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Changing the email address before any email address is activated should be subject to a different rate limit than the normal activation email resending. If there's only one rate limit for both, then if a newly signed up quickly discovers they gave a wrong email address, they'd have to wait three minutes to change it. With the two separate limits, they don't - but they'll have to wait three minutes before they can change the email address again. The downside of this setup is that a malicious actor can alternate between resending and changing the email address (to something like `user+$idx@domain`, delivered to the same inbox) to effectively halving the rate limit. I do not think there's a better solution, and this feels like such a small attack surface that I'd deem it acceptable. The way the code works after this change is that `ActivatePost` will now check the `MailChangeLimit_user` key rather than `MailResendLimit_user`, and if we're within the limit, it will set `MailChangedJustNow_user`. The `Activate` method - which sends the activation email, whether it is a normal resend, or one following an email change - will check `MailChangedJustNow_user`, and if it is set, it will check the rate limit against `MailChangedLimit_user`, otherwise against `MailResendLimit_user`, and then will delete the `MailChangedJustNow_user` key from the cache. Fixes #2040. Signed-off-by: Gergely Nagy <forgejo@gergo.csillger.hu> |
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admin | ||
auth | ||
devtest | ||
events | ||
explore | ||
feed | ||
healthcheck | ||
misc | ||
org | ||
repo | ||
shared | ||
user | ||
base.go | ||
githttp.go | ||
goget.go | ||
home.go | ||
metrics.go | ||
nodeinfo.go | ||
swagger_json.go | ||
web.go | ||
webfinger.go |