded. the html is also
sanitized, with javascript removed. a user can choose to load external
resources (e.g. images for tracking purposes).
the frontend is just (strict) typescript, no external frameworks. all
incoming/outgoing data is typechecked, both the api request parameters and
response types, and the data coming in over SSE. the types and checking code
are generated with sherpats, which uses the api definitions generated by
sherpadoc based on the Go code. so types from the backend are automatically
propagated to the frontend. since there is no framework to automatically
propagate properties and rerender components, changes coming in over the SSE
connection are propagated explicitly with regular function calls. the ui is
separated into "views", each with a "root" dom element that is added to the
visible document. these views have additional functions for getting changes
propagated, often resulting in the view updating its (internal) ui state (dom).
we keep the frontend compilation simple, it's just a few typescript files that
get compiled (combined and types stripped) into a single js file, no additional
runtime code needed or complicated build processes used. the webmail is served
is served from a compressed, cachable html file that includes style and the
javascript, currently just over 225kb uncompressed, under 60kb compressed (not
minified, including comments). we include the generated js files in the
repository, to keep Go's easily buildable self-contained binaries.
authentication is basic http, as with the account and admin pages. most data
comes in over one long-term SSE connection to the backend. api requests signal
which mailbox/search/messages are requested over the SSE connection. fetching
individual messages, and making changes, are done through api calls. the
operations are similar to imap, so some code has been moved from package
imapserver to package store. the future jmap implementation will benefit from
these changes too. more functionality will probably be moved to the store
package in the future.
the quickstart enables webmail on the internal listener by default (for new
installs). users can enable it on the public listener if they want to. mox
localserve enables it too. to enable webmail on existing installs, add settings
like the following to the listeners in mox.conf, similar to AccountHTTP(S):
WebmailHTTP:
Enabled: true
WebmailHTTPS:
Enabled: true
special thanks to liesbeth, gerben, andrii for early user feedback.
there is plenty still to do, see the list at the top of webmail/webmail.ts.
feedback welcome as always.
2023-08-07 22:57:03 +03:00
acc . WithWLock ( func ( ) {
make mox compile on windows, without "mox serve" but with working "mox localserve"
getting mox to compile required changing code in only a few places where
package "syscall" was used: for accessing file access times and for umask
handling. an open problem is how to start a process as an unprivileged user on
windows. that's why "mox serve" isn't implemented yet. and just finding a way
to implement it now may not be good enough in the near future: we may want to
starting using a more complete privilege separation approach, with a process
handling sensitive tasks (handling private keys, authentication), where we may
want to pass file descriptors between processes. how would that work on
windows?
anyway, getting mox to compile for windows doesn't mean it works properly on
windows. the largest issue: mox would normally open a file, rename or remove
it, and finally close it. this happens during message delivery. that doesn't
work on windows, the rename/remove would fail because the file is still open.
so this commit swaps many "remove" and "close" calls. renames are a longer
story: message delivery had two ways to deliver: with "consuming" the
(temporary) message file (which would rename it to its final destination), and
without consuming (by hardlinking the file, falling back to copying). the last
delivery to a recipient of a message (and the only one in the common case of a
single recipient) would consume the message, and the earlier recipients would
not. during delivery, the already open message file was used, to parse the
message. we still want to use that open message file, and the caller now stays
responsible for closing it, but we no longer try to rename (consume) the file.
we always hardlink (or copy) during delivery (this works on windows), and the
caller is responsible for closing and removing (in that order) the original
temporary file. this does cost one syscall more. but it makes the delivery code
(responsibilities) a bit simpler.
there is one more obvious issue: the file system path separator. mox already
used the "filepath" package to join paths in many places, but not everywhere.
and it still used strings with slashes for local file access. with this commit,
the code now uses filepath.FromSlash for path strings with slashes, uses
"filepath" in a few more places where it previously didn't. also switches from
"filepath" to regular "path" package when handling mailbox names in a few
places, because those always use forward slashes, regardless of local file
system conventions. windows can handle forward slashes when opening files, so
test code that passes path strings with forward slashes straight to go stdlib
file i/o functions are left unchanged to reduce code churn. the regular
non-test code, or test code that uses path strings in places other than
standard i/o functions, does have the paths converted for consistent paths
(otherwise we would end up with paths with mixed forward/backward slashes in
log messages).
windows cannot dup a listening socket. for "mox localserve", it isn't
important, and we can work around the issue. the current approach for "mox
serve" (forking a process and passing file descriptors of listening sockets on
"privileged" ports) won't work on windows. perhaps it isn't needed on windows,
and any user can listen on "privileged" ports? that would be welcome.
on windows, os.Open cannot open a directory, so we cannot call Sync on it after
message delivery. a cursory internet search indicates that directories cannot
be synced on windows. the story is probably much more nuanced than that, with
long deep technical details/discussions/disagreement/confusion, like on unix.
for "mox localserve" we can get away with making syncdir a no-op.
2023-10-14 11:54:07 +03:00
err = acc . DeliverDestination ( log , dest , & m , msgFile )
add webmail
it was far down on the roadmap, but implemented earlier, because it's
interesting, and to help prepare for a jmap implementation. for jmap we need to
implement more client-like functionality than with just imap. internal data
structures need to change. jmap has lots of other requirements, so it's already
a big project. by implementing a webmail now, some of the required data
structure changes become clear and can be made now, so the later jmap
implementation can do things similarly to the webmail code. the webmail
frontend and webmail are written together, making their interface/api much
smaller and simpler than jmap.
one of the internal changes is that we now keep track of per-mailbox
total/unread/unseen/deleted message counts and mailbox sizes. keeping this
data consistent after any change to the stored messages (through the code base)
is tricky, so mox now has a consistency check that verifies the counts are
correct, which runs only during tests, each time an internal account reference
is closed. we have a few more internal "changes" that are propagated for the
webmail frontend (that imap doesn't have a way to propagate on a connection),
like changes to the special-use flags on mailboxes, and used keywords in a
mailbox. more changes that will be required have revealed themselves while
implementing the webmail, and will be implemented next.
