mox/autotls/autotls.go

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// Package autotls automatically configures TLS (for SMTP, IMAP, HTTP) by
// requesting certificates with ACME, typically from Let's Encrypt.
package autotls
// We do tls-alpn-01, and also http-01. For DNS we would need a third party tool
// with an API that can make the DNS changes, as we don't want to link in dozens of
// bespoke API's for DNS record manipulation into mox.
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import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
cryptorand "crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net"
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"os"
"path/filepath"
"sort"
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"strings"
"sync"
"time"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/acme"
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"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promauto"
implement dnssec-awareness throughout code, and dane for incoming/outgoing mail delivery the vendored dns resolver code is a copy of the go stdlib dns resolver, with awareness of the "authentic data" (i.e. dnssec secure) added, as well as support for enhanced dns errors, and looking up tlsa records (for dane). ideally it would be upstreamed, but the chances seem slim. dnssec-awareness is added to all packages, e.g. spf, dkim, dmarc, iprev. their dnssec status is added to the Received message headers for incoming email. but the main reason to add dnssec was for implementing dane. with dane, the verification of tls certificates can be done through certificates/public keys published in dns (in the tlsa records). this only makes sense (is trustworthy) if those dns records can be verified to be authentic. mox now applies dane to delivering messages over smtp. mox already implemented mta-sts for webpki/pkix-verification of certificates against the (large) pool of CA's, and still enforces those policies when present. but it now also checks for dane records, and will verify those if present. if dane and mta-sts are both absent, the regular opportunistic tls with starttls is still done. and the fallback to plaintext is also still done. mox also makes it easy to setup dane for incoming deliveries, so other servers can deliver with dane tls certificate verification. the quickstart now generates private keys that are used when requesting certificates with acme. the private keys are pre-generated because they must be static and known during setup, because their public keys must be published in tlsa records in dns. autocert would generate private keys on its own, so had to be forked to add the option to provide the private key when requesting a new certificate. hopefully upstream will accept the change and we can drop the fork. with this change, using the quickstart to setup a new mox instance, the checks at internet.nl result in a 100% score, provided the domain is dnssec-signed and the network doesn't have any issues.
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"github.com/mjl-/autocert"
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/dns"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/mlog"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/moxvar"
)
var (
metricCertput = promauto.NewCounter(
prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "mox_autotls_certput_total",
Help: "Number of certificate store puts.",
},
)
)
// Manager is in charge of a single ACME identity, and automatically requests
// certificates for allowlisted hosts.
type Manager struct {
ACMETLSConfig *tls.Config // For serving HTTPS on port 443, which is required for certificate requests to succeed.
Manager *autocert.Manager
shutdown <-chan struct{}
sync.Mutex
hosts map[dns.Domain]struct{}
}
// Load returns an initialized autotls manager for "name" (used for the ACME key
// file and requested certs and their keys). All files are stored within acmeDir.
implement dnssec-awareness throughout code, and dane for incoming/outgoing mail delivery the vendored dns resolver code is a copy of the go stdlib dns resolver, with awareness of the "authentic data" (i.e. dnssec secure) added, as well as support for enhanced dns errors, and looking up tlsa records (for dane). ideally it would be upstreamed, but the chances seem slim. dnssec-awareness is added to all packages, e.g. spf, dkim, dmarc, iprev. their dnssec status is added to the Received message headers for incoming email. but the main reason to add dnssec was for implementing dane. with dane, the verification of tls certificates can be done through certificates/public keys published in dns (in the tlsa records). this only makes sense (is trustworthy) if those dns records can be verified to be authentic. mox now applies dane to delivering messages over smtp. mox already implemented mta-sts for webpki/pkix-verification of certificates against the (large) pool of CA's, and still enforces those policies when present. but it now also checks for dane records, and will verify those if present. if dane and mta-sts are both absent, the regular opportunistic tls with starttls is still done. and the fallback to plaintext is also still done. mox also makes it easy to setup dane for incoming deliveries, so other servers can deliver with dane tls certificate verification. the quickstart now generates private keys that are used when requesting certificates with acme. the private keys are pre-generated because they must be static and known during setup, because their public keys must be published in tlsa records in dns. autocert would generate private keys on its own, so had to be forked to add the option to provide the private key when requesting a new certificate. hopefully upstream will accept the change and we can drop the fork. with this change, using the quickstart to setup a new mox instance, the checks at internet.nl result in a 100% score, provided the domain is dnssec-signed and the network doesn't have any issues.
