2024-01-10 18:48:53 +03:00
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# Features
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## Easy to operate
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The initial installation should be easy when using the quickstart. It performs
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some DNS checks, generates config files, an initial admin account and an email
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address account, and it prints all the DNS records (quite a few!) you need to
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add for sending and receiving email. It also creates a systemd unit file to run
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mox as a service on Linux, along with commands to enable the server. When run,
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it fixes up file permissions. You normally only have to copy/paste text and run
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the suggested commands.
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Upgrades are usually a matter of replacing the binary and restart mox. Mox
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tries hard to not make incompatible changes. After an update you may want to
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change a configuration file to enable new functionality or behaviour.
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The [configuration files](../config/) that come annotated with documentation
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make it easy to discover and configure functionality. The web admin interface
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guides you even more in making runtime configuration changes. The web admin
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interface also writes to the runtime configuration file. So you get the power
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of plain files for configuration (for readability, version control/diffs), and
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the ease of a user interface for making changes.
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Mox is an all-in-one email server built in a single coherent code base. This
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ensures that all functionality works well together. And that you don't have to
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configure lots of individual components for a fully working system.
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## SMTP
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SMTP is used to deliver and receive email messages on the internet. Email
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clients also use it to ask an SMTP server to deliver messages (called
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submission).
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Mox implements:
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- An SMTP server to accept deliveries of incoming messages, on port 25.
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- An SMTP client and delivery queue for delivering messages to other mail
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servers, connecting to other servers on port 25.
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- A "submission" (SMTP) server, so authenticated clients can submit messages to
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the queue, from which Mox will deliver, with retries.
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- Commonly used SMTP extensions.
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## SPF/DKIM/DMARC
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SPF, DKIM and DMARC are mechanisms for "message authentication". SPF and DKIM
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can be used to verify that a domain is indeed associated with an incoming
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message. This allows mail servers to keep track of the reputation of a domain,
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which is used during junk filtering.
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SPF is a mechanism whereby a domain specifies in a TXT DNS record which IPs are
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allowed to use its domain in an address in the `MAIL FROM` command in an SMTP
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transaction. If a sending IP is not listed, a receiving mail server may reject
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the email as likely being junk. However, the decision to reject isn't made
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solely based on the SPF record, keep reading.
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DKIM is a mechanism whereby a domain specifies public keys in DNS TXT records.
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Legitimate messages originating from the domain will have one or more
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`DKIM-Signature` message headers that reference a public key and contain a
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signature. During delivery, the signature is verified.
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DMARC is a mechanism whereby a domain specifies a policy in a DNS TXT record
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about what to do messages that are not authenticated with "aligned" SPF and/or
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DKIM. These policies include "reject", or "quarantine" (put in junk mailbox),
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or "none" (don't treat differently). DMARC authenticates the address in the
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"From" header in an email message, since that is what users will typically look
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at and trust. For a message to pass the "aligned SPF" check, the SPF-domain
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must match the domain the message "From" header. For a message to pass the
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"aligned DKIM" check, at least one verified DKIM domain must match the domain
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in the message "From" header. A non-aligned verified domain is not used for
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DMARC, but can still be useful in junk filtering.
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Mox sets up SPF, DKIM and DMARC for your domain, and adds `DKIM-Signature`
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headers to outgoing messages.
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For incoming messages, mox will perform SPF, DKIM and DMARC checks. DMARC
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policies of domains are honored by mox, though mox interprets policy
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"quarantine" as "reject": Mox does not claim to accept messages, only to hide
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them away in a junk mailbox. Mox uses reputation of SPF-, DKIM- and
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DMARC(-like) verified domains in its reputation-based junk filtering.
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A domain's DMARC policy, as published in DNS records, can request reports about
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DMARC policies as performed by other mail servers. This gives you, as domain
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owner, insights into where both authenticated and non-authenticated messages
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are being sent from. The policy specifies an email address whereto such reports
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should be sent. Mox helps set up a policy to request such reports,
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automatically processes such reports, and provides access through its admin web
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interface. Mox also sends reports with the results of its DMARC evaluations to
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domains that request them.