the webmail user interface is modeled after the mail clients i use or have
used: thunderbird, macos mail, mutt; and webmails i normally only use for
testing: gmail, proton, yahoo, outlook. a somewhat technical user is assumed,
but still the goal is to make this webmail client easy to use for everyone. the
user interface looks like most other mail clients: a list of mailboxes, a
search bar, a message list view, and message details. there is a top/bottom and
a left/right layout for the list/message view, default is automatic based on
screen size. the panes can be resized by the user. buttons for actions are just
text, not icons. clicking a button briefly shows the shortcut for the action in
the bottom right, helping with learning to operate quickly. any text that is
underdotted has a title attribute that causes more information to be displayed,
e.g. what a button does or a field is about. to highlight potential phishing
attempts, any text (anywhere in the webclient) that switches unicode "blocks"
(a rough approximation to (language) scripts) within a word is underlined
orange. multiple messages can be selected with familiar ui interaction:
clicking while holding control and/or shift keys. keyboard navigation works
with arrows/page up/down and home/end keys, and also with a few basic vi-like
keys for list/message navigation. we prefer showing the text instead of
html (with inlined images only) version of a message. html messages are shown
in an iframe served from an endpoint with CSP headers to prevent dangerous
resources (scripts, external images) from being loaded. the html is also
sanitized, with javascript removed. a user can choose to load external
resources (e.g. images for tracking purposes).
the frontend is just (strict) typescript, no external frameworks. all
incoming/outgoing data is typechecked, both the api request parameters and
response types, and the data coming in over SSE. the types and checking code
are generated with sherpats, which uses the api definitions generated by
sherpadoc based on the Go code. so types from the backend are automatically
propagated to the frontend. since there is no framework to automatically
propagate properties and rerender components, changes coming in over the SSE
connection are propagated explicitly with regular function calls. the ui is
separated into "views", each with a "root" dom element that is added to the
visible document. these views have additional functions for getting changes
propagated, often resulting in the view updating its (internal) ui state (dom).
we keep the frontend compilation simple, it's just a few typescript files that
get compiled (combined and types stripped) into a single js file, no additional
runtime code needed or complicated build processes used. the webmail is served
is served from a compressed, cachable html file that includes style and the
javascript, currently just over 225kb uncompressed, under 60kb compressed (not
minified, including comments). we include the generated js files in the
repository, to keep Go's easily buildable self-contained binaries.
authentication is basic http, as with the account and admin pages. most data
comes in over one long-term SSE connection to the backend. api requests signal
which mailbox/search/messages are requested over the SSE connection. fetching
individual messages, and making changes, are done through api calls. the
operations are similar to imap, so some code has been moved from package
imapserver to package store. the future jmap implementation will benefit from
these changes too. more functionality will probably be moved to the store
package in the future.
the quickstart enables webmail on the internal listener by default (for new
installs). users can enable it on the public listener if they want to. mox
localserve enables it too. to enable webmail on existing installs, add settings
like the following to the listeners in mox.conf, similar to AccountHTTP(S):
WebmailHTTP:
Enabled: true
WebmailHTTPS:
Enabled: true
special thanks to liesbeth, gerben, andrii for early user feedback.
there is plenty still to do, see the list at the top of webmail/webmail.ts.
feedback welcome as always.
2023-08-07 22:57:03 +03:00
} )
if err != nil {
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
return fmt . Errorf ( "delivering message: %v" , err )
add webmail
it was far down on the roadmap, but implemented earlier, because it's
interesting, and to help prepare for a jmap implementation. for jmap we need to
implement more client-like functionality than with just imap. internal data
structures need to change. jmap has lots of other requirements, so it's already
a big project. by implementing a webmail now, some of the required data
structure changes become clear and can be made now, so the later jmap
implementation can do things similarly to the webmail code. the webmail
frontend and webmail are written together, making their interface/api much
smaller and simpler than jmap.
one of the internal changes is that we now keep track of per-mailbox
total/unread/unseen/deleted message counts and mailbox sizes. keeping this
data consistent after any change to the stored messages (through the code base)
is tricky, so mox now has a consistency check that verifies the counts are
correct, which runs only during tests, each time an internal account reference
is closed. we have a few more internal "changes" that are propagated for the
webmail frontend (that imap doesn't have a way to propagate on a connection),
like changes to the special-use flags on mailboxes, and used keywords in a
mailbox. more changes that will be required have revealed themselves while
implementing the webmail, and will be implemented next.
the webmail user interface is modeled after the mail clients i use or have
used: thunderbird, macos mail, mutt; and webmails i normally only use for
testing: gmail, proton, yahoo, outlook. a somewhat technical user is assumed,
but still the goal is to make this webmail client easy to use for everyone. the
user interface looks like most other mail clients: a list of mailboxes, a
search bar, a message list view, and message details. there is a top/bottom and
a left/right layout for the list/message view, default is automatic based on
screen size. the panes can be resized by the user. buttons for actions are just
text, not icons. clicking a button briefly shows the shortcut for the action in
the bottom right, helping with learning to operate quickly. any text that is
underdotted has a title attribute that causes more information to be displayed,
e.g. what a button does or a field is about. to highlight potential phishing
attempts, any text (anywhere in the webclient) that switches unicode "blocks"
(a rough approximation to (language) scripts) within a word is underlined
orange. multiple messages can be selected with familiar ui interaction:
clicking while holding control and/or shift keys. keyboard navigation works
with arrows/page up/down and home/end keys, and also with a few basic vi-like
keys for list/message navigation. we prefer showing the text instead of
html (with inlined images only) version of a message. html messages are shown
in an iframe served from an endpoint with CSP headers to prevent dangerous
resources (scripts, external images) from being loaded. the html is also
sanitized, with javascript removed. a user can choose to load external
resources (e.g. images for tracking purposes).
the frontend is just (strict) typescript, no external frameworks. all
incoming/outgoing data is typechecked, both the api request parameters and
response types, and the data coming in over SSE. the types and checking code
are generated with sherpats, which uses the api definitions generated by
sherpadoc based on the Go code. so types from the backend are automatically
propagated to the frontend. since there is no framework to automatically
propagate properties and rerender components, changes coming in over the SSE
connection are propagated explicitly with regular function calls. the ui is
separated into "views", each with a "root" dom element that is added to the
visible document. these views have additional functions for getting changes
propagated, often resulting in the view updating its (internal) ui state (dom).
