checkUpdatesEnabled ? [] : dom.p(box(yellow, 'Warning: Checking for updates has not been enabled in mox.conf (CheckUpdates: true).', dom.br(), 'Make sure you stay up to date through another mechanism!', dom.br(), 'You have a responsibility to keep the internet-connected software you run up to date and secure!', dom.br(), 'See ', link('https://updates.xmox.nl/changelog'))),
dom.span('Localpart (optional)', attr({title: 'Must be set if and only if account does not yet exist. The localpart for the user of this domain. E.g. postmaster.'})),
dom.br(),
localpart=dom.input(),
),
' ',
dom.button('Add domain', attr({title: 'Domain will be added and the config reloaded. You should add the required DNS records after adding the domain.'})),
dom.p('Note: changing a log level here only changes it for the current process. When mox restarts, it sets the log levels from the configuration file. Change mox.conf to keep the changes.'),
dom.table(
dom.thead(
dom.tr(
dom.th('Package', attr({title: 'Log levels can be configured per package. E.g. smtpserver, imapserver, dkim, dmarc, tlsrpt, etc.'})),
dom.th('Level', attr({title: 'If you set the log level to "trace", imap and smtp protocol transcripts will be logged. Sensitive authentication is replaced with "***" unless the level is >= "traceauth". Data is masked with "..." unless the level is "tracedata".'})),
dom.span('Maximum outgoing messages per day', attr({title: 'Maximum number of outgoing messages for this account in a 24 hour window. This limits the damage to recipients and the reputation of this mail server in case of account compromise. Default 1000. MaxOutgoingMessagesPerDay in configuration file.'})),
dom.span('Maximum first-time recipients per day', attr({title: 'Maximum number of first-time recipients in outgoing messages for this account in a 24 hour window. This limits the damage to recipients and the reputation of this mail server in case of account compromise. Default 200. MaxFirstTimeRecipientsPerDay in configuration file.'})),
if (Math.ceil(b[0]/chars.length)*chars.length > 255) {
continue // Prevent bias.
}
s += chars[b[0]%chars.length]
}
password.type = 'text'
password.value = s
}),
dom('div.text',
box(yellow, 'Important: Bots will try to bruteforce your password. Connections with failed authentication attempts will be rate limited but attackers WILL find weak passwords. If your account is compromised, spammers are likely to abuse your system, spamming your address and the wider internet in your name. So please pick a random, unguessable password, preferrably at least 12 characters.'),
dom.li(dom.a('Required DNS records', attr({href: '#domains/' + d + '/dnsrecords'}))),
dom.li(dom.a('Check current actual DNS records and domain configuration', attr({href: '#domains/' + d + '/dnscheck'}))),
),
dom.br(),
dom.h2('Client configuration'),
dom.div('If autoconfig/autodiscover does not work with an email client, use the settings below for this domain. Authenticate with email address and password.'),
dom.p('DMARC reports are periodically sent by other mail servers that received an email message with a "From" header with our domain. Domains can have a DMARC DNS record that asks other mail servers to send these aggregate reports for analysis.'),
renderDMARCSummaries(summaries),
)
}
const renderDMARCSummaries = (summaries) => {
return [
dom.p('Below a summary of DMARC aggregate reporting results for the past 30 days.'),
summaries.length === 0 ? dom.div(box(yellow, 'No domains with reports.')) :
dom('table',
dom.thead(
dom.tr(
dom.th('Domain', attr({title: 'Domain to which the DMARC policy applied. If example.com has a DMARC policy, and email is sent with a From-header with subdomain.example.com, and there is no DMARC record for that subdomain, but there is one for example.com, then the DMARC policy of example.com applies and reports are sent for that that domain.'})),