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//
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// contactEmail must be a valid email address to which notifications about ACME can
implement dnssec-awareness throughout code, and dane for incoming/outgoing mail delivery the vendored dns resolver code is a copy of the go stdlib dns resolver, with awareness of the "authentic data" (i.e. dnssec secure) added, as well as support for enhanced dns errors, and looking up tlsa records (for dane). ideally it would be upstreamed, but the chances seem slim. dnssec-awareness is added to all packages, e.g. spf, dkim, dmarc, iprev. their dnssec status is added to the Received message headers for incoming email. but the main reason to add dnssec was for implementing dane. with dane, the verification of tls certificates can be done through certificates/public keys published in dns (in the tlsa records). this only makes sense (is trustworthy) if those dns records can be verified to be authentic. mox now applies dane to delivering messages over smtp. mox already implemented mta-sts for webpki/pkix-verification of certificates against the (large) pool of CA's, and still enforces those policies when present. but it now also checks for dane records, and will verify those if present. if dane and mta-sts are both absent, the regular opportunistic tls with starttls is still done. and the fallback to plaintext is also still done. mox also makes it easy to setup dane for incoming deliveries, so other servers can deliver with dane tls certificate verification. the quickstart now generates private keys that are used when requesting certificates with acme. the private keys are pre-generated because they must be static and known during setup, because their public keys must be published in tlsa records in dns. autocert would generate private keys on its own, so had to be forked to add the option to provide the private key when requesting a new certificate. hopefully upstream will accept the change and we can drop the fork. with this change, using the quickstart to setup a new mox instance, the checks at internet.nl result in a 100% score, provided the domain is dnssec-signed and the network doesn't have any issues.
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// be sent. directoryURL is the ACME starting point.
//
// eabKeyID and eabKey are for external account binding when making a new account,
// which some ACME providers require.
//
implement dnssec-awareness throughout code, and dane for incoming/outgoing mail delivery the vendored dns resolver code is a copy of the go stdlib dns resolver, with awareness of the "authentic data" (i.e. dnssec secure) added, as well as support for enhanced dns errors, and looking up tlsa records (for dane). ideally it would be upstreamed, but the chances seem slim. dnssec-awareness is added to all packages, e.g. spf, dkim, dmarc, iprev. their dnssec status is added to the Received message headers for incoming email. but the main reason to add dnssec was for implementing dane. with dane, the verification of tls certificates can be done through certificates/public keys published in dns (in the tlsa records). this only makes sense (is trustworthy) if those dns records can be verified to be authentic. mox now applies dane to delivering messages over smtp. mox already implemented mta-sts for webpki/pkix-verification of certificates against the (large) pool of CA's, and still enforces those policies when present. but it now also checks for dane records, and will verify those if present. if dane and mta-sts are both absent, the regular opportunistic tls with starttls is still done. and the fallback to plaintext is also still done. mox also makes it easy to setup dane for incoming deliveries, so other servers can deliver with dane tls certificate verification. the quickstart now generates private keys that are used when requesting certificates with acme. the private keys are pre-generated because they must be static and known during setup, because their public keys must be published in tlsa records in dns. autocert would generate private keys on its own, so had to be forked to add the option to provide the private key when requesting a new certificate. hopefully upstream will accept the change and we can drop the fork. with this change, using the quickstart to setup a new mox instance, the checks at internet.nl result in a 100% score, provided the domain is dnssec-signed and the network doesn't have any issues.
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// getPrivateKey is called to get the private key for the host and key type. It
// can be used to deliver a specific (e.g. always the same) private key for a
// host, or a newly generated key.