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## DANE and MTA-STS
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DANE and MTA-STS are mechanisms for more secure email delivery using SMTP.
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Originally, SMTP delivered email messages over the internet in plain text.
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Message delivery was vulnerable to eavesdropping/interception.
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The SMTP STARTTLS extension added opportunistic TLS: If a server announces
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support, a (delivering) SMTP client can "upgrade" a connection to TLS. This
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prevents passive attackers from eavesdropping. But an active attacker can
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simply strip server support for STARTTLS, causing a message to be transferred
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in plain text. With opportunistic TLS for SMTP, the TLS certificate of a server
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is not verified: Certificates that are expired or for other host names are
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accepted.
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Both old-fashioned plain text delivery and STARTTLS don't protect against
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another active attack: Simply modifying DNS MX responses, causing email to be
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delivered to another server entirely. That other server may implement STARTTLS,
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and even have a certificate that can be verified. But the MX records need
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protection as well.
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Both DANE and MTA-STS are (different) opt-in mechanisms to protect MX records,
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and for verifying TLS certificates of SMTP servers.
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DANE protects MX records by requiring that they are DNSSEC-signed, causing
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changes to DNS records to be detected. With DANE, TLS certificates of an MX
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host are verified through (hashes of) either public keys or full certificates.
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These are published in DNS and must also be protected with DNSSEC. If a
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connection is intercepted by a different server, the TLS certificate validation
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would not pass.
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2024-02-10 13:39:31 +03:00
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MTA-STS uses PKIX (pool of trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs)) to protect
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2024-01-10 18:48:53 +03:00
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both MX records and to verify TLS during SMTP STARTTLS. MTA-STS serves
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existence/version of a policy at DNS record `_mta-sts.<recipientdomain>`, and
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the policy itself at the PKIX-verified `https://mta-sts.<recipientdomain>`,
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specifying allowed MX host names. During delivery, MX targets not in the
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MTA-STS policy are rejected. The MTA-STS, MX, and MX target IP address DNS
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records are not required to be protected with DNSSEC, and often aren't. If an
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attacker modifies the IP address of an MTA-STS-allowed MX target, the
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PKIX-verification during SMTP STARTTLS will not pass. MTA-STS policies specify
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how long they should be cached. Attackers can suppress existence of an MTA-STS
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record during the first communication between mail servers, but not on
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subsequent deliveries.
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For delivery of outgoing messages, mox will use both DANE and MTA-STS, if
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configured for a recipient domain. MTA-STS policies are cached and periodically
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refreshed.
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Domains hosted by mox are both DANE- and MTA-STS protected by default. However,
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DANE only applies if recipient domains and their MX records are DNSSEC-signed.
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Mox requests certificates with ACME from Let's Encrypt by default, so TLS
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certificates used in SMTP STARTTLS can be PKIX-verified. Mox also serves
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MTA-STS policies by default.
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Mox also implements the REQUIRETLS SMTP extension. It allows message delivery
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to specify that MX DNS records and SMTP server TLS certificates must be
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verified along the full delivery path (not just the next hop), and that
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delivery must be aborted if that cannot be guaranteed.
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Mox also implements both incoming and outgoing TLS reporting, with both DANE
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and MTA-STS details. TLS reports have aggregated counts of SMTP connections
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(with failures, including about TLS, and success) and the DANE/MTA-STS policies
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encountered. Domains can request delivery of TLS reports by specifying a report
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destination address in a TLSRPT policy, specified in a DNS TXT record under a
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domain.
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## IMAP4
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Email clients (also called Mail User Agents, MUAs) typically access messages
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through IMAP4. IMAP4 gives access to all mailboxes (folders) in an account, and
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all messages in those mailboxes. IMAP4 is a protocol with a long history, and
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for which many extensions have been specified. IMAP4 can be used for
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efficiently synchronizing an entire account for offline/local use, or used
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reading messages "online" (e.g. with third party webmail software).