we keep the frontend compilation simple, it's just a few typescript files that
get compiled (combined and types stripped) into a single js file, no additional
runtime code needed or complicated build processes used. the webmail is served
is served from a compressed, cachable html file that includes style and the
javascript, currently just over 225kb uncompressed, under 60kb compressed (not
minified, including comments). we include the generated js files in the
repository, to keep Go's easily buildable self-contained binaries.
authentication is basic http, as with the account and admin pages. most data
comes in over one long-term SSE connection to the backend. api requests signal
which mailbox/search/messages are requested over the SSE connection. fetching
individual messages, and making changes, are done through api calls. the
operations are similar to imap, so some code has been moved from package
imapserver to package store. the future jmap implementation will benefit from
these changes too. more functionality will probably be moved to the store
package in the future.
the quickstart enables webmail on the internal listener by default (for new
installs). users can enable it on the public listener if they want to. mox
localserve enables it too. to enable webmail on existing installs, add settings
like the following to the listeners in mox.conf, similar to AccountHTTP(S):
WebmailHTTP:
Enabled: true
WebmailHTTPS:
Enabled: true
special thanks to liesbeth, gerben, andrii for early user feedback.
there is plenty still to do, see the list at the top of webmail/webmail.ts.
feedback welcome as always.
2023-08-07 22:57:03 +03:00
}
log . Debug ( "immediately delivered from queue to sender" )
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
return nil
2023-03-12 12:38:02 +03:00
}
add a "backup" subcommand to make consistent backups, and a "verifydata" subcommand to verify a backup before restoring, and add tests for future upgrades
the backup command will make consistent snapshots of all the database files. i
had been copying the db files before, and it usually works. but if the file is
modified during the backup, it is inconsistent and is likely to generate errors
when reading (can be at any moment in the future, when reading some db page).
"mox backup" opens the database file and writes out a copy in a transaction.
it also duplicates the message files.
before doing a restore, you could run "mox verifydata" on the to-be-restored
"data" directory. it check the database files, and compares the message files
with the database.
the new "gentestdata" subcommand generates a basic "data" directory, with a
queue and a few accounts. we will use it in the future along with "verifydata"
to test upgrades from old version to the latest version. both when going to the
next version, and when skipping several versions. the script test-upgrades.sh
executes these tests and doesn't do anything at the moment, because no releases
have this subcommand yet.
inspired by a failed upgrade attempt of a pre-release version.
2023-05-26 20:26:51 +03:00
tx , err := DB . Begin ( ctx , true )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
if err != nil {
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
return fmt . Errorf ( "begin transaction: %w" , err )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
defer func ( ) {
if tx != nil {
if err := tx . Rollback ( ) ; err != nil {
log . Errorx ( "rollback for queue" , err )
}
}
} ( )
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
if err := tx . Insert ( qm ) ; err != nil {
return err
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
2023-05-22 16:03:23 +03:00
dst := qm . MessagePath ( )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
defer func ( ) {
if dst != "" {
2023-02-16 15:22:00 +03:00
err := os . Remove ( dst )
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
log . Check ( err , "removing destination message file for queue" , slog . String ( "path" , dst ) )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
} ( )
dstDir := filepath . Dir ( dst )
os . MkdirAll ( dstDir , 0770 )
make mox compile on windows, without "mox serve" but with working "mox localserve"
getting mox to compile required changing code in only a few places where
package "syscall" was used: for accessing file access times and for umask
handling. an open problem is how to start a process as an unprivileged user on
windows. that's why "mox serve" isn't implemented yet. and just finding a way
to implement it now may not be good enough in the near future: we may want to
starting using a more complete privilege separation approach, with a process
handling sensitive tasks (handling private keys, authentication), where we may
want to pass file descriptors between processes. how would that work on
windows?
anyway, getting mox to compile for windows doesn't mean it works properly on
windows. the largest issue: mox would normally open a file, rename or remove
it, and finally close it. this happens during message delivery. that doesn't
work on windows, the rename/remove would fail because the file is still open.
so this commit swaps many "remove" and "close" calls. renames are a longer
story: message delivery had two ways to deliver: with "consuming" the
(temporary) message file (which would rename it to its final destination), and
without consuming (by hardlinking the file, falling back to copying). the last
delivery to a recipient of a message (and the only one in the common case of a
single recipient) would consume the message, and the earlier recipients would
not. during delivery, the already open message file was used, to parse the
message. we still want to use that open message file, and the caller now stays
responsible for closing it, but we no longer try to rename (consume) the file.
we always hardlink (or copy) during delivery (this works on windows), and the
caller is responsible for closing and removing (in that order) the original
temporary file. this does cost one syscall more. but it makes the delivery code
(responsibilities) a bit simpler.
there is one more obvious issue: the file system path separator. mox already
used the "filepath" package to join paths in many places, but not everywhere.
and it still used strings with slashes for local file access. with this commit,
the code now uses filepath.FromSlash for path strings with slashes, uses
"filepath" in a few more places where it previously didn't. also switches from
"filepath" to regular "path" package when handling mailbox names in a few
places, because those always use forward slashes, regardless of local file
system conventions. windows can handle forward slashes when opening files, so
test code that passes path strings with forward slashes straight to go stdlib
file i/o functions are left unchanged to reduce code churn. the regular
non-test code, or test code that uses path strings in places other than
standard i/o functions, does have the paths converted for consistent paths
(otherwise we would end up with paths with mixed forward/backward slashes in
log messages).
windows cannot dup a listening socket. for "mox localserve", it isn't
important, and we can work around the issue. the current approach for "mox
serve" (forking a process and passing file descriptors of listening sockets on
"privileged" ports) won't work on windows. perhaps it isn't needed on windows,
and any user can listen on "privileged" ports? that would be welcome.
on windows, os.Open cannot open a directory, so we cannot call Sync on it after
message delivery. a cursory internet search indicates that directories cannot
be synced on windows. the story is probably much more nuanced than that, with
long deep technical details/discussions/disagreement/confusion, like on unix.
for "mox localserve" we can get away with making syncdir a no-op.