//
// When shutdown is closed, no new TLS connections can be created.
func Load(name, acmeDir, contactEmail, directoryURL string, eabKeyID string, eabKey []byte, getPrivateKey func(host string, keyType autocert.KeyType) (crypto.Signer, error), shutdown <-chan struct{}) (*Manager, error) {
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if directoryURL == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("empty ACME directory URL")
}
if contactEmail == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("empty contact email")
}
// Load identity key if it exists. Otherwise, create a new key.
make mox compile on windows, without "mox serve" but with working "mox localserve" getting mox to compile required changing code in only a few places where package "syscall" was used: for accessing file access times and for umask handling. an open problem is how to start a process as an unprivileged user on windows. that's why "mox serve" isn't implemented yet. and just finding a way to implement it now may not be good enough in the near future: we may want to starting using a more complete privilege separation approach, with a process handling sensitive tasks (handling private keys, authentication), where we may want to pass file descriptors between processes. how would that work on windows? anyway, getting mox to compile for windows doesn't mean it works properly on windows. the largest issue: mox would normally open a file, rename or remove it, and finally close it. this happens during message delivery. that doesn't work on windows, the rename/remove would fail because the file is still open. so this commit swaps many "remove" and "close" calls. renames are a longer story: message delivery had two ways to deliver: with "consuming" the (temporary) message file (which would rename it to its final destination), and without consuming (by hardlinking the file, falling back to copying). the last delivery to a recipient of a message (and the only one in the common case of a single recipient) would consume the message, and the earlier recipients would not. during delivery, the already open message file was used, to parse the message. we still want to use that open message file, and the caller now stays responsible for closing it, but we no longer try to rename (consume) the file. we always hardlink (or copy) during delivery (this works on windows), and the caller is responsible for closing and removing (in that order) the original temporary file. this does cost one syscall more. but it makes the delivery code (responsibilities) a bit simpler. there is one more obvious issue: the file system path separator. mox already used the "filepath" package to join paths in many places, but not everywhere. and it still used strings with slashes for local file access. with this commit, the code now uses filepath.FromSlash for path strings with slashes, uses "filepath" in a few more places where it previously didn't. also switches from "filepath" to regular "path" package when handling mailbox names in a few places, because those always use forward slashes, regardless of local file system conventions. windows can handle forward slashes when opening files, so test code that passes path strings with forward slashes straight to go stdlib file i/o functions are left unchanged to reduce code churn. the regular non-test code, or test code that uses path strings in places other than standard i/o functions, does have the paths converted for consistent paths (otherwise we would end up with paths with mixed forward/backward slashes in log messages). windows cannot dup a listening socket. for "mox localserve", it isn't important, and we can work around the issue. the current approach for "mox serve" (forking a process and passing file descriptors of listening sockets on "privileged" ports) won't work on windows. perhaps it isn't needed on windows, and any user can listen on "privileged" ports? that would be welcome. on windows, os.Open cannot open a directory, so we cannot call Sync on it after message delivery. a cursory internet search indicates that directories cannot be synced on windows. the story is probably much more nuanced than that, with long deep technical details/discussions/disagreement/confusion, like on unix. for "mox localserve" we can get away with making syncdir a no-op.