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Mox implements up to IMAP4rev2, the latest revision of IMAP4 that includes lots
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of functionality that used to be an extension. And mox implements commonly used
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extensions on top of that, such as CONDSTORE and QRESYNC, with more extensions
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to be implemented.
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## Junk filtering
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Junk email/spam/UCE (unsolicited commercial email) is still a big problem on
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the internet. One great feature of email, that is worth protecting, is that you
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can send an email to another person without previous introduction. However,
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spammers have the same opportunity. Various mechanisms have been developed over
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time to reduce the amount of junk.
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### Reputation-based
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Most of these mechanisms have components that involves reputation. The
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reputation can be based on the IP address of the sending server, or the email
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address (or just its domain) of the sender, or the contents of the message. Mox
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uses the junk/non-junk classifications of messages by the user to evaluate
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incoming messages.
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Email clients have the ability to mark a message as junk, which typically sets
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the junk-flag for the message and/or moves the message to the designated Junk
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mailbox. An email client can also mark a message as non-junk, but this isn't
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commonly done, so mox automatically automatically marks messages moved to
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certain mailboxes (like Archive, Trash) as non-junk.
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The message database, including junk/non-junk flags, is accessible by the SMTP
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server. The database allows for efficiently looking up messages by (non)-junk
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flags, verified SPF/DKIM/DMARC sender domain/address and originating IP
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address. This allows mox to quickly analyze the reputation of an incoming
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message, and make a decision to accept/reject a message if the sender
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address/domain/IP has enough reputation signal. This means messages from people
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you've communicated with before will reliably make it through the junk filter.
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At least if they have set up SPF and/or DKIM, which allows associating their
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messages with their domain. Only messages without reputation, "first-time
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senders", are subject to further scrutiny.
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### First-time senders
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For first-time senders, there is no, or not enough, signal in the sending
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address/domain/IP address to make a decision. Mox does bayesian analysis on the
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contents of such messages: The reputation of the words in a message are used to
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calculate the probability that a message is junk, which must not pass a
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configurable threshold. The reputation of words is based on their occurrence
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in historic junk/non-junk messages, as classified by the user.
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### Delivery feedback
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When an incoming message is rejected for being junk, mox returns a temporary
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error. Mox never claims to accept a message only to drop it (some cloud mail
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providers are known to do this!), or place it in a Junk mailbox, out of view of
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the user. The effect is that a spammer will not learn whether there is an
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actual temporary error, or their message is treated as junk. A legitimate
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sender whose message is erroneously classified as junk will receive a DSN
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message about the failed delivery attempts, making it clear a different means
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of communication should be tried.
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### Rejects mailbox
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When mox rejects a message for being junk, it stores a copy of the message in
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the special "Rejects" mailbox (automatically cleaned up). If you are expecting
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an email, e.g. about signup to a new service, and it is rejected, you will find
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the message in that mailbox. By moving the message to the Inbox, and marking it
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as non-junk (e.g. by moving it to the Archive or Trash mailbox), future
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messages by that sender will be accepted due to the now positive reputation.
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### Reputation is per account
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In mox, all reputation is per account, not shared among accounts. One account
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may mark all messages from a sender as junk, causing them to be rejected, while
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another account can accept messages from the same sender.
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### DNSBL
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2024-03-05 18:30:38 +03:00
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Mox can be configured to use an IP-based DNS blocklist (DNSBL). In other software, these are
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typically employed early in the SMTP session, to see if the remote IP is a
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known spammer. If so, the delivery attempt is stopped immediately. Mox doesn't use
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DNSBLs in its default installation. But if it is configured to use a DNSBL, it
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is only invoked when the other reputation-based checks are not conclusive. For
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these reasons:
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1. If a sender with positive reputation finds their IP listed in a DNSBL, the
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email communication channels that have always worked will keep working (until
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the user marks a few of their messages as junk).