2023-10-14 11:54:07 +03:00
if err := moxio . LinkOrCopy ( log , dst , msgFile . Name ( ) , nil , true ) ; err != nil {
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
return fmt . Errorf ( "linking/copying message to new file: %s" , err )
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
} else if err := moxio . SyncDir ( log , dstDir ) ; err != nil {
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
return fmt . Errorf ( "sync directory: %v" , err )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
if err := tx . Commit ( ) ; err != nil {
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
return fmt . Errorf ( "commit transaction: %s" , err )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
tx = nil
dst = ""
queuekick ( )
2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
return nil
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
func formatIPDomain ( d dns . IPDomain ) string {
if len ( d . IP ) > 0 {
return "[" + d . IP . String ( ) + "]"
}
return d . Domain . Name ( )
}
var (
kick = make ( chan struct { } , 1 )
deliveryResult = make ( chan string , 1 )
)
func queuekick ( ) {
select {
case kick <- struct { } { } :
default :
}
}
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
// Kick sets the NextAttempt for messages matching all filter parameters (ID,
// toDomain, recipient) that are nonzero, and kicks the queue, attempting delivery
// of those messages. If all parameters are zero, all messages are kicked. If
// transport is set, the delivery attempts for the matching messages will use the
// transport. An empty string is the default transport, i.e. direct delivery.
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
// Returns number of messages queued for immediate delivery.
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
func Kick ( ctx context . Context , ID int64 , toDomain , recipient string , transport * string ) ( int , error ) {
add a "backup" subcommand to make consistent backups, and a "verifydata" subcommand to verify a backup before restoring, and add tests for future upgrades
the backup command will make consistent snapshots of all the database files. i
had been copying the db files before, and it usually works. but if the file is
modified during the backup, it is inconsistent and is likely to generate errors
when reading (can be at any moment in the future, when reading some db page).
"mox backup" opens the database file and writes out a copy in a transaction.
it also duplicates the message files.
before doing a restore, you could run "mox verifydata" on the to-be-restored
"data" directory. it check the database files, and compares the message files
with the database.
the new "gentestdata" subcommand generates a basic "data" directory, with a
queue and a few accounts. we will use it in the future along with "verifydata"
to test upgrades from old version to the latest version. both when going to the
next version, and when skipping several versions. the script test-upgrades.sh
executes these tests and doesn't do anything at the moment, because no releases
have this subcommand yet.
inspired by a failed upgrade attempt of a pre-release version.
2023-05-26 20:26:51 +03:00
q := bstore . QueryDB [ Msg ] ( ctx , DB )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
if ID > 0 {
q . FilterID ( ID )
}
if toDomain != "" {
q . FilterEqual ( "RecipientDomainStr" , toDomain )
}
if recipient != "" {
q . FilterFn ( func ( qm Msg ) bool {
return qm . Recipient ( ) . XString ( true ) == recipient
} )
}
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
up := map [ string ] any { "NextAttempt" : time . Now ( ) }
if transport != nil {
if * transport != "" {
_ , ok := mox . Conf . Static . Transports [ * transport ]
if ! ok {
return 0 , fmt . Errorf ( "unknown transport %q" , * transport )
}
}
up [ "Transport" ] = * transport
}
n , err := q . UpdateFields ( up )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
if err != nil {
return 0 , fmt . Errorf ( "selecting and updating messages in queue: %v" , err )
}
queuekick ( )
return n , nil
}
// Drop removes messages from the queue that match all nonzero parameters.
// If all parameters are zero, all messages are removed.
// Returns number of messages removed.
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
func Drop ( ctx context . Context , log mlog . Log , ID int64 , toDomain string , recipient string ) ( int , error ) {
add a "backup" subcommand to make consistent backups, and a "verifydata" subcommand to verify a backup before restoring, and add tests for future upgrades
the backup command will make consistent snapshots of all the database files. i
had been copying the db files before, and it usually works. but if the file is
modified during the backup, it is inconsistent and is likely to generate errors
when reading (can be at any moment in the future, when reading some db page).
"mox backup" opens the database file and writes out a copy in a transaction.
it also duplicates the message files.
before doing a restore, you could run "mox verifydata" on the to-be-restored
"data" directory. it check the database files, and compares the message files
with the database.
the new "gentestdata" subcommand generates a basic "data" directory, with a
queue and a few accounts. we will use it in the future along with "verifydata"
to test upgrades from old version to the latest version. both when going to the
next version, and when skipping several versions. the script test-upgrades.sh
executes these tests and doesn't do anything at the moment, because no releases
have this subcommand yet.
inspired by a failed upgrade attempt of a pre-release version.
2023-05-26 20:26:51 +03:00
q := bstore . QueryDB [ Msg ] ( ctx , DB )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
if ID > 0 {
q . FilterID ( ID )
}
if toDomain != "" {
q . FilterEqual ( "RecipientDomainStr" , toDomain )
}
if recipient != "" {
q . FilterFn ( func ( qm Msg ) bool {
return qm . Recipient ( ) . XString ( true ) == recipient
} )
}
2023-05-22 16:03:23 +03:00
var msgs [ ] Msg
q . Gather ( & msgs )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
n , err := q . Delete ( )
if err != nil {
return 0 , fmt . Errorf ( "selecting and deleting messages from queue: %v" , err )
}
2023-05-22 16:03:23 +03:00
for _ , m := range msgs {
p := m . MessagePath ( )
if err := os . Remove ( p ) ; err != nil {
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
log . Errorx ( "removing queue message from file system" , err , slog . Int64 ( "queuemsgid" , m . ID ) , slog . String ( "path" , p ) )
2023-05-22 16:03:23 +03:00
}
}
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
return n , nil
}
implement "requiretls", rfc 8689
with requiretls, the tls verification mode/rules for email deliveries can be
changed by the sender/submitter. in two ways:
1. "requiretls" smtp extension to always enforce verified tls (with mta-sts or
dnssec+dane), along the entire delivery path until delivery into the final
destination mailbox (so entire transport is verified-tls-protected).
2. "tls-required: no" message header, to ignore any tls and tls verification
errors even if the recipient domain has a policy that requires tls verification
(mta-sts and/or dnssec+dane), allowing delivery of non-sensitive messages in
case of misconfiguration/interoperability issues (at least useful for sending
tls reports).
we enable requiretls by default (only when tls is active), for smtp and
submission. it can be disabled through the config.
for each delivery attempt, we now store (per recipient domain, in the account
of the sender) whether the smtp server supports starttls and requiretls. this
support is shown (after having sent a first message) in the webmail when
sending a message (the previous 3 bars under the address input field are now 5
bars, the first for starttls support, the last for requiretls support). when
all recipient domains for a message are known to implement requiretls,
requiretls is automatically selected for sending (instead of "default" tls
behaviour). users can also select the "fallback to insecure" to add the
"tls-required: no" header.
new metrics are added for insight into requiretls errors and (some, not yet
all) cases where tls-required-no ignored a tls/verification error.
the admin can change the requiretls status for messages in the queue. so with
default delivery attempts, when verified tls is required by failing, an admin
could potentially change the field to "tls-required: no"-behaviour.
messages received (over smtp) with the requiretls option, get a comment added
to their Received header line, just before "id", after "with".