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p := filepath.Join(acmeDir, name+".key")
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var key crypto.Signer
f, err := os.Open(p)
if f != nil {
defer f.Close()
}
if err != nil && os.IsNotExist(err) {
key, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), cryptorand.Reader)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("generating ecdsa identity key: %s", err)
}
der, err := x509.MarshalPKCS8PrivateKey(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal identity key: %s", err)
}
block := &pem.Block{
Type: "PRIVATE KEY",
Headers: map[string]string{
"Note": fmt.Sprintf("PEM PKCS8 ECDSA private key generated for ACME provider %s by mox", name),
},
Bytes: der,
}
b := &bytes.Buffer{}
if err := pem.Encode(b, block); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("pem encode: %s", err)
} else if err := os.WriteFile(p, b.Bytes(), 0660); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("writing identity key: %s", err)
}
} else if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open identity key file: %s", err)
} else {
var privKey any
if buf, err := io.ReadAll(f); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading identity key: %s", err)
} else if p, _ := pem.Decode(buf); p == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no pem data")
} else if p.Type != "PRIVATE KEY" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("got PEM block %q, expected \"PRIVATE KEY\"", p.Type)
} else if privKey, err = x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(p.Bytes); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing PKCS8 private key: %s", err)
}
switch k := privKey.(type) {
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
key = k
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
key = k
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported private key type %T", key)
}
}
m := &autocert.Manager{
make mox compile on windows, without "mox serve" but with working "mox localserve" getting mox to compile required changing code in only a few places where package "syscall" was used: for accessing file access times and for umask handling. an open problem is how to start a process as an unprivileged user on windows. that's why "mox serve" isn't implemented yet. and just finding a way to implement it now may not be good enough in the near future: we may want to starting using a more complete privilege separation approach, with a process handling sensitive tasks (handling private keys, authentication), where we may want to pass file descriptors between processes. how would that work on windows? anyway, getting mox to compile for windows doesn't mean it works properly on windows. the largest issue: mox would normally open a file, rename or remove it, and finally close it. this happens during message delivery. that doesn't work on windows, the rename/remove would fail because the file is still open. so this commit swaps many "remove" and "close" calls. renames are a longer story: message delivery had two ways to deliver: with "consuming" the (temporary) message file (which would rename it to its final destination), and without consuming (by hardlinking the file, falling back to copying). the last delivery to a recipient of a message (and the only one in the common case of a single recipient) would consume the message, and the earlier recipients would not. during delivery, the already open message file was used, to parse the message. we still want to use that open message file, and the caller now stays responsible for closing it, but we no longer try to rename (consume) the file. we always hardlink (or copy) during delivery (this works on windows), and the caller is responsible for closing and removing (in that order) the original temporary file. this does cost one syscall more. but it makes the delivery code (responsibilities) a bit simpler. there is one more obvious issue: the file system path separator. mox already used the "filepath" package to join paths in many places, but not everywhere. and it still used strings with slashes for local file access. with this commit, the code now uses filepath.FromSlash for path strings with slashes, uses "filepath" in a few more places where it previously didn't. also switches from "filepath" to regular "path" package when handling mailbox names in a few places, because those always use forward slashes, regardless of local file system conventions. windows can handle forward slashes when opening files, so test code that passes path strings with forward slashes straight to go stdlib file i/o functions are left unchanged to reduce code churn. the regular non-test code, or test code that uses path strings in places other than standard i/o functions, does have the paths converted for consistent paths (otherwise we would end up with paths with mixed forward/backward slashes in log messages). windows cannot dup a listening socket. for "mox localserve", it isn't important, and we can work around the issue. the current approach for "mox serve" (forking a process and passing file descriptors of listening sockets on "privileged" ports) won't work on windows. perhaps it isn't needed on windows, and any user can listen on "privileged" ports? that would be welcome. on windows, os.Open cannot open a directory, so we cannot call Sync on it after message delivery. a cursory internet search indicates that directories cannot be synced on windows. the story is probably much more nuanced than that, with long deep technical details/discussions/disagreement/confusion, like on unix. for "mox localserve" we can get away with making syncdir a no-op.
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Cache: dirCache(filepath.Join(acmeDir, "keycerts", name)),
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Prompt: autocert.AcceptTOS,
Email: contactEmail,
Client: &acme.Client{
DirectoryURL: directoryURL,
Key: key,
UserAgent: "mox/" + moxvar.Version,
},
implement dnssec-awareness throughout code, and dane for incoming/outgoing mail delivery the vendored dns resolver code is a copy of the go stdlib dns resolver, with awareness of the "authentic data" (i.e. dnssec secure) added, as well as support for enhanced dns errors, and looking up tlsa records (for dane). ideally it would be upstreamed, but the chances seem slim. dnssec-awareness is added to all packages, e.g. spf, dkim, dmarc, iprev. their dnssec status is added to the Received message headers for incoming email. but the main reason to add dnssec was for implementing dane. with dane, the verification of tls certificates can be done through certificates/public keys published in dns (in the tlsa records). this only makes sense (is trustworthy) if those dns records can be verified to be authentic. mox now applies dane to delivering messages over smtp. mox already implemented mta-sts for webpki/pkix-verification of certificates against the (large) pool of CA's, and still enforces those policies when present. but it now also checks for dane records, and will verify those if present. if dane and mta-sts are both absent, the regular opportunistic tls with starttls is still done. and the fallback to plaintext is also still done. mox also makes it easy to setup dane for incoming deliveries, so other servers can deliver with dane tls certificate verification. the quickstart now generates private keys that are used when requesting certificates with acme. the private keys are pre-generated because they must be static and known during setup, because their public keys must be published in tlsa records in dns. autocert would generate private keys on its own, so had to be forked to add the option to provide the private key when requesting a new certificate. hopefully upstream will accept the change and we can drop the fork. with this change, using the quickstart to setup a new mox instance, the checks at internet.nl result in a 100% score, provided the domain is dnssec-signed and the network doesn't have any issues.
