2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
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package main
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import (
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"time"
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2023-02-27 16:12:58 +03:00
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/dmarcdb"
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2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/dns"
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2023-02-27 16:12:58 +03:00
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/http"
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/imapserver"
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2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/mlog"
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/mox-"
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2023-02-27 16:12:58 +03:00
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/mtastsdb"
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/queue"
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/smtpserver"
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2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/store"
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2023-02-27 16:12:58 +03:00
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/tlsrptdb"
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implement outgoing tls reports
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
2023-11-09 19:40:46 +03:00
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/tlsrptsend"
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2023-01-30 16:27:06 +03:00
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)
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2023-12-05 15:35:58 +03:00
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func shutdown(log mlog.Log) {
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2023-03-12 12:38:02 +03:00
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// We indicate we are shutting down. Causes new connections and new SMTP commands
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// to be rejected. Should stop active connections pretty quickly.
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mox.ShutdownCancel()
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// Now we are going to wait for all connections to be gone, up to a timeout.
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done := mox.Connections.Done()
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second := time.Tick(time.Second)
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select {
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case <-done:
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log.Print("connections shutdown, waiting until 1 second passed")
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<-second
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case <-time.Tick(3 * time.Second):
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// We now cancel all pending operations, and set an immediate deadline on sockets.
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// Should get us a clean shutdown relatively quickly.
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mox.ContextCancel()
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mox.Connections.Shutdown()
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second := time.Tick(time.Second)
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select {
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case <-done:
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log.Print("no more connections, shutdown is clean, waiting until 1 second passed")
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<-second // Still wait for second, giving processes like imports a chance to clean up.
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case <-second:
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log.Print("shutting down with pending sockets")
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}
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}
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err := os.Remove(mox.DataDirPath("ctl"))
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log.Check(err, "removing ctl unix domain socket during shutdown")
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}
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2023-02-27 16:12:58 +03:00
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// start initializes all packages, starts all listeners and the switchboard
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// goroutine, then returns.
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implement outgoing tls reports
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
2023-11-09 19:40:46 +03:00
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func start(mtastsdbRefresher, sendDMARCReports, sendTLSReports, skipForkExec bool) error {
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2023-02-27 16:12:58 +03:00
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smtpserver.Listen()
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imapserver.Listen()
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http.Listen()
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if !skipForkExec {
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// If we were just launched as root, fork and exec as unprivileged user, handing
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// over the bound sockets to the new process. We'll get to this same code path
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// again, skipping this if block, continuing below with the actual serving.
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if os.Getuid() == 0 {
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mox.ForkExecUnprivileged()
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panic("cannot happen")
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} else {
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2023-05-31 15:09:53 +03:00
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mox.CleanupPassedFiles()
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2023-02-27 16:12:58 +03:00
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}
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}
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if err := mtastsdb.Init(mtastsdbRefresher); err != nil {
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2024-05-10 15:44:37 +03:00
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return fmt.Errorf("mtastsdb init: %s", err)
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2023-02-27 16:12:58 +03:00
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}
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if err := tlsrptdb.Init(); err != nil {
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2024-05-10 15:44:37 +03:00
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return fmt.Errorf("tlsrptdb init: %s", err)
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}
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if err := dmarcdb.Init(); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("dmarcdb init: %s", err)
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2023-02-27 16:12:58 +03:00
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}
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implement tls client certificate authentication
the imap & smtp servers now allow logging in with tls client authentication and
the "external" sasl authentication mechanism. email clients like thunderbird,
fairemail, k9, macos mail implement it. this seems to be the most secure among
the authentication mechanism commonly implemented by clients. a useful property
is that an account can have a separate tls public key for each device/email
client. with tls client cert auth, authentication is also bound to the tls
connection. a mitm cannot pass the credentials on to another tls connection,
similar to scram-*-plus. though part of scram-*-plus is that clients verify
that the server knows the client credentials.
for tls client auth with imap, we send a "preauth" untagged message by default.
that puts the connection in authenticated state. given the imap connection
state machine, further authentication commands are not allowed. some clients
don't recognize the preauth message, and try to authenticate anyway, which
fails. a tls public key has a config option to disable preauth, keeping new
connections in unauthenticated state, to work with such email clients.
for smtp (submission), we don't require an explicit auth command.
both for imap and smtp, we allow a client to authenticate with another
mechanism than "external". in that case, credentials are verified, and have to
be for the same account as the tls client auth, but the adress can be another
one than the login address configured with the tls public key.
only the public key is used to identify the account that is authenticating. we
ignore the rest of the certificate. expiration dates, names, constraints, etc
are not verified. no certificate authorities are involved.
users can upload their own (minimal) certificate. the account web interface
shows openssl commands you can run to generate a private key, minimal cert, and
a p12 file (the format that email clients seem to like...) containing both
private key and certificate.
the imapclient & smtpclient packages can now also use tls client auth. and so
does "mox sendmail", either with a pem file with private key and certificate,
or with just an ed25519 private key.
there are new subcommands "mox config tlspubkey ..." for
adding/removing/listing tls public keys from the cli, by the admin.
2024-12-06 00:41:49 +03:00
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if err := store.Init(mox.Context); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("store init: %s", err)
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}
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2024-04-28 23:48:51 +03:00
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done := make(chan struct{}) // Goroutines for messages and webhooks, and cleaners.
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2023-02-27 16:12:58 +03:00
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if err := queue.Start(dns.StrictResolver{Pkg: "queue"}, done); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("queue start: %s", err)
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}
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2023-11-01 19:55:40 +03:00
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if sendDMARCReports {
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dmarcdb.Start(dns.StrictResolver{Pkg: "dmarcdb"})
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}
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implement outgoing tls reports
we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now
we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for
outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the
reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these
reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about
STARTTLS-related failures.
sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting
NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf.
only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the
TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy
for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are
typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT
policies.
config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing
installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for
new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin
pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're
requesting TLS reports about your MX host.
gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go
throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code
had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect
reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE
verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be
ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of
mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
2023-11-09 19:40:46 +03:00
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if sendTLSReports {
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tlsrptsend.Start(dns.StrictResolver{Pkg: "tlsrptsend"})
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}
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2023-02-27 16:12:58 +03:00
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store.StartAuthCache()
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smtpserver.Serve()
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imapserver.Serve()
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http.Serve()
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go func() {
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2023-08-08 00:14:31 +03:00
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store.Switchboard()
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<-make(chan struct{})
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2023-02-27 16:12:58 +03:00
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}()
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return nil
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}
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