2023-10-24 11:06:16 +03:00
// SaveRequireTLS updates the RequireTLS field of the message with id.
func SaveRequireTLS ( ctx context . Context , id int64 , requireTLS * bool ) error {
return DB . Write ( ctx , func ( tx * bstore . Tx ) error {
m := Msg { ID : id }
if err := tx . Get ( & m ) ; err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "get message: %w" , err )
}
m . RequireTLS = requireTLS
return tx . Update ( & m )
} )
}
2023-03-30 11:38:36 +03:00
type ReadReaderAtCloser interface {
io . ReadCloser
io . ReaderAt
}
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
// OpenMessage opens a message present in the queue.
2023-05-22 15:40:36 +03:00
func OpenMessage ( ctx context . Context , id int64 ) ( ReadReaderAtCloser , error ) {
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
qm := Msg { ID : id }
add a "backup" subcommand to make consistent backups, and a "verifydata" subcommand to verify a backup before restoring, and add tests for future upgrades
the backup command will make consistent snapshots of all the database files. i
had been copying the db files before, and it usually works. but if the file is
modified during the backup, it is inconsistent and is likely to generate errors
when reading (can be at any moment in the future, when reading some db page).
"mox backup" opens the database file and writes out a copy in a transaction.
it also duplicates the message files.
before doing a restore, you could run "mox verifydata" on the to-be-restored
"data" directory. it check the database files, and compares the message files
with the database.
the new "gentestdata" subcommand generates a basic "data" directory, with a
queue and a few accounts. we will use it in the future along with "verifydata"
to test upgrades from old version to the latest version. both when going to the
next version, and when skipping several versions. the script test-upgrades.sh
executes these tests and doesn't do anything at the moment, because no releases
have this subcommand yet.
inspired by a failed upgrade attempt of a pre-release version.
2023-05-26 20:26:51 +03:00
err := DB . Get ( ctx , & qm )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
if err != nil {
return nil , err
}
f , err := os . Open ( qm . MessagePath ( ) )
if err != nil {
return nil , fmt . Errorf ( "open message file: %s" , err )
}
r := store . FileMsgReader ( qm . MsgPrefix , f )
return r , err
}
const maxConcurrentDeliveries = 10
// Start opens the database by calling Init, then starts the delivery process.
func Start ( resolver dns . Resolver , done chan struct { } ) error {
if err := Init ( ) ; err != nil {
return err
}
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
log := mlog . New ( "queue" , nil )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
// High-level delivery strategy advice: ../rfc/5321:3685
go func ( ) {
// Map keys are either dns.Domain.Name()'s, or string-formatted IP addresses.
busyDomains := map [ string ] struct { } { }
timer := time . NewTimer ( 0 )
for {
select {
2023-02-16 11:57:27 +03:00
case <- mox . Shutdown . Done ( ) :
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
done <- struct { } { }
return
case <- kick :
case <- timer . C :
case domain := <- deliveryResult :
delete ( busyDomains , domain )
}
if len ( busyDomains ) >= maxConcurrentDeliveries {
continue
}
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
launchWork ( log , resolver , busyDomains )
timer . Reset ( nextWork ( mox . Shutdown , log , busyDomains ) )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
} ( )
return nil
}
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
func nextWork ( ctx context . Context , log mlog . Log , busyDomains map [ string ] struct { } ) time . Duration {
add a "backup" subcommand to make consistent backups, and a "verifydata" subcommand to verify a backup before restoring, and add tests for future upgrades
the backup command will make consistent snapshots of all the database files. i
had been copying the db files before, and it usually works. but if the file is
modified during the backup, it is inconsistent and is likely to generate errors
when reading (can be at any moment in the future, when reading some db page).
"mox backup" opens the database file and writes out a copy in a transaction.
it also duplicates the message files.
before doing a restore, you could run "mox verifydata" on the to-be-restored
"data" directory. it check the database files, and compares the message files
with the database.
the new "gentestdata" subcommand generates a basic "data" directory, with a
queue and a few accounts. we will use it in the future along with "verifydata"
to test upgrades from old version to the latest version. both when going to the
next version, and when skipping several versions. the script test-upgrades.sh
executes these tests and doesn't do anything at the moment, because no releases
have this subcommand yet.
inspired by a failed upgrade attempt of a pre-release version.
2023-05-26 20:26:51 +03:00
q := bstore . QueryDB [ Msg ] ( ctx , DB )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
if len ( busyDomains ) > 0 {
var doms [ ] any
for d := range busyDomains {
doms = append ( doms , d )
}
q . FilterNotEqual ( "RecipientDomainStr" , doms ... )
}
q . SortAsc ( "NextAttempt" )
q . Limit ( 1 )
qm , err := q . Get ( )
if err == bstore . ErrAbsent {
return 24 * time . Hour
} else if err != nil {
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
log . Errorx ( "finding time for next delivery attempt" , err )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
return 1 * time . Minute
}
return time . Until ( qm . NextAttempt )
}
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
func launchWork ( log mlog . Log , resolver dns . Resolver , busyDomains map [ string ] struct { } ) int {
add a "backup" subcommand to make consistent backups, and a "verifydata" subcommand to verify a backup before restoring, and add tests for future upgrades
the backup command will make consistent snapshots of all the database files. i
had been copying the db files before, and it usually works. but if the file is
modified during the backup, it is inconsistent and is likely to generate errors
when reading (can be at any moment in the future, when reading some db page).
"mox backup" opens the database file and writes out a copy in a transaction.
it also duplicates the message files.
before doing a restore, you could run "mox verifydata" on the to-be-restored
"data" directory. it check the database files, and compares the message files
with the database.
the new "gentestdata" subcommand generates a basic "data" directory, with a
queue and a few accounts. we will use it in the future along with "verifydata"
to test upgrades from old version to the latest version. both when going to the
next version, and when skipping several versions. the script test-upgrades.sh
executes these tests and doesn't do anything at the moment, because no releases
have this subcommand yet.
inspired by a failed upgrade attempt of a pre-release version.