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GetPrivateKey: getPrivateKey,
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// HostPolicy set below.
}
// If external account binding key is provided, use it for registering a new account.
// todo: ideally the key and its id are provided temporarily by the admin when registering a new account. but we don't do that interactive setup yet. in the future, an interactive setup/quickstart would ask for the key once to register a new acme account.
if eabKeyID != "" {
m.ExternalAccountBinding = &acme.ExternalAccountBinding{
KID: eabKeyID,
Key: eabKey,
}
}
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a := &Manager{
Manager: m,
shutdown: shutdown,
hosts: map[dns.Domain]struct{}{},
}
m.HostPolicy = a.HostPolicy
acmeTLSConfig := *m.TLSConfig()
acmeTLSConfig.GetCertificate = func(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
return a.loggingGetCertificate(hello, dns.Domain{}, false, false)
}
a.ACMETLSConfig = &acmeTLSConfig
return a, nil
}
// logigngGetCertificate is a helper to implement crypto/tls.Config.GetCertificate,
// optionally falling back to a certificate for fallbackHostname in case SNI is
// absent or for an unknown hostname.
func (m *Manager) loggingGetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo, fallbackHostname dns.Domain, fallbackNoSNI, fallbackUnknownSNI bool) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
log := mlog.New("autotls", nil).WithContext(hello.Context())
// If we can't find a certificate (depending on fallback parameters), we return a
// nil certificate and nil error, which crypto/tls turns into a TLS alert
// "unrecognized name", which can be interpreted by clients as a hint that they are
// using the wrong hostname, or a certificate is missing.
if hello.ServerName == "" && fallbackNoSNI {
hello.ServerName = fallbackHostname.ASCII
}
// Handle missing SNI to prevent logging an error below.
if hello.ServerName == "" {
log.Debug("tls request without sni servername, rejecting", slog.Any("localaddr", hello.Conn.LocalAddr()), slog.Any("supportedprotos", hello.SupportedProtos))
return nil, nil
}
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cert, err := m.Manager.GetCertificate(hello)
if err != nil && errors.Is(err, errHostNotAllowed) {
if !fallbackUnknownSNI {
log.Debugx("requesting certificate", err, slog.String("host", hello.ServerName))
return nil, nil
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}
log.Debug("certificate for unknown hostname, using fallback hostname", slog.String("host", hello.ServerName))
hello.ServerName = fallbackHostname.ASCII
cert, err = m.Manager.GetCertificate(hello)
if err != nil {
log.Errorx("requesting certificate for fallback hostname", err, slog.String("host", hello.ServerName))
} else {
log.Debugx("requesting certificate for fallback hostname", err, slog.String("host", hello.ServerName))
}
return cert, err
} else if err != nil {
log.Errorx("requesting certificate", err, slog.String("host", hello.ServerName))
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}
return cert, err
}
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// TLSConfig returns a TLS server config that optionally returns a certificate for
// fallbackHostname if no SNI was done, or for an unknown hostname.
//
// If fallbackNoSNI is set, TLS connections without SNI will use a certificate for
// fallbackHostname. Otherwise, connections without SNI will fail with a message
// that no TLS certificate is available.