dom.th('Messages', attr({title: 'Total number of messages that had the DMARC policy applied and reported. Actual messages sent is likely higher because not all email servers send DMARC aggregate reports, or perform DMARC checks at all.'})),
dom.th('DMARC "quarantine"/"reject"', attr({title: 'Messages for which policy was to mark them as spam (quarantine) or reject them during SMTP delivery.'})),
dom.th('DKIM "fail"', attr({title: 'Messages with a failing DKIM check. This can happen when sending through a mailing list where that list keeps your address in the message From-header but also strips DKIM-Signature headers in the message. DMARC evaluation passes if either DKIM passes or SPF passes.'})),
dom.th('SPF "fail"', attr({title: 'Message with a failing SPF check. This can happen with email forwarding and with mailing list. Other mail servers have sent email with this domain in the message From-header. DMARC evaluation passes if at least SPF or DKIM passes.'})),
dom.th('Policy overrides', attr({title: 'Mail servers can override the DMARC policy. E.g. a mail server may be able to detect emails coming from mailing lists that do not pass DMARC and would have to be rejected, but for which an override has been configured.'})),
const start = new Date(new Date().getTime() - 30*24*3600*1000).toISOString()
const [reports, dnsdomain] = await Promise.all([
api.DMARCReports(start, end, d),
api.Domain(d),
])
// todo future: table sorting? period selection (last day, 7 days, 1 month, 1 year, custom period)? collapse rows for a report? show totals per report? a simple bar graph to visualize messages and dmarc/dkim/spf fails? similar for TLSRPT.
dom.p('DMARC reports are periodically sent by other mail servers that received an email message with a "From" header with our domain. Domains can have a DMARC DNS record that asks other mail servers to send these aggregate reports for analysis.'),
dom.p('Below the DMARC aggregate reports for the past 30 days.'),
reports.length === 0 ? dom.div('No DMARC reports for domain.') :
dom.table(
dom.thead(
dom.tr(
dom.th('ID'),
dom.th('Organisation', attr({title: 'Organization that sent the DMARC report.'})),
dom.th('Period (UTC)', attr({title: 'Period this reporting period is about. Mail servers are recommended to stick to whole UTC days.'})),
dom.th('Policy', attr({title: 'The DMARC policy that the remote mail server had fetched and applied to the message. A policy that changed during the reporting period may result in unexpected policy evaluations.'})),
dom.th('Source IP', attr({title: 'Remote IP address of session at remote mail server.'})),
dom.th('Messages', attr({title: 'Total messages that the results apply to.'})),
dom.th('ADKIM', attr({title: 'DKIM alignment. For a pass, one of the DKIM signatures that pass must be strict/relaxed-aligned with the domain, as specified by the policy.'})),
dom.th('ASPF', attr({title: 'SPF alignment. For a pass, the SPF policy must pass and be strict/relaxed-aligned with the domain, as specified by the policy.'})),
dom.th('SMTP to', attr({title: 'Domain of destination address, as specified during the SMTP session.'})),
dom.th('SMTP from', attr({title: 'Domain of originating address, as specified during the SMTP session.'})),
dom.th('Header from', attr({title: 'Domain of address in From-header of message.'})),
dom.th('Auth Results', attr({title: 'Details of DKIM and/or SPF authentication results. DMARC requires at least one aligned DKIM or SPF pass.'})),
none: 'DMARC checks or were not applied. This does not mean these messages are definitely not spam though, and they may have been rejected based on other checks, such as reputation or content-based filters.',
quarantine: 'DMARC policy is to mark message as spam.',
reject: 'DMARC policy is to reject the message during SMTP delivery.',
}
const rows = []
const addRow = (...last) => {
const tr = dom.tr(
recordIndex > 0 || rows.length > 0 ? [] : [