2023-05-26 20:26:51 +03:00
q := bstore . QueryDB [ Msg ] ( mox . Shutdown , DB )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
q . FilterLessEqual ( "NextAttempt" , time . Now ( ) )
q . SortAsc ( "NextAttempt" )
q . Limit ( maxConcurrentDeliveries )
if len ( busyDomains ) > 0 {
var doms [ ] any
for d := range busyDomains {
doms = append ( doms , d )
}
q . FilterNotEqual ( "RecipientDomainStr" , doms ... )
}
msgs , err := q . List ( )
if err != nil {
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
log . Errorx ( "querying for work in queue" , err )
2023-05-22 15:40:36 +03:00
mox . Sleep ( mox . Shutdown , 1 * time . Second )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
return - 1
}
for _ , m := range msgs {
busyDomains [ formatIPDomain ( m . RecipientDomain ) ] = struct { } { }
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
go deliver ( log , resolver , m )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
return len ( msgs )
}
// Remove message from queue in database and file system.
2023-05-22 15:40:36 +03:00
func queueDelete ( ctx context . Context , msgID int64 ) error {
add a "backup" subcommand to make consistent backups, and a "verifydata" subcommand to verify a backup before restoring, and add tests for future upgrades
the backup command will make consistent snapshots of all the database files. i
had been copying the db files before, and it usually works. but if the file is
modified during the backup, it is inconsistent and is likely to generate errors
when reading (can be at any moment in the future, when reading some db page).
"mox backup" opens the database file and writes out a copy in a transaction.
it also duplicates the message files.
before doing a restore, you could run "mox verifydata" on the to-be-restored
"data" directory. it check the database files, and compares the message files
with the database.
the new "gentestdata" subcommand generates a basic "data" directory, with a
queue and a few accounts. we will use it in the future along with "verifydata"
to test upgrades from old version to the latest version. both when going to the
next version, and when skipping several versions. the script test-upgrades.sh
executes these tests and doesn't do anything at the moment, because no releases
have this subcommand yet.
inspired by a failed upgrade attempt of a pre-release version.
2023-05-26 20:26:51 +03:00
if err := DB . Delete ( ctx , & Msg { ID : msgID } ) ; err != nil {
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
return err
}
// If removing from database fails, we'll also leave the file in the file system.
p := mox . DataDirPath ( filepath . Join ( "queue" , store . MessagePath ( msgID ) ) )
if err := os . Remove ( p ) ; err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "removing queue message from file system: %v" , err )
}
return nil
}
// deliver attempts to deliver a message.
// The queue is updated, either by removing a delivered or permanently failed
// message, or updating the time for the next attempt. A DSN may be sent.
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
func deliver ( log mlog . Log , resolver dns . Resolver , m Msg ) {
2023-12-05 18:06:50 +03:00
qlog := log . WithCid ( mox . Cid ( ) ) . With ( slog . Any ( "from" , m . Sender ( ) ) ,
slog . Any ( "recipient" , m . Recipient ( ) ) ,
slog . Int ( "attempts" , m . Attempts ) ,
slog . Int64 ( "msgid" , m . ID ) )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
defer func ( ) {
deliveryResult <- formatIPDomain ( m . RecipientDomain )
x := recover ( )
if x != nil {
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
qlog . Error ( "deliver panic" , slog . Any ( "panic" , x ) )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
debug . PrintStack ( )
2023-09-15 17:47:17 +03:00
metrics . PanicInc ( metrics . Queue )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
} ( )
// We register this attempt by setting last_attempt, and already next_attempt time
// in the future with exponential backoff. If we run into trouble delivery below,
// at least we won't be bothering the receiving server with our problems.
// Delivery attempts: immediately, 7.5m, 15m, 30m, 1h, 2h (send delayed DSN), 4h,
// 8h, 16h (send permanent failure DSN).
// ../rfc/5321:3703
// todo future: make the back off times configurable. ../rfc/5321:3713
2023-02-06 18:08:21 +03:00
backoff := time . Duration ( 7 * 60 + 30 + jitter . Intn ( 10 ) - 5 ) * time . Second
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
for i := 0 ; i < m . Attempts ; i ++ {
backoff *= time . Duration ( 2 )
}
m . Attempts ++
now := time . Now ( )
m . LastAttempt = & now
m . NextAttempt = now . Add ( backoff )
add a "backup" subcommand to make consistent backups, and a "verifydata" subcommand to verify a backup before restoring, and add tests for future upgrades
the backup command will make consistent snapshots of all the database files. i
had been copying the db files before, and it usually works. but if the file is
modified during the backup, it is inconsistent and is likely to generate errors
when reading (can be at any moment in the future, when reading some db page).
"mox backup" opens the database file and writes out a copy in a transaction.
it also duplicates the message files.
before doing a restore, you could run "mox verifydata" on the to-be-restored
"data" directory. it check the database files, and compares the message files
with the database.
the new "gentestdata" subcommand generates a basic "data" directory, with a
queue and a few accounts. we will use it in the future along with "verifydata"
to test upgrades from old version to the latest version. both when going to the
next version, and when skipping several versions. the script test-upgrades.sh
executes these tests and doesn't do anything at the moment, because no releases
have this subcommand yet.
inspired by a failed upgrade attempt of a pre-release version.
2023-05-26 20:26:51 +03:00
qup := bstore . QueryDB [ Msg ] ( mox . Shutdown , DB )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
qup . FilterID ( m . ID )
update := Msg { Attempts : m . Attempts , NextAttempt : m . NextAttempt , LastAttempt : m . LastAttempt }
if _ , err := qup . UpdateNonzero ( update ) ; err != nil {
qlog . Errorx ( "storing delivery attempt" , err )
return
}
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
// Find route for transport to use for delivery attempt.
var transport config . Transport
var transportName string
if m . Transport != "" {
var ok bool
transport , ok = mox . Conf . Static . Transports [ m . Transport ]
if ! ok {
var remoteMTA dsn . NameIP // Zero value, will not be included in DSN. ../rfc/3464:1027
fail ( qlog , m , backoff , false , remoteMTA , "" , fmt . Sprintf ( "cannot find transport %q" , m . Transport ) )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
return
}
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
transportName = m . Transport
} else {
route := findRoute ( m . Attempts - 1 , m )
transport = route . ResolvedTransport
transportName = route . Transport
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
if transportName != "" {
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
qlog = qlog . With ( slog . String ( "transport" , transportName ) )
qlog . Debug ( "delivering with transport" )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
implement outgoing tls reports
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
2023-11-09 19:40:46 +03:00
// We gather TLS connection successes and failures during delivery, and we store
// them in tlsrptb. Every 24 hours we send an email with a report to the recipient
// domains that opt in via a TLSRPT DNS record. For us, the tricky part is
// collecting all reporting information. We've got several TLS modes
// (opportunistic, DANE and/or MTA-STS (PKIX), overrides due to Require TLS).