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2. As little reliance on centralized parties (which DNSBLs typically are) as
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possible.
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3. No leaking of IP addresses of mail servers a mox instance is communicating
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with to the DNSBL operator.
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2024-03-05 18:30:38 +03:00
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Mox can also monitor DNSBLs for its own IPs only, without using those
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blocklists to analyze incoming deliveries. The status is exported in metrics.
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2024-01-10 18:48:53 +03:00
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### Greylisting
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Greylisting is a commonly implemented mechanism whereby the first delivery
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attempt from a first-time sender is rejected with a temporary error. The idea
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is that spammers don't implement delivery queueing, and will never try again.
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A legitimate mail server would try again, typically within 5-15 minutes, and
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the second or third attempt will be accepted. Mox does not implement
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greylisting in this manner:
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Mail servers typically send from multiple IP addresses. At least both an IPv4
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and IPv6 address, and often multiple of each to reduce impact of a negative
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reputation for an IP address (e.g. being listed in a DNSBL). IP-based
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reputation incentivizes mail servers to use a different IP address for delivery
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retries after encountering a failure. Greylisting incentivizes mail servers to
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use the same IP address for retries. These incentives conflict, and mox regards
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IP-based reputation as more (long-term) valuable. Due to delivering from
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different IP addresses, greylisting can cause very long delays, or cause
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delivery failures altogether.
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Mox does employ mechanisms to slow down possible spammers: SMTP transactions of
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first-time senders and for messages classified as junk are slowed down. This
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reduces the rate at which junk mail would be received, and consumes resources
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of the spammer. First-time senders are delayed for 15 seconds, making it
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possible to wait for expected messages, such as for signups.
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## Webmail
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Mox includes a webmail client, still in early stages. Despite its looks, and
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missing features like composing messages in HTML, it is surprisingly usable,
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featuring:
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- Text and HTML rendering of messages, with/without external resources
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(tracking images).
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- Threading, including muting threads
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- Drag-and-drop for moving messages
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- Layout: top/bottom vs left/right, adjustable widths/heights
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- Keyboard shortcuts
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The webmail benefits from having access to the message database, allowing for
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new functionality that wouldn't be easy to implement with SMTP/IMAP4. For
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example, mox keeps track of REQUIRETLS support of MX hosts (mail servers) of
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recipient domains. The webmail show this information when composing a message,
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and can enable REQUIRETLS by default.
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See [webmail screenshots](../screenshots/#hdr-webmail).
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## Internationalized email
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Originally, email addresses were ASCII-only. An email address consists of a
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"localpart", an "@" and a domain name. Only ASCII was allowed in message
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headers. With internationalized email, localparts can be in UTF-8, domains can
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use internationalized domain names (IDN/IDNA: unicode names with both an UTF-8
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encoding, and an ASCII encoding for use in DNS with domains starting with
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"xn--"), and message headers are allowed to contain UTF-8 as well.
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With internationalized email, users of scripts not representable in ASCII can
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use their native scripts for their email addresses.
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Mox implements internationalized email.
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## Automatic account configuration
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To configure an email account in an email client, you typically need to specify:
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1. Email address and full name.
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2. Submission (SMTP) server address, port, TLS mode, username, password and
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authentication mechanism.
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3. IMAP4 server address, port, TLS mode, username, password and authentication
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mechanism.
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This can be cumbersome to configure manually. Email clients can choose from
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several autoconfiguration mechanisms to automatically find (some of) the right
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settings, given an email address:
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SRV DNS records
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: The domain of the email address is used for looking up DNS SRV records, which
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point to the submission (SMTP) and IMAP servers, ports (with implied TLS
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mode). Not specified: username, authentication mechanism. Only secure when used
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with DNSSEC. Mox prints SRV records to add for a domain.