dom.td(reportRowspan, valignTop, dom.a('' + r.ID, attr({href: '#domains/' + d + '/dmarc/' + r.ID, title: 'View raw report.'}))),
(pol.Reasons || []).map(reason => [dom.br(), dom.span(reason.Type + (reason.Comment ? ' (' + reason.Comment + ')' : ''), attr({title: 'Policy was overridden by remote mail server for this reasons.'}))]),
),
dom.td(recordRowspan, valignTop, pol.DKIM === 'pass' ? 'pass' : box(yellow, dom.span(pol.DKIM, attr({title: 'No or no valid DKIM-signature is present that is "aligned" with the domain name.'})))),
dom.td(recordRowspan, valignTop, pol.SPF === 'pass' ? 'pass' : box(yellow, dom.span(pol.SPF, attr({title: 'No SPF policy was found, or IP is not allowed by policy, or domain name is not "aligned" with the domain name.'})))),
pass: 'Message was signed and signature was verified.',
fail: 'Message was signed, but signature was invalid.',
policy: 'Message was signed, but signature is not accepted by policy.',
neutral: 'Message was signed, but the signature contains an error or could not be processed. This status is also used for errors not covered by other statuses.',
temperror: 'Message could not be verified. E.g. because of DNS resolve error. A later attempt may succeed. A missing DNS record is treated as temporary error, a new key may not have propagated through DNS shortly after it was taken into use.',
permerror: 'Message cannot be verified. E.g. when a required header field is absent or for invalid (combination of) parameters. We typically set this if a DNS record does not allow the signature, e.g. due to algorithm mismatch or expiry.',
dom.span(dkim.Selector, attr({title: 'Selector, the DKIM record is at "<selector>._domainkey.<domain>".' + (dkim.Domain === d ? '' : ';\ndomain: ' + dkim.Domain)})),
]
)
}
for (const spf of spfs) {
const statuses = {
none: 'No SPF policy found.',
neutral: 'Policy states nothing about IP, typically due to "?" qualifier in SPF record.',
pass: 'IP is authorized.',
fail: 'IP is explicitly not authorized, due to "-" qualifier in SPF record.',
softfail: 'Weak statement that IP is probably not authorized, "~" qualifier in SPF record.',
temperror: 'Trying again later may succeed, e.g. for temporary DNS lookup error.',
permerror: 'Error requiring some intervention to correct. E.g. invalid DNS record.',
dom.p('TLSRPT (TLS reporting) is a mechanism to request feedback from other mail servers about TLS connections to your mail server. If is typically used along with MTA-STS and/or DANE to enforce that SMTP connections are protected with TLS. Mail servers implementing TLSRPT will typically send a daily report with both successful and failed connection counts, including details about failures.'),
renderTLSRPTSummaries(summaries)
)
}
const renderTLSRPTSummaries = (summaries) => {
return [
dom.p('Below a summary of TLS reports for the past 30 days.'),
dom.p('TLSRPT (TLS reporting) is a mechanism to request feedback from other mail servers about TLS connections to your mail server. If is typically used along with MTA-STS and/or DANE to enforce that SMTP connections are protected with TLS. Mail servers implementing TLSRPT will typically send a daily report with both successful and failed connection counts, including details about failures.'),
dom.p('Below the TLS reports for the past 30 days.'),
records.length === 0 ? dom.div('No TLS reports for domain.') :
dom.table(
dom.thead(
dom.tr(
dom.th('Report', attr({colspan: '3'})),
dom.th('Policy', attr({colspan: '3'})),
dom.th('Failure Details', attr({colspan: '8'})),
),
dom.tr(
dom.th('ID'),
dom.th('From', attr({title: 'SMTP mail from from which we received the report.'})),
dom.th('Period (UTC)', attr({title: 'Period this reporting period is about. Mail servers are recommended to stick to whole UTC days.'})),
dom.th('Policy', attr({title: 'The policy applied, typically STSv1.'})),
dom.th('Successes', attr({title: 'Total number of successful TLS connections for policy.'})),