// Failures can happen at various levels: MTA-STS policies (apply to whole delivery
// attempt/domain), MX targets (possibly multiple per delivery attempt, both for
// MTA-STS and DANE).
//
// Once the SMTP client has tried a TLS handshake, we register success/failure,
// regardless of what happens next on the connection. We also register failures
// when they happen before we get to the SMTP client, but only if they are related
// to TLS (and some DNSSEC).
var recipientDomainResult tlsrpt . Result
var hostResults [ ] tlsrpt . Result
defer func ( ) {
2023-11-12 16:35:47 +03:00
if mox . Conf . Static . NoOutgoingTLSReports || m . RecipientDomain . IsIP ( ) {
implement outgoing tls reports
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
2023-11-09 19:40:46 +03:00
return
}
now := time . Now ( )
dayUTC := now . UTC ( ) . Format ( "20060102" )
2023-11-13 15:48:52 +03:00
// See if this contains a failure. If not, we'll mark TLS results for delivering
// DMARC reports SendReport false, so we won't as easily get into a report sending
// loop.
var failure bool
for _ , result := range hostResults {
if result . Summary . TotalFailureSessionCount > 0 {
failure = true
break
}
}
if recipientDomainResult . Summary . TotalFailureSessionCount > 0 {
failure = true
}
implement outgoing tls reports
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
2023-11-09 19:40:46 +03:00
results := make ( [ ] tlsrptdb . TLSResult , 0 , 1 + len ( hostResults ) )
2023-11-12 16:35:47 +03:00
tlsaPolicyDomains := map [ string ] bool { }
implement outgoing tls reports
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
2023-11-09 19:40:46 +03:00
addResult := func ( r tlsrpt . Result , isHost bool ) {
var zerotype tlsrpt . PolicyType
if r . Policy . Type == zerotype {
return
}
// Ensure we store policy domain in unicode in database.
policyDomain , err := dns . ParseDomain ( r . Policy . Domain )
if err != nil {
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
qlog . Errorx ( "parsing policy domain for tls result" , err , slog . String ( "policydomain" , r . Policy . Domain ) )
implement outgoing tls reports
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
2023-11-09 19:40:46 +03:00
return
}
2023-11-12 16:35:47 +03:00
if r . Policy . Type == tlsrpt . TLSA {
tlsaPolicyDomains [ policyDomain . ASCII ] = true
}
implement outgoing tls reports
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
2023-11-09 19:40:46 +03:00
tlsResult := tlsrptdb . TLSResult {
PolicyDomain : policyDomain . Name ( ) ,
DayUTC : dayUTC ,
RecipientDomain : m . RecipientDomain . Domain . Name ( ) ,
IsHost : isHost ,
2023-11-13 15:48:52 +03:00
SendReport : ! m . IsTLSReport && ( ! m . IsDMARCReport || failure ) ,
implement outgoing tls reports
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
2023-11-09 19:40:46 +03:00
Results : [ ] tlsrpt . Result { r } ,
}
results = append ( results , tlsResult )
}
for _ , result := range hostResults {
addResult ( result , true )
}
2023-11-12 16:35:47 +03:00
// If we were delivering to a mail host directly (not a domain with MX records), we
// are more likely to get a TLSA policy than an STS policy. Don't potentially
// confuse operators with both a tlsa and no-policy-found result.
// todo spec: ../rfc/8460:440 an explicit no-sts-policy result would be useful.
if recipientDomainResult . Policy . Type != tlsrpt . NoPolicyFound || ! tlsaPolicyDomains [ recipientDomainResult . Policy . Domain ] {
addResult ( recipientDomainResult , false )
}
implement outgoing tls reports
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
2023-11-09 19:40:46 +03:00
if len ( results ) > 0 {
err := tlsrptdb . AddTLSResults ( context . Background ( ) , results )
qlog . Check ( err , "adding tls results to database for upcoming tlsrpt report" )
}
} ( )
implement dnssec-awareness throughout code, and dane for incoming/outgoing mail delivery
the vendored dns resolver code is a copy of the go stdlib dns resolver, with
awareness of the "authentic data" (i.e. dnssec secure) added, as well as support
for enhanced dns errors, and looking up tlsa records (for dane). ideally it
would be upstreamed, but the chances seem slim.
dnssec-awareness is added to all packages, e.g. spf, dkim, dmarc, iprev. their
dnssec status is added to the Received message headers for incoming email.
but the main reason to add dnssec was for implementing dane. with dane, the
verification of tls certificates can be done through certificates/public keys
published in dns (in the tlsa records). this only makes sense (is trustworthy)
if those dns records can be verified to be authentic.
mox now applies dane to delivering messages over smtp. mox already implemented
mta-sts for webpki/pkix-verification of certificates against the (large) pool
of CA's, and still enforces those policies when present. but it now also checks
for dane records, and will verify those if present. if dane and mta-sts are
both absent, the regular opportunistic tls with starttls is still done. and the
fallback to plaintext is also still done.
mox also makes it easy to setup dane for incoming deliveries, so other servers
can deliver with dane tls certificate verification. the quickstart now
generates private keys that are used when requesting certificates with acme.
the private keys are pre-generated because they must be static and known during
setup, because their public keys must be published in tlsa records in dns.
autocert would generate private keys on its own, so had to be forked to add the
option to provide the private key when requesting a new certificate. hopefully
upstream will accept the change and we can drop the fork.
with this change, using the quickstart to setup a new mox instance, the checks
at internet.nl result in a 100% score, provided the domain is dnssec-signed and
the network doesn't have any issues.