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Thunderbird-style autoconfig
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: The domain of the email address is used for looking up an XML config file at
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`https://autoconfig.<domain>`, protected with WebPKI. The configuration file
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holds all settings. Mox serves autoconfig profiles on its webserver.
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Autodiscover-style autodiscovery
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: The domain of the email address is used to look up a SRV record that points
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to an PKIX-protected HTTPS webserver that serves an XML configuration file with
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all settings. Only secure when the SRV lookup is DNSSEC-protected. Mox serves
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autodiscover profiles on its webserver.
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Apple device management profile
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: A configuration file with all settings must be transferred to the device
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manually. Mox lets users download these profiles in the account web interface,
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and shows a QR code to easily download the profile.
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Even though email clients have many options to automatically find the correct
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settings, many still prefer to guess incorrect legacy settings.
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## ACME for automatic TLS
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A modern email server needs a PKIX TLS certificate for its own hostname, used
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for SMTP with STARTTLS. Each domain with a "mail" CNAME for IMAP4 and SMTP
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submission, with MTA-STS and with autoconfiguration needs three more
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PKIX/WebPKI TLS certificates. Manually preventing your email infrastructure
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from automatic periodic expiration is cumbersome, but [an
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option](../config/#cfg-mox-conf-Listeners-x-TLS-KeyCerts). With ACME, TLS
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certificates are retrieved and refreshed automatically.
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The quickstart sets mox up with ACME using Let's Encrypt. Other ACME providers
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can be [defined](../config/#cfg-mox-conf-ACME-x) and
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[configured](../config/#cfg-mox-conf-Listeners-x-TLS-ACME). Mox supports
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[external account binding](../config/#cfg-mox-conf-ACME-x-ExternalAccountBinding)
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(EAB) for ACME providers that require association with an existing non-ACME
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account. Mox also suggests DNS CAA records, explicitly allowlisting Certificate
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Authorities (CAs) allowed to sign certificates for a domain. Mox recommends CAA
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records that only allow the account ID that mox has registered, preventing
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potential MitM attempts.
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ACME is also used for TLS certificates for the webserver, see below.
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## Webserver
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Mox includes a configurable webserver. This may seem to add unnecessary
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complexity and functionality to an email server, but contemporary email already
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requires the complexity of an HTTP stack due to MTA-STS and automatic account
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configuration. Not to mention webmail and an admin web interface. Luckily, mox
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can build on the proven HTTP client and server stack of the Go standard
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library.
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Mox mostly adds configuration options for:
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- Redirections of [entire domains](../config/#cfg-domains-conf-WebDomainRedirects) or
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[paths](../config/#cfg-domains-conf-WebHandlers-dash-WebRedirect).
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- [Serving static files](../config/#cfg-domains-conf-WebHandlers-dash-WebStatic)
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from a directory, including optional directory listings.
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- [Forwarding/Reverse proxying](../config/#cfg-domains-conf-WebHandlers-dash-WebForward),
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including WebSocket connections.
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Incoming requests are handled by going through the list of configured handlers.
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The first matching handler takes care of the request, matching on:
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- Host
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- Path (regular expression)
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Handlers can specify additional behaviour:
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- Automatically redirect plain HTTP requests to HTTPS.
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- Automatically compress the response if it seems compressible (based on
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content-type). A compressed static files are kept in a fixed size cache.
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- Strip the matched path before serving static file or forwarding the request.
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- Add custom headers to the response.
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These settings can all be configued through the admin web interface.
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TLS certificates for configured domains are managed automatically if ACME is
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configured.