dom.th('Failures', attr({title: 'Total number of failed TLS connections for policy.'})),
dom.th('Result Type', attr({title: 'Type of failure.'})),
dom.th('Sending MTA', attr({title: 'IP of sending MTA.'})),
dom.th('Receiving MX Host'),
dom.th('Receiving MX HELO'),
dom.th('Receiving IP'),
dom.th('Count', attr({title: 'Number of TLS connections that failed with these details.'})),
dom.th('More', attr({title: 'Optional additional information about the failure.'})),
dom.th('Code', attr({title: 'Optional API error code relating to the failure.'})),
dom.p("MTA-STS is a mechanism allowing email domains to publish a policy for using SMTP STARTTLS and TLS verification. See ", link('https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8461.html', 'RFC 8461'), '.'),
dom.p("The SMTP protocol is unencrypted by default, though the SMTP STARTTLS command is typically used to enable TLS on a connection. However, MTA's using STARTTLS typically do not validate the TLS certificate. An MTA-STS policy can specify that validation of host name, non-expiration and webpki trust is required."),
makeMTASTSTable(policies),
)
}
const formatMTASTSMX = (mx) => {
return (mx || []).map(e => {
return (e.Wildcard ? '*.' : '') + e.Domain.ASCII
}).join(', ')
}
const makeMTASTSTable = items => {
if (!items || !items.length) {
return dom.div('No data')
}
// Elements: Field name in JSON, column name override, title for column name.
const keys = [
["LastUse", "", "Last time this policy was used."],
["Domain", "Domain", "Domain this policy was retrieved from and this policy applies to."],
["Backoff", "", "If true, a DNS record for MTA-STS exists, but a policy could not be fetched. This indicates a failure with MTA-STS."],
["RecordID", "", "Unique ID for this policy. Each time a domain changes its policy, it must also change the record ID that is published in DNS to propagate the change."],
["Version", "", "For valid MTA-STS policies, this must be 'STSv1'."],
["Mode", "", "'enforce': TLS must be used and certificates must be validated; 'none': TLS and certificate validation is not required, typically only useful for removing once-used MTA-STS; 'testing': TLS should be used and certificated should be validated, but fallback to unverified TLS or plain text is allowed, but such cases must be reported"],
["MX", "", "The MX hosts that are configured to do TLS. If TLS and validation is required, but an MX host is not on this list, delivery will not be attempted to that host."],
["MaxAgeSeconds", "", "How long a policy can be cached and reused after it was fetched. Typically in the order of weeks."],
["Extensions", "", "Free-form extensions in the MTA-STS policy."],
["ValidEnd", "", "Until when this cached policy is valid, based on time the policy was fetched and the policy max age. Non-failure policies are automatically refreshed before they become invalid."],
["LastUpdate", "", "Last time this policy was updated."],
["Inserted", "", "Time when the policy was first inserted."],
// todo: make a mechanism to get the ../config/config.go sconf-doc struct tags
// here. So we can use them for the titles, as documentation. Instead of current
// approach of copy/pasting those texts, inevitably will get out of date.
// todo: perhaps lay these out in the same way as in the config file? will help admins mentally map between the two. will take a bit more vertical screen space, but current approach looks messy/garbled. we could use that mechanism for more parts of the configuration file. we can even show the same sconf-doc struct tags. the html admin page will then just be a glorified guided text editor!
// Make a handler row. This is more complicated, since it can be one of the three
// types (static, redirect, forward), and can change between those types.
const handlerRow = (wh) => {
// We make and remember components for headers, possibly not used.