2023-10-10 13:09:35 +03:00
var dialer smtpclient . Dialer = & net . Dialer { }
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
if transport . Submissions != nil {
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
deliverSubmit ( qlog , resolver , dialer , m , backoff , transportName , transport . Submissions , true , 465 )
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
} else if transport . Submission != nil {
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
deliverSubmit ( qlog , resolver , dialer , m , backoff , transportName , transport . Submission , false , 587 )
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
} else if transport . SMTP != nil {
implement outgoing tls reports
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
2023-11-09 19:40:46 +03:00
// todo future: perhaps also gather tlsrpt results for submissions.
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
deliverSubmit ( qlog , resolver , dialer , m , backoff , transportName , transport . SMTP , false , 25 )
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
} else {
ourHostname := mox . Conf . Static . HostnameDomain
if transport . Socks != nil {
socksdialer , err := proxy . SOCKS5 ( "tcp" , transport . Socks . Address , nil , & net . Dialer { } )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
if err != nil {
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
fail ( qlog , m , backoff , false , dsn . NameIP { } , "" , fmt . Sprintf ( "socks dialer: %v" , err ) )
return
implement dnssec-awareness throughout code, and dane for incoming/outgoing mail delivery
the vendored dns resolver code is a copy of the go stdlib dns resolver, with
awareness of the "authentic data" (i.e. dnssec secure) added, as well as support
for enhanced dns errors, and looking up tlsa records (for dane). ideally it
would be upstreamed, but the chances seem slim.
dnssec-awareness is added to all packages, e.g. spf, dkim, dmarc, iprev. their
dnssec status is added to the Received message headers for incoming email.
but the main reason to add dnssec was for implementing dane. with dane, the
verification of tls certificates can be done through certificates/public keys
published in dns (in the tlsa records). this only makes sense (is trustworthy)
if those dns records can be verified to be authentic.
mox now applies dane to delivering messages over smtp. mox already implemented
mta-sts for webpki/pkix-verification of certificates against the (large) pool
of CA's, and still enforces those policies when present. but it now also checks
for dane records, and will verify those if present. if dane and mta-sts are
both absent, the regular opportunistic tls with starttls is still done. and the
fallback to plaintext is also still done.
mox also makes it easy to setup dane for incoming deliveries, so other servers
can deliver with dane tls certificate verification. the quickstart now
generates private keys that are used when requesting certificates with acme.
the private keys are pre-generated because they must be static and known during
setup, because their public keys must be published in tlsa records in dns.
autocert would generate private keys on its own, so had to be forked to add the
option to provide the private key when requesting a new certificate. hopefully
upstream will accept the change and we can drop the fork.
with this change, using the quickstart to setup a new mox instance, the checks
at internet.nl result in a 100% score, provided the domain is dnssec-signed and
the network doesn't have any issues.
2023-10-10 13:09:35 +03:00
} else if d , ok := socksdialer . ( smtpclient . Dialer ) ; ! ok {
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
fail ( qlog , m , backoff , false , dsn . NameIP { } , "" , "socks dialer is not a contextdialer" )
return
} else {
dialer = d
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
ourHostname = transport . Socks . Hostname
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
recipientDomainResult , hostResults = deliverDirect ( qlog , resolver , dialer , ourHostname , transportName , m , backoff )
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
}
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
func findRoute ( attempt int , m Msg ) config . Route {
routesAccount , routesDomain , routesGlobal := mox . Conf . Routes ( m . SenderAccount , m . SenderDomain . Domain )
if r , ok := findRouteInList ( attempt , m , routesAccount ) ; ok {
return r
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
if r , ok := findRouteInList ( attempt , m , routesDomain ) ; ok {
return r
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
if r , ok := findRouteInList ( attempt , m , routesGlobal ) ; ok {
return r
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
return config . Route { }
}
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
func findRouteInList ( attempt int , m Msg , routes [ ] config . Route ) ( config . Route , bool ) {
for _ , r := range routes {
if routeMatch ( attempt , m , r ) {
return r , true
}
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
return config . Route { } , false
}
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
func routeMatch ( attempt int , m Msg , r config . Route ) bool {
return attempt >= r . MinimumAttempts && routeMatchDomain ( r . FromDomainASCII , m . SenderDomain . Domain ) && routeMatchDomain ( r . ToDomainASCII , m . RecipientDomain . Domain )
}
func routeMatchDomain ( l [ ] string , d dns . Domain ) bool {
if len ( l ) == 0 {
return true
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
for _ , e := range l {
if d . ASCII == e || strings . HasPrefix ( e , "." ) && ( d . ASCII == e [ 1 : ] || strings . HasSuffix ( d . ASCII , e ) ) {
return true
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}
}
new feature: when delivering messages from the queue, make it possible to use a "transport"
the default transport is still just "direct delivery", where we connect to the
destination domain's MX servers.
other transports are:
- regular smtp without authentication, this is relaying to a smarthost.
- submission with authentication, e.g. to a third party email sending service.
- direct delivery, but with with connections going through a socks proxy. this
can be helpful if your ip is blocked, you need to get email out, and you have
another IP that isn't blocked.
keep in mind that for all of the above, appropriate SPF/DKIM settings have to
be configured. the "dnscheck" for a domain does a check for any SOCKS IP in the
SPF record. SPF for smtp/submission (ranges? includes?) and any DKIM
requirements cannot really be checked.
which transport is used can be configured through routes. routes can be set on
an account, a domain, or globally. the routes are evaluated in that order, with
the first match selecting the transport. these routes are evaluated for each
delivery attempt. common selection criteria are recipient domain and sender
domain, but also which delivery attempt this is. you could configured mox to
attempt sending through a 3rd party from the 4th attempt onwards.
routes and transports are optional. if no route matches, or an empty/zero
transport is selected, normal direct delivery is done.
we could already "submit" emails with 3rd party accounts with "sendmail". but
we now support more SASL authentication mechanisms with SMTP (not only PLAIN,
but also SCRAM-SHA-256, SCRAM-SHA-1 and CRAM-MD5), which sendmail now also
supports. sendmail will use the most secure mechanism supported by the server,
or the explicitly configured mechanism.
for issue #36 by dmikushin. also based on earlier discussion on hackernews.
2023-06-16 19:38:28 +03:00
return false
2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
}