//
// If fallbackUnknownSNI is set, TLS connections with an SNI hostname that is not
// allowlisted will instead use a certificate for fallbackHostname. Otherwise, such
// TLS connections will fail.
func (m *Manager) TLSConfig(fallbackHostname dns.Domain, fallbackNoSNI, fallbackUnknownSNI bool) *tls.Config {
return &tls.Config{
GetCertificate: func(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
return m.loggingGetCertificate(hello, fallbackHostname, fallbackNoSNI, fallbackUnknownSNI)
},
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}
}
// CertAvailable checks whether a non-expired ECDSA certificate is available in the
// cache for host. No other checks than expiration are done.
func (m *Manager) CertAvailable(ctx context.Context, log mlog.Log, host dns.Domain) (bool, error) {
ck := host.ASCII // Would be "+rsa" for rsa keys.
data, err := m.Manager.Cache.Get(ctx, ck)
if err != nil && errors.Is(err, autocert.ErrCacheMiss) {
return false, nil
} else if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("attempt to get certificate from cache: %v", err)
}
// The cached keycert is of the form: private key, leaf certificate, intermediate certificates...
privb, rem := pem.Decode(data)
if privb == nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("missing private key in cached keycert file")
}
pubb, _ := pem.Decode(rem)
if pubb == nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("missing certificate in cached keycert file")
} else if pubb.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
return false, fmt.Errorf("second pem block is %q, expected CERTIFICATE", pubb.Type)
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(pubb.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("parsing certificate from cached keycert file: %v", err)
}
// We assume the certificate has a matching hostname, and is properly CA-signed. We
// only check the expiration time.
if time.Until(cert.NotBefore) > 0 || time.Since(cert.NotAfter) > 0 {
return false, nil
}
return true, nil
}
// SetAllowedHostnames sets a new list of allowed hostnames for automatic TLS.
// After setting the host names, a goroutine is start to check that new host names
// are fully served by publicIPs (only if non-empty and there is no unspecified
// address in the list). If no, log an error with a warning that ACME validation
// may fail.
func (m *Manager) SetAllowedHostnames(log mlog.Log, resolver dns.Resolver, hostnames map[dns.Domain]struct{}, publicIPs []string, checkHosts bool) {
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m.Lock()
defer m.Unlock()
// Log as slice, sorted.
l := make([]dns.Domain, 0, len(hostnames))
for d := range hostnames {
l = append(l, d)
}
sort.Slice(l, func(i, j int) bool {
return l[i].Name() < l[j].Name()
})
log.Debug("autotls setting allowed hostnames", slog.Any("hostnames", l), slog.Any("publicips", publicIPs))
var added []dns.Domain
for h := range hostnames {
if _, ok := m.hosts[h]; !ok {
added = append(added, h)
}
}
m.hosts = hostnames
if checkHosts && len(added) > 0 && len(publicIPs) > 0 {
for _, ip := range publicIPs {
if net.ParseIP(ip).IsUnspecified() {
return
}
}
go func() {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
publicIPstrs := map[string]struct{}{}
for _, ip := range publicIPs {
publicIPstrs[ip] = struct{}{}
}
log.Debug("checking ips of hosts configured for acme tls cert validation")
for _, h := range added {
implement dnssec-awareness throughout code, and dane for incoming/outgoing mail delivery the vendored dns resolver code is a copy of the go stdlib dns resolver, with awareness of the "authentic data" (i.e. dnssec secure) added, as well as support for enhanced dns errors, and looking up tlsa records (for dane). ideally it would be upstreamed, but the chances seem slim. dnssec-awareness is added to all packages, e.g. spf, dkim, dmarc, iprev. their dnssec status is added to the Received message headers for incoming email. but the main reason to add dnssec was for implementing dane. with dane, the verification of tls certificates can be done through certificates/public keys published in dns (in the tlsa records). this only makes sense (is trustworthy) if those dns records can be verified to be authentic. mox now applies dane to delivering messages over smtp. mox already implemented mta-sts for webpki/pkix-verification of certificates against the (large) pool of CA's, and still enforces those policies when present. but it now also checks for dane records, and will verify those if present. if dane and mta-sts are both absent, the regular opportunistic tls with starttls is still done. and the fallback to plaintext is also still done. mox also makes it easy to setup dane for incoming deliveries, so other servers can deliver with dane tls certificate verification. the quickstart now generates private keys that are used when requesting certificates with acme. the private keys are pre-generated because they must be static and known during setup, because their public keys must be published in tlsa records in dns. autocert would generate private keys on its own, so had to be forked to add the option to provide the private key when requesting a new certificate. hopefully upstream will accept the change and we can drop the fork. with this change, using the quickstart to setup a new mox instance, the checks at internet.nl result in a 100% score, provided the domain is dnssec-signed and the network doesn't have any issues.