attr({title: 'Path to strip from the request URL before evaluating to a local path. If the requested URL path does not start with this prefix and ContinueNotFound it is considered non-matching and next WebHandlers are tried. If ContinueNotFound is not set, a file not found (404) is returned in that case.'}),
),
dom.td(
'Root',
attr({title: 'Directory to serve files from for this handler. Keep in mind that relative paths are relative to the working directory of mox.'}),
),
dom.td(
'ListFiles',
attr({title: 'If set, and a directory is requested, and no index.html is present that can be served, a file listing is returned. Results in 403 if ListFiles is not set. If a directory is requested and the URL does not end with a slash, the response is a redirect to the path with trailing slash.'}),
),
dom.td(
'ContinueNotFound',
attr({title: "If a requested URL does not exist, don't return a file not found (404) response, but consider this handler non-matching and continue attempts to serve with later WebHandlers, which may be a reverse proxy generating dynamic content, possibly even writing a static file for a next request to serve statically. If ContinueNotFound is set, HTTP requests other than GET and HEAD do not match. This mechanism can be used to implement the equivalent of 'try_files' in other webservers."}),
),
dom.td(
dom.span(
'Response headers',
attr({title: 'Headers to add to the response. Useful for cache-control, content-type, etc. By default, Content-Type headers are automatically added for recognized file types, unless added explicitly through this setting. For directory listings, a content-type header is skipped.'}),
attr({title: 'Base URL to redirect to. The path must be empty and will be replaced, either by the request URL path, or by OrigPathRegexp/ReplacePath. Scheme, host, port and fragment stay intact, and query strings are combined. If empty, the response redirects to a different path through OrigPathRegexp and ReplacePath, which must then be set. Use a URL without scheme to redirect without changing the protocol, e.g. //newdomain/. If a redirect would send a request to a URL with the same scheme, host and path, the WebRedirect does not match so a next WebHandler can be tried. This can be used to redirect all plain http traffic to https.'}),
attr({title: 'Regular expression for matching path. If set and path does not match, a 404 is returned. The HTTP path used for matching always starts with a slash.'}),
),
dom.td(
'ReplacePath',
attr({title: "Replacement path for destination URL based on OrigPathRegexp. Implemented with Go's Regexp.ReplaceAllString: $1 is replaced with the text of the first submatch, etc. If both OrigPathRegexp and ReplacePath are empty, BaseURL must be set and all paths are redirected unaltered."}),
),
dom.td(
'StatusCode',
attr({title: 'Status code to use in redirect, e.g. 307. By default, a permanent redirect (308) is returned.'}),
),
),
dom.tr(
dom.td(
row.type=dom.select(
attr({required: ''}),
dom.option('Static'),
dom.option('Redirect', attr({selected: ''})),
dom.option('Forward'),
function change(e) {
makeType(e.target.value)
},
),
),
dom.td(
row.BaseURL=dom.input(attr({placeholder: 'empty or https://target/path?q=1#frag or //target/...', value: wr.BaseURL || ''})),
attr({title: 'Strip the matching WebHandler path from the WebHandler before forwarding the request.'}),
),
dom.td(
'URL',
attr({title: "URL to forward HTTP requests to, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8123/base. If StripPath is false the full request path is added to the URL. Host headers are sent unmodified. New X-Forwarded-{For,Host,Proto} headers are set. Any query string in the URL is ignored. Requests are made using Go's net/http.DefaultTransport that takes environment variables HTTP_PROXY and HTTPS_PROXY into account."}),
),
dom.td(
dom.span(
'Response headers',
attr({title: 'Headers to add to the response. Useful for adding security- and cache-related headers.'}),
// Row that starts starts with two tables: one for the fields all WebHandlers have
// (in common). And one for the details, i.e. WebStatic, WebRedirect, WebForward.
row.root = dom.tr(
dom.td(
dom.table(
dom.tr(
dom.td('LogName', attr({title: 'Name used during logging for requests matching this handler. If empty, the index of the handler in the list is used.'})),
dom.td('Domain', attr({title: 'Request must be for this domain to match this handler.'})),
dom.td('Path Regexp', attr({title: 'Request must match this path regular expression to match this handler. Must start with with a ^.'})),
dom.td('To HTTPS', attr({title: 'Redirect plain HTTP (non-TLS) requests to HTTPS'})),
dom.button('Save', attr({type: 'submit'}), attr({title: 'Save config. If the configuration has changed since this page was loaded, an error will be returned. After saving, the changes take effect immediately.'})),