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You may be tempted to install mox on a server that already runs a webserver. It
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is possible to configure mox to work with an existing webserver, but it will
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complicate the configuration significantly: The mox configuration has to be
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modified for
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[autoconfig](../config/#cfg-mox-conf-Listeners-x-AutoconfigHTTPS-NonTLS) and
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[MTA-STS](../config/#cfg-mox-conf-Listeners-x-MTASTSHTTPS-NonTLS) and the
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existing webserver needs to be configured to forward. You will likely manage
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TLS certificates outside of mox and have to configure the paths to the [keys
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and certificates](../config/#cfg-mox-conf-Listeners-x-TLS-KeyCerts), and
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refresh them timely, restarting mox. Also see the `-existing-webserver` option
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in the [quickstart command](../commands/#hdr-mox-quickstart).
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## Localserve
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|
2024-03-17 09:58:02 +03:00
|
|
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The [mox localserve](../commands/#hdr-mox-localserve) command starts a local mox
|
2024-01-10 18:48:53 +03:00
|
|
|
instance with a lot of its functionality: SMTP/submission, IMAP4, Webmail,
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account and admin web interface and the webserver. Localserve listens on the
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standard ports + 1000, so no special privileges are needed.
|
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|
Localserve is useful for testing the email functionality of your application:
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Localserve can accept all email (catchall), optionally return
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temporary/permanent errors, and you can read messages in the webmail.
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|
|
Localserve enables "pedantic mode", raising errors for non-standard protocol
|
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|
behaviour.
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|
## Admin web interface
|
|
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|
|
The admin web interface helps admins set up accounts, configure addresses, and
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|
set up new domains (with instructions to create DNS records, and with a check
|
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|
|
to see if they are correct). Changes made through the admin web interface
|
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|
|
updates the [domains.conf config file](../config/#hdr-domains-conf).
|
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|
Received DMARC and TLS reports can be viewed, and cached MTA-STS policies
|
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listed.
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DMARC evaluations for outgoing DMARC reports, and SMTP (TLS) connection results
|
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|
|
for outgoing TLS reports can be viewed, and removed. Suppression lists for
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|
|
addresses for outgoing reports can be managed as well. Some domains don't
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accept reports at the addresses they configure, and send DSNs. The suppression
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|
list helps reduce operational noise.
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See [Admin web interface screenshots](../screenshots/#hdr-admin-web-interface).
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## Metrics and logging
|
|
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|
|
Mox provides [prometheus metrics](https://prometheus.io/docs/concepts/metric_types/)
|
|
|
|
for monitoring. A standard set of application metrics are exposed: Open file
|
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|
|
descriptors, memory/cpu usage, etc. Mox also exposes metrics specific to its
|
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|
|
internals. See the example
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|
|
[prometheus rules](https://github.com/mjl-/mox/blob/main/prometheus.rules) in
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|
the repository.
|
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|
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Mox has configurable log levels, per
|
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|
|
[functional package](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/mjl-/mox#section-directories).
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Mox logs in structured [logfmt](https://brandur.org/logfmt) format, which is
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|
easy to work with (parse, filter, derive metrics from). Mox also includes three
|
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|
|
trace-level logs, for SMTP and IMAP4: trace, traceauth (logs sensitive
|
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|
|
authentication data, like passwords), tracedata (logs (bulk) message content).
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|
|
## Security
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
Mox aims to be a secure mail server. Many email-security features have been
|
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|
|
implemented. Mox comes with a automated test suite, which includes fuzzing. Mox
|
|
|
|
is written in Go, a modern safer programming language that prevents whole
|
|
|
|
classes of bugs, or limits their impact.
|
|
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## Reusable components
|
|
|
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|
|
Most non-server Go packages mox consists of are written to be reusable Go
|
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|
|
packages.
|
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|
|
There is no guarantee that there will be no breaking changes. With Go's
|
|
|
|
dependency versioning approach (minimal version selection), Go code will never
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|
|
unexpectedly stop compiling. Incompatibilities will show when explicitly
|
|
|
|
updating a dependency. Making the required changes is typically fairly
|
|
|
|
straightforward.
|
|
|
|
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|
|
Incompatible changes compared to previous releases are tracked in the git
|
|
|
|
repository, see [apidiff/](https://github.com/mjl-/mox/tree/main/apidiff).
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