mox/serve.go

113 lines
3 KiB
Go
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package main
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"time"
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/dmarcdb"
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/dns"
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/http"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/imapserver"
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/mlog"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/mox-"
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/mtastsdb"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/queue"
"github.com/mjl-/mox/smtpserver"
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/store"
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/tlsrptdb"
implement outgoing tls reports we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about STARTTLS-related failures. sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf. only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT policies. config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're requesting TLS reports about your MX host. gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
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"github.com/mjl-/mox/tlsrptsend"
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)
func shutdown(log mlog.Log) {
// We indicate we are shutting down. Causes new connections and new SMTP commands
// to be rejected. Should stop active connections pretty quickly.
mox.ShutdownCancel()
// Now we are going to wait for all connections to be gone, up to a timeout.
done := mox.Connections.Done()
second := time.Tick(time.Second)
select {
case <-done:
log.Print("connections shutdown, waiting until 1 second passed")
<-second
case <-time.Tick(3 * time.Second):
// We now cancel all pending operations, and set an immediate deadline on sockets.
// Should get us a clean shutdown relatively quickly.
mox.ContextCancel()
mox.Connections.Shutdown()
second := time.Tick(time.Second)
select {
case <-done:
log.Print("no more connections, shutdown is clean, waiting until 1 second passed")
<-second // Still wait for second, giving processes like imports a chance to clean up.
case <-second:
log.Print("shutting down with pending sockets")
}
}
err := os.Remove(mox.DataDirPath("ctl"))
log.Check(err, "removing ctl unix domain socket during shutdown")
}
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// start initializes all packages, starts all listeners and the switchboard
// goroutine, then returns.
implement outgoing tls reports we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about STARTTLS-related failures. sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf. only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT policies. config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're requesting TLS reports about your MX host. gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
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func start(mtastsdbRefresher, sendDMARCReports, sendTLSReports, skipForkExec bool) error {
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smtpserver.Listen()
imapserver.Listen()
http.Listen()
if !skipForkExec {
// If we were just launched as root, fork and exec as unprivileged user, handing
// over the bound sockets to the new process. We'll get to this same code path
// again, skipping this if block, continuing below with the actual serving.
if os.Getuid() == 0 {
mox.ForkExecUnprivileged()
panic("cannot happen")
} else {
mox.CleanupPassedFiles()
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}
}
if err := mtastsdb.Init(mtastsdbRefresher); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("mtastsdb init: %s", err)
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}
if err := tlsrptdb.Init(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tlsrptdb init: %s", err)
}
if err := dmarcdb.Init(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dmarcdb init: %s", err)
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}
implement tls client certificate authentication the imap & smtp servers now allow logging in with tls client authentication and the "external" sasl authentication mechanism. email clients like thunderbird, fairemail, k9, macos mail implement it. this seems to be the most secure among the authentication mechanism commonly implemented by clients. a useful property is that an account can have a separate tls public key for each device/email client. with tls client cert auth, authentication is also bound to the tls connection. a mitm cannot pass the credentials on to another tls connection, similar to scram-*-plus. though part of scram-*-plus is that clients verify that the server knows the client credentials. for tls client auth with imap, we send a "preauth" untagged message by default. that puts the connection in authenticated state. given the imap connection state machine, further authentication commands are not allowed. some clients don't recognize the preauth message, and try to authenticate anyway, which fails. a tls public key has a config option to disable preauth, keeping new connections in unauthenticated state, to work with such email clients. for smtp (submission), we don't require an explicit auth command. both for imap and smtp, we allow a client to authenticate with another mechanism than "external". in that case, credentials are verified, and have to be for the same account as the tls client auth, but the adress can be another one than the login address configured with the tls public key. only the public key is used to identify the account that is authenticating. we ignore the rest of the certificate. expiration dates, names, constraints, etc are not verified. no certificate authorities are involved. users can upload their own (minimal) certificate. the account web interface shows openssl commands you can run to generate a private key, minimal cert, and a p12 file (the format that email clients seem to like...) containing both private key and certificate. the imapclient & smtpclient packages can now also use tls client auth. and so does "mox sendmail", either with a pem file with private key and certificate, or with just an ed25519 private key. there are new subcommands "mox config tlspubkey ..." for adding/removing/listing tls public keys from the cli, by the admin.
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if err := store.Init(mox.Context); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("store init: %s", err)
}
done := make(chan struct{}) // Goroutines for messages and webhooks, and cleaners.
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if err := queue.Start(dns.StrictResolver{Pkg: "queue"}, done); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("queue start: %s", err)
}
if sendDMARCReports {
dmarcdb.Start(dns.StrictResolver{Pkg: "dmarcdb"})
}
implement outgoing tls reports we were already accepting, processing and displaying incoming tls reports. now we start tracking TLS connection and security-policy-related errors for outgoing message deliveries as well. we send reports once a day, to the reporting addresses specified in TLSRPT records (rua) of a policy domain. these reports are about MTA-STS policies and/or DANE policies, and about STARTTLS-related failures. sending reports is enabled by default, but can be disabled through setting NoOutgoingTLSReports in mox.conf. only at the end of the implementation process came the realization that the TLSRPT policy domain for DANE (MX) hosts are separate from the TLSRPT policy for the recipient domain, and that MTA-STS and DANE TLS/policy results are typically delivered in separate reports. so MX hosts need their own TLSRPT policies. config for the per-host TLSRPT policy should be added to mox.conf for existing installs, in field HostTLSRPT. it is automatically configured by quickstart for new installs. with a HostTLSRPT config, the "dns records" and "dns check" admin pages now suggest the per-host TLSRPT record. by creating that record, you're requesting TLS reports about your MX host. gathering all the TLS/policy results is somewhat tricky. the tentacles go throughout the code. the positive result is that the TLS/policy-related code had to be cleaned up a bit. for example, the smtpclient TLS modes now reflect reality better, with independent settings about whether PKIX and/or DANE verification has to be done, and/or whether verification errors have to be ignored (e.g. for tls-required: no header). also, cached mtasts policies of mode "none" are now cleaned up once the MTA-STS DNS record goes away.
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if sendTLSReports {
tlsrptsend.Start(dns.StrictResolver{Pkg: "tlsrptsend"})
}
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store.StartAuthCache()
smtpserver.Serve()
imapserver.Serve()
http.Serve()
go func() {
store.Switchboard()
<-make(chan struct{})
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}()
return nil
}