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ips, _, err := resolver.LookupIP(ctx, "ip", h.ASCII+".")
if err != nil {
log.Warnx("acme tls cert validation for host may fail due to dns lookup error", err, slog.Any("host", h))
continue
}
for _, ip := range ips {
if _, ok := publicIPstrs[ip.String()]; !ok {
log.Warn("acme tls cert validation for host is likely to fail because not all its ips are being listened on",
slog.Any("hostname", h),
slog.Any("listenedips", publicIPs),
slog.Any("hostips", ips),
slog.Any("missingip", ip))
}
}
}
}()
}
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}
// Hostnames returns the allowed host names for use with ACME.
func (m *Manager) Hostnames() []dns.Domain {
m.Lock()
defer m.Unlock()
var l []dns.Domain
for h := range m.hosts {
l = append(l, h)
}
return l
}
var errHostNotAllowed = errors.New("autotls: host not in allowlist")
// HostPolicy decides if a host is allowed for use with ACME, i.e. whether a
// certificate will be returned if present and/or will be requested if not yet
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// present. Only hosts added with SetAllowedHostnames are allowed. During shutdown,
// no new connections are allowed.
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func (m *Manager) HostPolicy(ctx context.Context, host string) (rerr error) {
log := mlog.New("autotls", nil).WithContext(ctx)
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defer func() {
log.Debugx("autotls hostpolicy result", rerr, slog.String("host", host))
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}()
// Don't request new TLS certs when we are shutting down.
select {
case <-m.shutdown:
return fmt.Errorf("shutting down")
default:
}
xhost, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host)
if err == nil {
// For http-01, host may include a port number.
host = xhost
}
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d, err := dns.ParseDomain(host)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid host: %v", err)
}
m.Lock()
defer m.Unlock()
if _, ok := m.hosts[d]; !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", errHostNotAllowed, d)
}
return nil
}
type dirCache autocert.DirCache
func (d dirCache) Delete(ctx context.Context, name string) (rerr error) {
log := mlog.New("autotls", nil).WithContext(ctx)
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defer func() {
log.Debugx("dircache delete result", rerr, slog.String("name", name))
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}()
err := autocert.DirCache(d).Delete(ctx, name)
if err != nil {
log.Errorx("deleting cert from dir cache", err, slog.String("name", name))
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} else if !strings.HasSuffix(name, "+token") {
log.Info("autotls cert delete", slog.String("name", name))
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}
return err
}
func (d dirCache) Get(ctx context.Context, name string) (rbuf []byte, rerr error) {
log := mlog.New("autotls", nil).WithContext(ctx)
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defer func() {
log.Debugx("dircache get result", rerr, slog.String("name", name))
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}()
buf, err := autocert.DirCache(d).Get(ctx, name)
if err != nil && errors.Is(err, autocert.ErrCacheMiss) {
log.Infox("getting cert from dir cache", err, slog.String("name", name))
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} else if err != nil {
log.Errorx("getting cert from dir cache", err, slog.String("name", name))
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} else if !strings.HasSuffix(name, "+token") {
log.Debug("autotls cert get", slog.String("name", name))
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}
return buf, err
}
func (d dirCache) Put(ctx context.Context, name string, data []byte) (rerr error) {
log := mlog.New("autotls", nil).WithContext(ctx)
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defer func() {
log.Debugx("dircache put result", rerr, slog.String("name", name))
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}()
metricCertput.Inc()
err := autocert.DirCache(d).Put(ctx, name, data)
if err != nil {
log.Errorx("storing cert in dir cache", err, slog.String("name", name))
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} else if !strings.HasSuffix(name, "+token") {
log.Info("autotls cert store", slog.String("name", name))
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}
return err
}